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Abstract

When we are confronted with vulnerable people, with those groups and individuals
who are impaired with respect to their ability to function as the rational, autonomous
and moral agents that we typically take humans to be, we are encouraged to invoke
notions of rights, and in particular notions of human rights, in order to secure their
care and protection. Such an approach seeks not simply to reinforce the view that
vulnerable people are the moral equivalents of us all and thus are entitled to an equal
moral consideration, but also this approach recognises that to be vulnerable is often
to be unable to assert and secure a standard of existence we think appropriate for all
humans to enjoy. And whilst human rights may be regarded as having a variety of
roles or purposes, nevertheless, the care and protection function, what I refer to as
the task of moral rescue, is somehow crucial to the concept. Any notion of human
rights that failed to offer protection to those in danger or to those at risk of harm or
neglect or abuse, no matter what other benefits it promised or conferred, would be
seen as both morally negligent and intellectually impoverished.

Yet in this thesis I assert that human rights have largely failed those who are
vulnerable and in particular they have often failed those who are especially
vulnerable. This failure of human rights is predicated upon three factors. First,
human rights are based upon a view of the individual as a rational, autonomous,
independent moral agent who at all times identifies and asserts her own best
interests. In this thesis I suggest that such a view is misleading. In particular it fails
to acknowledge that what often defines the vulnerable, and particularly those who are
especially vulnerable, is their inability to act from a rationally, reflective agency.
Second, human rights fail to address the different sorts of social and political contexts
within which vulnerable people often find themselves. The world of the vulnerable is
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frequently one of disempowerment, dependency and marginalisation, and this is
particularly so with regard to those vulnerable I have identified within the course of
this thesis; the frail aged within this country’s residential aged care facilities, many of
whom suffer from dementia, and the chronically mentally ill. Finally, within human
rights the emphasis has typically been upon the rights the vulnerable possess and
has neglected the duties and obligations that relevant agents owe the vulnerable.

In this thesis I assert that the only way to engage the human rights of the vulnerable,
in fact the only way to ‘operationalise’ human rights, is by a strong commitment to
duty. In a society so consistently defined by rights, notions of duty all too often
appear to be sidelined, yet it is only by an emphasis upon the duties and obligations
of caregivers, whoever we take such caregivers to be (doctors, psychiatrists,
psychologists, social workers, nurses, policy makers and bureaucrats), that human
rights can be engaged and vulnerable people protected. Thus I argue for a notion of
the duties and obligations of caregivers as a mean of enacting the human rights that
all persons are said to possess.

My emphasis in this work is upon those whose vulnerability is extreme. This does
not diminish its importance. Increasingly in the West, with the advancing incidence of
chronic neurodegenerative disorders such as the dementias, we are forced to
confront extreme vulnerability. How we engage such persons is crucial to the sorts
of lives they lead and is crucial also to the sorts of people we become. We all begin
life in an extreme state of vulnerability and there are many times throughout the
course of our existence when we may be severely compromised, if only for brief
periods. For those of us who suffer from dementia or chronic mental illness, our
vulnerability will be persistent and permanent. Thus this perspective recognises that
the vulnerable are not a group of people set apart from the rest of us. In many ways
it is we who are the vulnerable.
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Introduction

In this thesis I argue that our current approach of seeking to protect vulnerable
people by emphasising the human rights that individuals are entitled to is flawed.
Much of the moral force of human rights is directed toward the care and protection of
the vulnerable, and indeed the concept can be considered a philosophy of rescue for
vulnerable groups and individuals – yet in this task it has consistently failed. This
failure is due to three interrelated reasons. First, because an emphasis upon rights
fundamentally misinterprets the sorts of beings that vulnerable humans are. Second,
because such an emphasis fails to account for the sorts of situations and locations in
which vulnerable individuals find themselves and through which they operate and
engage others. Third, because within human rights the emphasis has typically been
upon the rights of the individual, at the expense of duties and obligations which may
be owed by others. In order to effectively engage human rights, and so offer security
and protection for vulnerable people, I present an argument located within the
concepts of duties or obligations. This argument derives not from the rights
paradigm itself, rather, it reflects features of both virtue theory and Christian theology.
In addition it also based upon what I refer to as ‘the narrative of everyday lives’, that
is the characteristic way in which humans typically engage each other from the
perspective of everyday moral discourse.

The context within which I place this argument is through a discussion of
vulnerability. By using the term ‘vulnerable’ I am identifying those groups and
individuals who are unable to act in order to secure their own best interests. This
raises a well worn argument about ‘true’ interests and ‘false’ interests to be sure –
but it also suggests that in order to identify and secure one’s interests one must be
the sort of person who is able to act and engage others in a particular sort of way.
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The sort of person who is capable of asserting and securing her interests is one who
we typically recognise as a rational, autonomous and moral agent – independent,
confident, self assured, assertive and reflective. To be able to identify, assert and
realise our interests is a crucial part of being a fully developed person. For those
whose capacity to act in this way is either diminished or absent, or indeed for those
who are prevented from engaging in such typically human action, I apply the term
‘vulnerable’. Vulnerable people, as I define them, are those who are either incapable
of acting out of a rational, reflective and autonomous agency or else they are those
who are prevented from doing so.

As I have argued elsewhere, a central theme within the concept of human rights is
the protection of vulnerable people.1 In chapter four, Vulnerability and the Promise of
Rights, I acknowledge that there is more to human rights than the security of the
vulnerable, yet it is clear that the ‘care and protection’ function is of fundamental
importance. Some have tended to be absolutist about human rights, presenting the
concept both as a supreme ethical position which in some way supersedes all other
ethical discussion and to see the role and purpose of rights as being only ever the
protection of the vulnerable. For example Baxi writes that ‘never before have the
languages of human rights sought to supplant all other ethical languages’, and he
describes the ‘historic mission’ of human rights as ‘to give voice to human suffering,
to make it visible and to ameliorate it.’2 Such assertions are uncalled for and display
more rhetoric than thoughtful analysis, yet they do reflect the importance of human
rights as a vehicle whose purpose is in no small way to protect those who cannot
protect themselves. In this regard and to this end human rights can be understood

1

Anthony P. Butcher, ‘Human Rights and the Vulnerable in our Midst’, Quadrant, January-February
2001, pp 24-27.
2
Upendra Baxi, ‘Voices of Suffering, Fragmented Universality, and the Future of Human Rights’ in.
Burns H. Weston and Stephen P. Marks, [eds] The Future of International Human Rights, New York,
Transnational, 1999, p 101.
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as normative moral claims often made by those who are vulnerable or by others on
their behalf. When used in this way they seek to minimise the disadvantages (either
personal, structural or situational) that confront vulnerable groups and individuals.
Within this context the notion of human rights is seen as establishing some basic
degree of care and protection for those people who are unable to secure, by their
own efforts, an appropriate minimum standard of existence that we think all humans
ought to enjoy. In such cases human rights are seen first, as establishing some
basic level of access to goods and services for those who may be marginalised or in
some way excluded from the social and political process, and second, as protecting
the weak and powerless from others (institutions, organizations and individuals) who
would do them harm.

It has, however, become increasingly apparent that an approach emphasising
individual rights has consistently failed to protect the vulnerable. Whether these
vulnerable are children, refugees, the homeless, the disabled, the frail aged or the
mentally ill, it has become evident that the emphasis upon an individual’s rights are
often irrelevant to their best interests, and as I have again argued elsewhere with
respect to the mentally ill, it is potentially corrosive of their well-being.3 And if the
practice of ascribing rights to vulnerable people has been unable to offer them any
effective protection then we are entitled to be sceptical of this practice in its entirety.
That is because the vulnerable are not a group that is in some way separate and
distinct from the rest of us. Indeed it is we who are the vulnerable. Many of us are
vulnerable in the present, most of us will be vulnerable at some time in the future and
all of us have been vulnerable in the past. If the one thing that human rights cannot

3

Anthony P. Butcher, ‘The Relative Irrelevance of Human Rights for the Care and Protection of the
Mentally Ill’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol.35, No.1, 2000, pp 85-97. As part of my
argument in this paper I maintain that once having ascribed rights to vulnerable people we tend to
assume that we have done all that is necessary to care and protect – without realising that there is a vast
difference between having rights in law and enjoying rights in reality.
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do is to offer security and protection to people when they are vulnerable – when they
are at risk of harm, or abuse, or violence, or neglect – then, arguably, and at least in
the current application of the concept, it has failed us all.

There is of course a good deal of prima facie evidence that encourages us to be
cynical about human rights as an effective form of moral rescue. For example, much
of the recent history of psychiatry in Australia has revolved around the failure of the
discipline to adequately protect those mentally ill individuals who have come into its
care. Despite various appeals in both law and morals to ‘patients’ rights’, which are
either contained within ethical professional statements or embedded within various
mental health acts at both state and territory level, the recent history of the discipline
is clouded by revelations of abuse and neglect of the mentally ill – and most often at
the hands of those responsible for their care and protection.4 This abuse and
neglect, as I point out in chapters four and five, has ranged from the failure of mental
health services to respond to the needs of mentally ill persons [neglect], to physical
and sometimes sexual assaults on the mentally ill by those charged with their care
[abuse]. In some instances this abuse has led to the deaths of patients which mental
health professionals have, it often appears, been at some pains to cover up.

A similar comment could be made with respect to the aged in this country’s
residential aged care facilities. Notions of ‘residents’ rights’ emerged against a
backdrop of some horrific stories of the maltreatment of frail and elderly persons in
institutional care during the early and middle years of the 1980s. Despite a much
publicised commitment to the rights of the aged in residential facilities over recent

4

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Human Rights and Mental Illness: Report of the
National Inquiry into the Human Rights of People with Mental Illness, Canberra, AGPS, 1993.
Generally I refer to this as the Burdekin Report, named after the then Federal Human Rights
Commissioner, Brian Burdekin, who headed the Inquiry and the Report. Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission, Human Rights and Mental Illness: Report of the Reconvened Inquiry into the
Human Rights of People with Mental Illness (Victoria). Canberra, AGPS, 1995.
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years by, in particular, the federal government, numerous stories continue within the
media that the frail aged are as a group, neglected, exploited and ill-treated. Stories
abound of substandard facilities and untrained staff delivering ‘care’ that placed
residents’ well being and even lives at risk, as well as rather more brutal reports of
the frail aged being subjected to assaults (and some reported sexual assaults) by
those who (again) were the very people charged with their care and protection.5 And
whilst the Commonwealth has responded with a whole platform of ‘residents’ rights’,
intentionally grafted onto human rights concepts and statements, professionals within
the industry, particularly doctors, nurses and old age psychiatrists, remain uniformly
unimpressed. In like fashion I refer to these developments in chapters four and five
of this thesis.

Of course we need not limit ourselves to simply a consideration of the frail aged or
the mentally ill. Over the past two years in Australia we have witnessed the
increasingly distressing spectacle of asylum seekers and refugees (men, women and
children) being detained in camps, for months and sometimes for years, whilst the
long and drawn out process of their ‘assessment’ for legitimate and entitled entry into
this country is determined. As the former federal Human Rights Commissioner, Chris
Sidoti, has made clear, such detaining is in direct contravention of various articles of
international human rights law of which Australia is a signatory, yet such law has
been powerless to change the government’s position.6 And despite acknowledged
research by health professionals of the distress and anxiety suffered by those

5

For recent examples see: The Canberra Times, ‘Abuses at ACT nursing homes’, 3rd March 2000;
The Canberra Times, ‘Cloud over ACT nursing home: Magistrate critics hiring of sex offender’, 17th
March 2000; The Canberra Times, ‘Nursing-home patient “almost as bad” as POW’, 5th October 2000;
The Australian, ‘Reforms fail dementia victims’, 17th May 2001; Herald Sun, ‘17 aged care homes fail
checks’, 24th June 2002.
6
Chris Sidoti, ‘Immigration detention: a question of human rights’, Reform, Issue 75, 1999, pp 36-40;
Chris Sidoti, ‘Refugee policy: is there a way out of this mess?’, Dialogue 21, Academy of the Social
Science, January 2002, pp 28- 41. See also ‘Human Rights and Immigration Detention in Australia’
Report of Justice P. N. Bhagwati, Regional Advisor for Asia and the Pacific of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mission to Australia, 24th May to 2nd June 2002.
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detained and resultant evidence of depression, post traumatic stress disorder,
attempts at suicide and self harming behaviour,7 the government’s resolve has stood
firm. Cries of ‘human rights’ have made little impact upon a political strategy that
has, it seems, much support in the wider community.

In addition to the above we might also refer to the practice of the mandatory
sentencing of young people and adults who have been convicted of certain property
offences. Such provisions, often portrayed as unjustly discriminating against
Australia’s indigenous population, were introduced into Northern Territory and
Western Australian law in 1996 amid a good deal of criticism from the legal
profession, indigenous advocacy groups and international human rights
organizations. Yet despite widespread argument that these measures were in
contravention (again) of a large body of international human rights law that Australia
was (again) signatory to, the concept of human rights was powerless to protect those
who sought sanctuary beneath its moral umbrella.8 The issues I have referred to
above are local in nature, yet any brief or cursory observation of international politics
would no doubt reveal many more instances where human rights have apparently
been unable to secure the care and protection of ‘at risk’ peoples. Indeed it often
seems as if human rights, rather than actually protecting vulnerable people, are
mostly consigned to endless reports, conventions, international conferences and
commissions of inquiry which are engaged well after murder and abuse have been
committed and the perpetrators long gone. Human rights may generate much
academic discourse and verbose pretentious baring of souls on appropriate

7

Zachary Steel and Derrick M. Silove, ‘The Mental Health Implications of Detaining Asylum
Seekers’, Medical Journal of Australia, 2001, 175, pp 596-599; Aamer Sultan and Kevin O’Sullivan,
‘Psychological disturbances in asylum seekers held in long term detention: a participant-observer
account’, Medical Journal of Australia, 2001, 175, pp 593-596.
8
Chris Cunneen, ‘Mandatory Sentencing and Human Rights’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice,
Vol.13, No.3, March 2002, pp 322-327.
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international forums, but with respect to the care and protection of vulnerable peoples
it is a philosophy that has, in the main, been spectacularly unsuccessful.

At this point I should make clear that my opposition in this thesis is not to the notion
of rights per se – either legal or moral. Indeed as I will make mention throughout,
and address in some detail in the final chapter, my intention is to give force and
authority to notions of rights which (I assert) can only be done through a
countervailing commitment to duty and obligation. I would make clear at this early
stage that I have no intention of replacing the rights paradigm with a duties paradigm.
My aim is not to supplant the idea of rights, whether moral rights in general or human
rights in particular. My intention is to supplement the idea of human rights or, to be
more precise, it is to engage or operationalise human rights. My assertion is that in
order to make human rights relevant, or effective, or accessible for vulnerable people
then we are necessarily drawn toward notions of duty and obligation – the duties and
obligations that we have toward the vulnerable.

Further, I am not suggesting that human rights have necessarily and in all cases
failed to achieve their ends of protecting and securing advantage for all vulnerable
people everywhere. For example Justice Michael Kirby recently outlined the role
played both by the International Labour Organization as well as various mechanisms
(state and federal courts and commissions of arbitration) in Australia charged with
resolving disputes and conflict within the area of industrial relations. Kirby sees a
nexus between the work of such organizations and the furtherance of social justice
principles and broader principles of human rights, and he cites areas such as; child
labour laws, workers’ rights and entitlements, the notion of equal work for equal value
(regardless of gender), the securing of the rights of trade unions and equal pay for
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Aboriginal workers, as amongst those areas that have shown the success of the
human rights paradigm.9

On the surface Kirby’s argument appears plausible but it does gloss over a number
of issues specifically related to the role and influence of the rights paradigm. For a
start, trade unions and workers in general can hardly be seen as examples of
profound vulnerability. It is not that they are not vulnerable – surely it is an
awareness of their own vulnerability that encourages them to band together to further
their economic and social ends – but their vulnerability is not of the same order as
those whom I am interested in within this thesis. Their vulnerability is not as
profound as that which confronts the mentally ill or the frail aged, many of whom may
suffer from some degree of cognitive impairment. Such association of workers are
often well organised and powerful and have a great deal of access not simply to
financial (and thus legal) resources but also to political decision makers, and their
ability to engage and involve the media likewise gives them opportunity to further
their aims. A similar point could be made with respect to Aboriginal workers whose
cause has often been embraced by some powerful and influential forces on the left,
particularly left wing unions and elements within the Australian Labour Party.
Certainly young children can be seen as vulnerable in the way that I use that term in
this thesis, but the issue in this regard appears to be how much of the way we treat
young children with respect to child labour is due to human rights and how much is
due to our ethical objection to past practices – an objection we would have had even
if we had no notion of human rights?

9

Michael Kirby, ‘Human Rights and Industrial Relations’, The Kingsley Laffer Industrial Relations
Memorial Lecture, University of Sydney, Tuesday 23rd April 2002. As stated previously, it is one thing
to have rights in law, it is another thing entirely to actually benefit from those rights. Kirby does not
expand on the point of when Aboriginal workers received equal pay, how many of them still retained
their jobs and how many were retrenched.
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To continue with my comment on Kirby’s paper we could ask: did ‘human rights’
enable Aboriginal workers in rural and outback Australia to receive a fair wage, or
was it the actions of the left and the very public battles Aboriginal activists had with
conservative state and federal governments and equally conservative employers? A
similar sort of point could be made about women’s right to equal pay for equal work
and the influence again of the left in conjunction with feminist groups, both of whom,
it may be argued, are well organised, politically astute and efficiently mobilised. Thus
we might ask, with respect to Kirby’s position, how do we know that the concept of
human rights has actually aided the groups in question? That is, how can we ‘factor
out’ the influences of political lobbying, legal challenge, popular sympathy, and the
threat of electoral damage, leaving only the measurable variable of ‘human rights’ –
which is ultimately given credit for being a major force in the move to social justice?
To assert that human rights is of benefit is one thing – to demonstrate it quite
another.

In this thesis I specifically target the mentally ill and the aged in residential aged care
facilities within Australia as two groups who not only do not have a voice, but when a
voice is raised, however weakly on their behalf, it is all too easily ignored or put to
one side. These two groups have no powerful friends or allies. They do not
demonstrate, they do not march, they do not assert and seldom claim and they most
certainly cannot bring electoral consequences to bear upon government. They are
so often marginalised or excluded from participation in political debate. These
groups are the vulnerable par excellence and for them human rights have mostly
failed. In this thesis I maintain that the likelihood that human rights will fail the
vulnerable is in direct proportion to the degree of vulnerability such groups
demonstrate. The more vulnerable groups are, the more powerless, marginalised
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and invisible they are, then the more likely it is that human rights will be largely
irrelevant.10

I have cited Kirby’s report at this early stage for it provides a focus for the different
sorts of rights that people may be said to possess and encourages us to think on the
mechanisms required by which people may enjoy their rights. Human rights are
presented as universal moral entitlements to which people may appeal in order to
achieve certain ends; just treatment, social equity, civil and political liberty, protection
against unfair harm or injury and so on. The urge amongst rights theorists, of which
Kirby is an example, is to have such rights encapsulated in law, the purpose of which
is to facilitate people’s enjoyment of their rights and to provide a mechanism of
appeal for rights owed but not recognised. Whether these rights are ‘claim rights’
(civil and political liberties) or ‘welfare rights’ (economic and social entitlements),
what is crucial is that the law establishes the right and enables people to take
advantage of its benefits. With both claim rights and welfare rights, what is required
from the state is legislative action supported by social structures and institutions to
facilitate people’s enjoyment of their rights.11 But what of rights to care and
protection – particularly when people are incapable of acting in their own interests
and require others to either act for them or treat them in particular ways? Who
speaks for those incapable of speaking for themselves? The problem with talking
about rights in the way Kirby does is that; first, we are not sure that it is human rights
that have actually provided the benefits (human rights as opposed to numerous other

10

Thus we have the ‘rights paradox’, which broadly states that human rights are a benefit only in direct
proportion to the other social, political, economic and legal influences a group can bring to bear in
support of its claims. The subtext is that it is not ‘human rights’ that are securing advantage, rather it is
these other variables and those groups who cannot muster these other variables will do very poorly
indeed. Anthony P. Butcher, ‘Human Rights and the Vulnerable in our Midst’, op cit. [f/n 1 at p 2]
11
Arguably of course much more is required than mere ‘structures and policy’. For example, we might
identify an orientation or active engagement by the state that human rights are the sorts of social and
ethical goods which are the reasonable and justifiable entitlements of each and every individual. This
may require the state to actively validate notions of rights on a philosophical - cognitive level – but
still, without ‘structures and policy’ such rights would be largely meaningless.
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variables); and second, that this view says nothing to those who cannot actively claim
or assert or demand, in other words it says nothing to those whose vulnerability is
profound.

The question thus arises; why has the philosophy of human rights failed the
vulnerable and, as suggested by my comments above, why is it that the more
intensely vulnerable people are the more likely it is that human rights will fail? The
answer is that human rights do not take into account the sorts of persons that
vulnerable humans are and thus, and as a consequence, they fail to appreciate the
degree of powerlessness and helplessness that often impacts upon vulnerable
people within the social locations wherein such people live their lives. Whilst the
rational, autonomous and moral agent who is intelligent, articulate and goal directed
and who is best able to identify and assert his own self interest is a powerful image at
the heart of the rights paradigm – such an image is an illusion. This rational
individual, this maker of claims, this claimer of rights, this independent moral agent is
a chimera at the heart of the Western liberal democratic tradition. He is more myth
than reality. This is not to say that humans are not capable of being rational,
autonomous and moral agents. Clearly they are. Neither am I denying that it is
man’s rational and moral capacity that sets him apart from other creatures and in fact
defines the sort of being that he is. Indeed I am quite prepared to accept that what is
unique within humankind, as a species, is its general capacity for rational (goal
directed and reflective) moral agency. Rather it is clear that despite our capacity for
autonomous, self determining agency there are numerous times in our existence
when we fall far short of that ideal and when we are particularly dependent on the
actions of others not only for our well being but also for our very survival. In such
instances human rights (claim rights, welfare rights or care and protection rights)
offer us little protection, few guarantees and no effective security. And it is when we
are at our most vulnerable that human rights are most likely to fail us.
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Instances of marked or profound vulnerability are not rare occasions within the
course of a human life. For example we begin life and spend our first dozen or so
years totally dependent for our continued existence on the care and protection of
others, most often our parents. Many of us who live into old age will in like fashion
find ourselves similarly dependent upon our fellows for an increasing range of
activities that we once competently undertook for ourselves. And even those of us
who suffer little or no illness or infirmity throughout our adult years will still experience
periods when our choices are constrained, our decision making ability compromised,
and our rational and assertive capacities reduced or at the very least under threat.
But what of those who can be described in some way as permanently vulnerable?
What of those who suffer from chronic and incapacitating mental illness, those with
dementia, with significant intellectual disabilities or those who are perfectly rational
yet suffer from severely debilitating physical impairments and depend for their day-today well being or even existence on the good offices of others? If the emphasis upon
individual rights cannot secure the well being of these people then it is clear that this
approach has both limited moral force and instrumental value. In such cases the
rights paradigm itself is called into question. What is required is a means of
engaging vulnerable people that acknowledges both what it means to be a vulnerable
person as well as reflects the sort of situations that vulnerable humans find
themselves in.

As stated previously I am not attempting to replace the rights paradigm by an
equivalent duties paradigm. My argument is that human rights have failed, in
particular those who are profoundly vulnerable, because, as stated above, they
cannot account for the sorts of lives that vulnerable people lead, nor for the sorts of
contexts within which such lives are played out, and because the notion of duties has
been increasingly discounted from the rights equation. But quite apart from these
fundamental shortcomings human rights have a variety of practical and theoretical
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difficulties. For example, there is little agreement about what goods are constitutive
of human rights, about how to negotiate between competing or conflicting rights,
about what to do when rights fail, or even, as stated previously, how we can
effectively demonstrate that the rights paradigm is instrumentally beneficial over and
above other possible explanations for social change. Further, rights tend to be vague
and open-ended and whilst duties are generally held to be correlative of rights, often
there is no clear way of identifying just who has the correlative duty, what that duty
entails, nor (and most importantly) is there any way to force people who have duties
correlative to rights to discharge those duties and be accountable for so doing. In
fact in our rush to embrace human rights rhetoric we have tended to abandon notions
of duty and obligation altogether. We may pay lip service to duty but we largely
ignore any precise definitive statements. Duties often appear to be optional. Yet,
and as I argue in the final chapter, the way to protect the vulnerable, to engage their
human rights, is by recourse to a robust ethos of duty. I do not deny that we can
(and do) conceptualise human beings as rights bearing creatures (whatever we take
this to mean and to encompass), but I do assert that the way to ensure that the
human rights of vulnerable people are protected is by an ethic of duty. If we wish to
operationalise any notion of rights first we must talk about duty. In the final chapter I
assert that in the mix of rights and duties (legal or moral) it is duties that are primary.
Duties are antecedent to rights. It is only by engaging duties that rights can have an
impact on the day to day lives of vulnerable people.

We may put the above dilemma in another way. Within the area of human rights
much debate is centred upon the question of whether or not humans can be
regarded as having such moral entitlements in the first place. Not all philosophers
have answered in the affirmative. Some, such as Alasdair MacIntyre for example,
are quite dismissive of the idea that fundamental moral entitlements accrue to people
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simply and for no other reason than they are people.12 However let us assume (for
arguments sake) that the question is settled and that humans do in fact possess such
fundamental and inalienable rights. The issue then becomes – to what purpose are
these rights directed? The answer is surely that they are in some way directed to the
betterment of human life. If this is the case then human rights are a means to an end
and not just an end in themselves. This suggests, and particularly if we acknowledge
the failure of the rights approach to care and protect those who are particularly
vulnerable, that there may be other means to the end we desire.

In this thesis I argue that the ‘other means’ lies with an emphasis upon duty. A
problem with the rights perspective is that we tend to focus first, upon whether or not
humans have rights; second, upon which particular philosophical justification is
appropriate to anchor the ownership of such rights to; and third, what social, political,
or economic goods can we describe as being part of the package of ‘human rights’.
But the final aspect of this perspective, and it is surely the most important although
(paradoxically) the least discussed is this: – how can we ensure that humans have an
effective means of enjoying the rights they have? It may be true that rights inspire
duties, but who owns these duties, and how (and this is most important) can we
ensure that these duties lead to the effective enjoyment of the individual’s rights? In
and of themselves human rights guarantee nothing. The only way to operationalise
rights is to talk about duties and until we can present some reasonably coherent
notion of duties grounded in a particular philosophy of moral engagement then
notions of rights are simply so much sterile assertion.

But what if (for arguments sake again) we all agree that humans have no
fundamental or inalienable rights. Does that mean we may treat others as the whim

12

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory, London, Duckworth, 1981, p 69; where he
likens the belief in human rights to a belief in witches and unicorns!
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takes us? Of course not. If there were no human rights we would still be faced with
the question of ‘how ought we treat others’ for this is the most important question that
any human can ask of herself. Theories of rights, as with theories of duties, only
have meaning and purpose to the extent that they enrich human lives. This much is
known, as I argue in chapter four, at the level of the street. When I discuss ‘human
rights and street level philosophy’ it is to emphasize that people embrace theories
and perspectives of rights in order to achieve some specific end. They seek to
realise the ‘promise’ that human rights offers. In general, people embrace human
rights in order to make their lives better and so we may be assured that if it became
more prudent and advantageous to abandon human rights than to embrace them
then, at the level of the street at least, human rights would be jettisoned overnight. At
the level of the street people often lead desperate lives, and so they embrace the
human rights paradigm in any of its many and varied forms essentially because it
holds out a hope of an enriched human life. Yet simply emphasising ‘rights’ provides
no guarantee that rights will emerge. The way to engage rights is thus (and again) to
talk about duties.

There are three interrelated themes which run through this thesis. First is the notion
of vulnerability. Second is the relationship between rights and vulnerability and third
is the concept of duties and obligations. In chapters one to three I discuss
vulnerability, first as a philosophical construct, next as a personal experience and
finally as a social and political interpretation. In chapters four and five I focus on the
idea of rights and in particular human rights. My interest is in moral rights rather than
legal rights and in human rights as an outgrowth of the natural law tradition of, in
particular, Hobbes and Locke. This is because of the impact such views have had
not only upon the construction of liberal democratic society but also upon the sort of
person who is a fit subject for such a society. In the last chapter I consider how a
notion of duties and obligations offers a more effective means of securing the best
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interests of the vulnerable than does a theory which emphasises individual rights. In
this thesis I take as examples of vulnerability the mentally ill and the frail aged within
this country’s residential care facilities, particularly those who suffer from dementia.
Although at times I refer to other groups or individuals who are vulnerable it is these
two populations that I employ, in general, as ‘metaphors of vulnerability.’

In chapter one, Vulnerability – Philosophical, I argue that one is vulnerable when
one’s ability to act as a rational, autonomous and moral agent with regard to the
securing of one’s own particular interests is in some way reduced or diminished or
impaired. Vulnerability in its usual sense suggests notions primarily of ‘harm’ or
‘danger’ or even of ‘loss’. Thus it is a loss (or lack) of capacity or ability that I am
identifying when I embrace the concept of vulnerability. If this is so then it is clear
that humans can be vulnerable in a variety of situations and to varying degrees. But
some forms of harm and some kinds of danger and some ways of experiencing loss
are more important than others. Some kinds of harm, for example, impair our very
ability to act as the rational reflective agents that we typically assume is characteristic
of being human. Some types of loss rob us of our capacity to act autonomously and
independently. When one’s ability to act in this way is impaired then I invoke the
notion of vulnerability. Another way of describing this position is to say that we all
have certain interests. Whilst interests can vary in their nature or function there are
some interests that are crucial in order for us to act as rational agents and without
which we could not be regarded as being a rational, independent actor or possessing
a moral agency in any meaningful sense of those terms. These interests I refer to as
‘first order interests’ and define them as the ability to act as rational, autonomous and
moral beings. It is from these first order interests that emerge our ability to engage in
characteristically human sorts of endeavours and so it is when these first order
interests are threatened or undermined or are in some way diminished (by either
personal incapacity or outside interference) that I invoke the notion of vulnerability.
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There are three features implicit in my view of vulnerability. First, as described
above, is the reduction or impairment of an individual to act as a rational,
autonomous and moral agent. Second, is that when we engage the concept of
vulnerability we are implying a relationship between those who are vulnerable and
others who stand in regard to them and have a duty or obligation to care and protect.
One of the main reasons we have for identifying some as vulnerable is to consider
how we ought to act towards them and this necessarily involves some form of
relationship whether this relationship is defined in legal or in moral terms. Therefore
in this chapter I consider also the sorts of relationships that exist between the
vulnerable and certain others who may be seen as holding a duty of care towards
them. Third, I argue that whatever the legal demands, there are good reasons for
seeing the relationship between the vulnerable and those who stand in regard to
them as crucially a moral relationship.

Beyond these considerations we may see vulnerability in either a strong or a weak
sense, as well as inhabiting a variety of dimensions. With regard to the first point it is
clear that not all people are vulnerable to the same degree. Some people can be
‘more or less’ vulnerable just as some can be ‘more or less’ rational, or ‘more or less’
autonomous, or ‘more or less’ independent, or ‘more or less’ reflective and so on. In
this thesis I am concerned primarily with vulnerability at its most extreme and the
failure of human rights to protect those individuals and groups who are particularly
vulnerable. With regard to the second point I acknowledge that not all are vulnerable
in the same way. We need to make distinctions between different sorts of
vulnerability. Thus I propose vulnerability as ‘transitory’, ‘episodic’ and ‘permanent’.
Whilst the type of vulnerability may vary this does not detract from its essential
feature and that is; to be vulnerable is to have one’s ability to act as a rational,
autonomous and moral agent in some way, and for some reason, impaired.
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In the second chapter, Vulnerability – Personal, I go beyond the philosophical outline
which sets the framework for talking about vulnerability and consider what it means
to be vulnerable from the personal, experiential perspective. In the first part of this
chapter I explore the difficult notion of ‘personhood’. To be a ‘person’, to display
‘personhood’, is often to be regarded as displaying a rational goal directed and self
reflective moral agency. Whilst this rationally centred definition of personhood is not
the only definition possible, it is fair to say that when we look for what is typically
indicative of human persons we look first for a rational and reflective moral agent.
And if these particular qualities are diminished or in some way under threat then
notions of what constitute a person seem also often to be under threat. In the first
part of this chapter therefore I discuss what we mean by the normal and everyday
use of terms such as ‘rational’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘moral’, that is, what is often and
typically regarded as the constituents of ‘personhood’.

But this is still not to appreciate the extent to which vulnerability represents a
personal and individual experience. In the second part of this chapter I want to
explore what we might reasonably identify as the lived reality of vulnerability. In
‘vulnerability and the personal encounter’ my focus is on the extent to which the
subjective reality of vulnerability diminishes those aspects of human existence that
we most usually take as being representative of a human life. That is I want to get
away from discussions about vulnerability in the abstract and explore what it means
to be vulnerable from the perspective not only of those who are vulnerable but also
from the perspectives of those who are closest to them. My focus in this regard is on
the experience of dementia – a metaphor for the vulnerable.

There are compelling arguments for introducing dementia as an example of
vulnerability. The various forms of dementia provide a powerful instance when our
ability to act as a rational, autonomous and moral agent is, to varying degrees,
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impaired and we are forced to rely on the care and protection of others. This is
vulnerability in its extreme sense – a far cry from the notion of those who may
engage the rights paradigm to identify and assert their interests. Moreover this
instance is not infrequently encountered by individuals within the context of the life
span. In the 21st century, dementia will become a major public health issue within
Western countries as the population inevitably ages. Alzheimer’s disease, the most
common form of dementia, currently affects between 55,000 and 144,000 Australians
and some 3.7 million people worldwide – a figure that is expected to double by the
year 2011.13 Thus the problem of dementia will confront not simply individual
sufferers and their families and carers but the whole community. Further, dementia
goes to the heart of notions of ‘personhood’, indeed dementia can be (and has often
been) described in terms of an erosion of personhood. In addition dementia
unavoidably introduces a focus on rights, whether these are described in terms of
‘the rights of the elderly’, or ‘the rights of dementia sufferers’, or ‘the rights of
residents in aged care facilities’, and so the focus is on how we perceive and act
toward those whose ability to care for themselves and to make decisions in their own
best interest is in some way diminished – and often profoundly so.

Within dementia we are confronted with individuals who are frequently unable to
function as the rational, autonomous and moral agents that we regard (and value) as
typical of human beings. Within dementia we are confronted with the reality that
vulnerability is both a personal experience as well as a social commitment, a
relationship between one who is vulnerable and others (carers, family, friends and
professionals) who are engaged to care and protect. Dementia also reveals in sharp
focus that what is crucial to establish well being and protection is not a theory of
rights, for rights involve claims and assertions and demands and those with dementia

13

These figures are cited in: K. Sullivan and F. O’Conor, ‘Should a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease
be disclosed?’ Aging and Mental Health, 2001; 5(4) p 340.
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can engage in none of these practices. Dementia reminds us that the well being of
the dementia sufferer (her ‘rights’ if you like) can only be secured to the extent that
significant others maintain and act upon a strong sense of moral duty and moral
engagement. The image of the rational, assertive, autonomous actor is missing
within dementia. If we want to secure the best interests of those with dementia we
must look beyond traditional notions of rights and entitlements with their emphasis
upon claims, assertions and entitlements. We must look to the duties and obligations
of caregivers for it is only by responding to such duties and obligations that rights,
and thus the well being that rights promise, can have tangible meaning.

In chapter three, Vulnerability – Political, I explore another way of presenting
vulnerability. My suggestion in this chapter is that we can portray vulnerability as a
structure upon which civil society, and specifically the liberal democratic variant, is
founded. To this end I focus on the works of the contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke
and, to a lesser extent, Rawls. Despite obvious and well-documented criticisms of
these writers (particularly the first two) and their unique approach to human social
and political life, there are compelling reasons for a discussion of this sort. First,
within the work of each a notion of the innate vulnerability of the human individual
maintains an important though often unrecognised presence. Indeed vulnerability
may be portrayed as man’s natural state prior to his emergence within civil society.
Second, civil society itself is proposed by each writer as a response to this
vulnerability. It is only after his emergence into civil life that man can fully realise his
interests and develop his potential. Third, the concept of rights (human, natural or
rationally chosen) is employed by each writer, both as a means of protecting man
from the uncertainties of his naturally vulnerable state but also as a foundation upon
which modern liberal forms of political organization are structured. Finally, the notion
of the modern rights bearing individual (rational, autonomous and moral) who

21
powerfully identifies and asserts his own self interest is strategically juxtaposed to the
inherently vulnerable picture of man beyond (or before) civil and political life.

Whatever one’s position on the intellectual veracity of the contract theorists, there are
two crucially important concepts developed by these writers that are essential to any
understanding of modern liberal society. First, from each came the idea that any
government is legitimate only insofar as it is based on the consent of the governed.
Second, is the allied notion that all individuals have certain fundamental rights which
are held against all-comers (governments, institutions, individuals); rights which
derive from and reflect the nature of the individual himself, with the protection of such
rights being the very reason for the establishment of civil society. Added to these
dual concepts of rights and legitimacy I would suggest a third. This is the idea of
vulnerability. Whereas society is justified in no small way by recourse to the
protection of rights, the reason we have both rights and society is to guard against
the effects of vulnerability. Without society and without rights man is vulnerable. He
is unable to develop his potential as a human individual; he is unable to function as a
rational, autonomous and moral actor and he is inevitably at odds with his fellows. In
this way one can understand vulnerability as a pivotal point in liberal democratic
theory. It provides the intellectual rationale for the construction of civil society whilst
also establishing the moral justification for the idea of human rights. Thus on this
account of things both human rights and civil society are sustained by (and are a
response to) man’s inherent vulnerability.

There is a final reason for a discussion of what we might refer to as ‘the political
philosophy of human rights’. Encapsulated within the contract theorists is a view of
man as a rational, autonomous, self assertive, reflective, choice driven individual.
This is what I have referred to as ‘the human rights image of man’. Yet it is clear that
when we engage the vulnerable, particularly the mentally ill and the elderly within
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residential aged care facilities - many of whom suffer from the dual disabilities of
mental illness and dementia, this image is more myth than reality. The paradox is
that human rights are often directed at protecting those who are impaired in their
ability to be rational, assertive individuals, yet the concept itself is in no small way
dependent upon a view that defines humans precisely in terms of their rational
reflective capacity. Human rights require from the vulnerable, particularly the most
vulnerable, capacities that they often do not possess in order to enjoy the rights they
are promised. This fact alone ought to alert us to the crucial role of duties in the care
and protection of vulnerable people.

In chapter four, Vulnerability and the Promise of Rights, I consider what it is that we
hope to achieve by conceptualising the problems that confront the vulnerable within
the confines of a rights discourse. In other words, what does the ‘promise of rights’
hold for those who are vulnerable? Human rights themselves can be seen as
normative claims addressing how people ought to be treated rather than being
descriptive statements about how people actually are treated. In this regard they
provide a moral framework which seeks to set a standard within which people can
operate and engage others, as well as being an index against which the way we
behave toward others can be measured. Human rights can thus be seen as a
‘promise’ to the vulnerable, a promise to ensure their care and protection. This is of
course why we embrace notions of rights. We embark on a rights discourse because
we see their essential role as the care and protection of the vulnerable. This is why
we hear rather more about the human rights of the poor and oppressed, of the
powerless and the impoverished, of children, the elderly, the mentally ill and so on
and rather less about the rights of the rich and powerful, of bankers and bureaucrats,
of media moguls and mining magnates. At their most basic level the task of human
rights is to protect those who cannot protect themselves.
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Certainly we may argue that human rights have other functions as well. For example
we might plausibly suggest that human rights, in particular the civil and political
variety, can be seen as a framework, (the rules of the game so to speak), upon which
liberal democracy itself is founded. This argument might propose that if one wants to
play the ‘game’ of liberal democracy then one of necessity must embrace certain
basic rules. All games have rules that are fundamental to the way they are carried
on and it is difficult to see liberal democracy being played without some rather
extensive notion of civil and political rights. Yet the civil and political variety of human
rights is only one small part of the whole picture. Essentially human rights are moral
claims to certain ways of being treated and we would think very poorly of any theory
of individual rights if it could be shown that the one thing such a theory could not do
was to protect the vulnerable.

My general approach in this chapter is to propose and reflect upon some direct
questions. For example; what specifically do we have in mind when we embark on a
rights discussion with the point of view of achieving certain rather specific ends?
This recognises that there is a difference between the idea of a right as a conceptual
construct and the way that rights are actually employed by those that use them within
the social and political marketplace, at ‘the level of the street’ as I call it. By invoking
the spectre of the marketplace I acknowledge that there are at least two ways we can
approach discussion on rights. One is from a stipulative perspective. In this instance
we may seek some uniformity on how rights, as legal and moral constructs, ought to
be used. However such debate is seldom overtly employed in marketplace
situations. Rather the marketplace tends to approach rights from a strategic
perspective. This considers how rights are actually used or employed. That is, the
focus of rights is to achieve certain (strategic) ends or outcomes - the enrichment of
human life as I earlier described it. An important question thus becomes: what is it
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that we want rights to do for the vulnerable? As my comments above imply, one
response is that a major purpose of human rights is to ‘care and protect’.

Yet care and protect how, and in what way? The answer to this depends very much
upon one’s position within the rights debate. Those who are vulnerable may have a
quite different perspective on the way the rights discourse is structured and the
particular ends toward which it ought to be directed than those who (or so they claim)
speak for the vulnerable, or those who are responsible for the vulnerable in a legal or
moral sense. This introduces a tension, for example, between the state and various
professional bodies who are charged with the care and protection of dementia
sufferers, and the family and friends of those who have dementia – not to mention
the sufferers themselves. How have the rights documents themselves been ordered
to reflect the interests of those groups and individuals who are vulnerable? This
occasions an examination of various statements on rights. In this chapter my interest
is on the Australian context. Specifically I will be focussing on relevant documents
that claim to protect the well being of, in particular, the mentally ill and those
residents in aged care facilities, both groups having been the focus of rights based
attention in recent years in this country and both groups being amongst the most
profoundly vulnerable.

If the promise of rights is, in large part, to protect the vulnerable then it is clear that
they have so often failed this promise. In chapter five, Vulnerability and the Failure of
Rights, I document the extent of this failure. Again my primary focus is on the
mentally ill and the aged within residential aged care facilities within the Australian
setting. My argument in this chapter is that human rights have failed the vulnerable
because the image of man contained within so much of the rights paradigm is at
odds with what it means to be vulnerable, and also, because as human rights are
typically constructed they cannot effectively address the sorts of social and political
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locations the vulnerable find themselves in. By using the term ‘typically constructed’ I
am referring to the view of man contained within the idea of human rights that
suggests a rationally constructed, assertive, self motivated, claiming individual. This
is the image of man that lies at the heart of human rights, and it is this image that is
both assumed and implied within Australian pronouncements on human rights,
particularly with respect to the elderly and the mentally ill.

This chapter builds upon and develops many of the themes introduced in previous
chapters. For example I return to consider what it means to be vulnerable and how
this vulnerability, particularly in its more severe manifestation, is crucially opposed to
the picture of the rights-bearing individual. To this end the often powerless,
dependent, ‘other-reliant’ individual, the reality of man through the life-span, is
counter posed to the rational, assertive, goal directed, independent and self-reliant
individual. I consider what we expect of the rights paradigm – that is, to care for and
protect the vulnerable – and show how many political, economic and social forces
often conspire to undermine the benefits that the rights paradigm might hold for
vulnerable people. Indeed, when we think of the vulnerable we often think of them as
existing within particular settings or contexts, such as the family, the hospital, the
psychiatric unit, the aged care facility and so on. Often conflicts arise between
different actors within these institutional structures. If rights are regarded as
expressing the interests of individuals and as a means by which those interests are
protected, it is instructive to discover how rights fare when such interests are in
conflict with forces that are frequently more powerful in a social and political sense.

In this chapter I argue that rights, in and of themselves, that is rights qua rights, are
powerless when confronted with forces and interests hostile to the well being of the
vulnerable. Throughout this chapter my focus is on the mentally ill and the aged
within residential aged care facilities. In both instances rights per se are largely
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irrelevant to their welfare and best interests. My conclusion is that the extent to
which the concept of human rights emphasises the rational, assertive and
independent individual, it is deeply flawed. Such a view of human rights offers little
safeguard or protection to either those who are vulnerable or in fact to any of us,
given that there are substantial periods in our lives when we will experience, to a
greater or lesser degree, episodes of vulnerability. This chapter will set the scene for
my finally chapter which will argue that, in order to engage human rights and to make
them relevant and sustaining, we need first to address notions of duty and
responsibility.

Finally in chapter six, On Rights, Duties and the Image of the Vulnerable, I suggest
possible avenues for securing the welfare of vulnerable people, and by extension all
people, through an emphatic commitment to notions of duty and obligation. Such a
commitment seeks to both engage rights and to realise their promise. I begin this
chapter by considering the relationship between rights and duties. I suggest that
within the discourse of everyday lives and the sorts of moral talk we embrace within
such contexts there are good reasons for regarding rights as secondary to duties.
Generally, I argue, we approach moral discussion from the perspective of oughts
rather than from the perspective of our own, or others, moral entitlements. When we
think of how we ought to behave in any given situation which demands a moral
response, we tend to engage in notions of ‘what ought I do’, or ‘how ought I behave’.
We generally do not consult theories of rights as a way of guiding our behaviour.

This leads us to reflect upon how we may engage the vulnerable and what sorts of
values or orientations are instructive for maximising the wellbeing of vulnerable
people. If human rights as they currently stand and how they are currently practiced
have failed the vulnerable, as I maintain, then it seems clear that those in a position
to act with regard to the welfare of vulnerable individuals are required to consider
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their own actions and the impact such actions can have upon those who are often
unable to act for themselves. Such a perspective recognises that what is typical of
vulnerable people is that they often require others to act for them. In such
circumstances the mere ascription of human rights (or indeed moral or legal rights in
general) to vulnerable people misses the point. How are we to engage rights? What
values and attitudes may agents embrace in order to activate the rights that
vulnerable people are said to have. How can we make human rights (or moral or
even legal rights) a lived reality for those who are vulnerable? Where would such
inspiration come from to provide a moral context within which agents can act to
secure the care and protection of the vulnerable?

My response to these questions is to seek within Christian philosophy and virtue
ethics a framework which may guide agents in their dealings with vulnerable people.
To this end I consider the role of the vulnerable within the Christian texts and as well
I discuss those aspects of Aristotle’s virtue theory that may provide a moral basis for
our engagement of the vulnerable. Such a discussion can be seen within the context
of the way we approach moral discourse from within what I call ‘the narrative of
everyday lives’, that is the characteristic way in which humans typically engage each
other from the perspective of everyday moral discourse. It is at this level of
discussion that perceptions and attitudes must change if we are to protect the
vulnerable. And it is upon this change in perceptions and attitudes that politicians,
policy makers, professionals and those who care for the frail aged and the mentally ill
can reasonably be expected to base their engagement with the vulnerable.

In the final part of this chapter I make some practical suggestions as to how we might
construct a constitution of duties in much the same way as we traditionally construct
present constitutions of rights. I do not dwell too much on this aspect. I want to
resist the temptation to simply replace lists of rights owned by recipients with lists of
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duties owed by agents. This is because such lists and constitutions, although
important, are secondary to the psychological and emotional and intellectual
connection we make to vulnerable people. Just as the theory of rights reflects or
emerges from an intellectual position that one takes about persons and the
relationships between persons, so one must begin from the intellectual position that
addresses the duties and obligations that one has to the vulnerable. Constitutions of
duty will follow, because as humans we have both a need and a compulsion to
document, yet first and foremost we must have a moral and psychological
understanding of and commitment to the vulnerable in our midst. This philosophical
and intellectual grounding upon which such constitutions are anchored must come
first.

This thesis is not seeking to replace the ‘human rights paradigm’ with what might be
referred to as a ‘human duties paradigm’. What I am seeking is better described in
terms of a question of balance and counterbalance. My argument is that the human
rights paradigm has failed precisely because the focus has traditionally been upon
notions of rights, in particular rights as claims that people can make upon the state
and various state institutions and functionaries, but with no compensating ethic of
duty. This much is clear, within the Australian context at least when we consider the
position of the frail aged and the mentally ill. As far as these groups are concerned
human rights reflect sterile assertions of muscular individuality, yet notions of rights
cannot be presented apart from or distinct from an equally powerful notion of duty
and moral obligation. My emphasis in this thesis is upon ‘human rights’ as distinct
from more general moral rights or even legal rights. Yet the same argument could be
made in regard to these other presentations of rights. The mentally ill and the frail
aged are certainly protected by legal rights, for example the legal right not to be
assaulted being an obvious one, yet it is clear that whether or not such rights are
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translated into a lived reality for these groups and individuals depends very much
upon the sense of duty that those who care for the mentally ill and frail aged hold.

The world inhabited by the mentally ill and those with dementia is often a closed
world of institutional routine and regulation far from the glare and spotlight of public
discourse. In particular the aged in residential facilities are largely invisible. True,
the way they have been treated over recent years in Australia has been the subject
of much media (and thus community) debate, but such debate waxes and wanes with
its place in the community’s focus. It is dependent in no small way upon the lurid
nature of the abuse and neglect that may have occurred in this nursing home or that
hostel and subject of course to competition from other equally lurid stories for media
attention. To a very large degree their lives are played out behind the closed doors
of institutions and the sorts of conditions they live under, either in terms of the
services available to them or the standards of care which shape their day to day
lives, are dependent upon the attitudes and values that those who care for them
have. If an elderly resident in end stage dementia is assaulted, who complains?
Certainly not the victim. And often neither does the victim’s family who may fear the
consequences to their loved one of complaints about standards.14 (I raise this issue
in chapter five) Can any notion of rights, legal or moral or human, protect such
vulnerable people if those who are charged with care and protection act out of
frustration, or hostility, or enmity and have little or no sense of duty? This is why we
need to address agents and the sorts of moral assumptions that agents work from,
for it is only via a strong notion of moral obligation or duty that such a debate can be
engaged. It is to this debate that this thesis is directed.

14

One (feared) consequence may be that the residential institution may leverage for the complainant to
take their family member to another institution. Families also fear being defined as ‘whingers’ or
‘troublemakers’ by institutions. It is often thought politic just to keep quiet and put up with abuse.
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There are two final comments I would make, one having to do with the language
used in the text and the other purely personal. With regard to the former I am aware
of ongoing debates regarding the use of non-sexist language in academic work. In
this thesis, rather than using the masculine form of he, his, or him for all cases that
assume both masculine and feminine, or continually trying to use non gender specific
terms such as ‘one’, which tends to sound contrived or clumsy, I have simply chosen
to use ‘he’ or ‘she’, or ‘his’ or ‘her’ throughout. The exceptions are of course when
the gender is obviously male or female as when I might refer to a particular author. I
hope this does not give offence.

With regard to the personal dimension I would say that this thesis reflects an interest
I have had stemming from my own professional work over the last 25 years or so in
Australia. In that time I have worked almost exclusively within the area of mental
health and aged care, mostly acute psychiatry, but of late within residential aged care
facilities. In the course of my professional work, notions of rights and in particular
human rights have gained great currency. In Australia such concepts have been
directed primarily at the mentally ill and, over the last ten to 15 years, toward the
aged in residential facilities. Yet it appears clear that the actual impact upon the lives
of such people in terms of personal benefits has been minimal. It is not too much of
an exaggeration to say that the same sorts of issues that confronted professionals
like myself in the 1970s, prior to the application of rights to these two groups of
people, are almost identical to the issues that confront us today.

Briefly, what are the issues that confront clinicians like myself? As far as mental
health is concerned there is a lack of professional services for particular groups; the
criminally insane, Aborigines, adolescents, those with dual diagnosis (mental illness
and drug and alcohol problems) and people who live in rural and regional Australia.
As well there are other chronic shortcomings, in particular a lack of 24 hour crisis
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services for families in dire need outside normal working hours, poor community
follow up, a chronic lack of mental health beds, and an undue emphasis within
mental health upon medical, as opposed to psychological, intervention. As far as the
aged in residential facilities are concerned the issues of twenty years ago also
remain: poor staff-resident ratios and a lack of trained staff in facilities being the most
obvious. These two problems have been at the heart of some of the more notorious
cases of abuse and neglect of recent years. It seems we are regularly confronted by
media stories of residents being tied to commodes and elderly people left in urine
soaked beds or left to wander in night clothes in the middle of the day because staff
are occupied doing other work. The inappropriate use of restraints (physical and
chemical) is a continuing issue for those with dementia: the lack of enough dementia
specific units and appropriately trained staff is a chronic issue in Australia where
dementia patients often share rooms with those not so impaired. And so it is no
coincidence that residential aged care facilities are thus characterised by very high
levels of depression, most of which goes untreated or even clinically unrecognised.
The examples are seemingly endless and I deal with some (but not all – for obvious
reasons of space) at various points within this thesis.

The current landscape of professional experience looks remarkably similar in many
ways to the one that confronted professionals in the 1970s. One important difference
is that today the well being and integrity of both the mentally ill and the
institutionalised aged are theoretically ‘protected’ and ‘secured’ by the presence of a
whole plethora of rights, - legal, moral and in many cases, human. But the human
rights paradigm, so enthusiastically promoted as a form of moral rescue for the
vulnerable aged and the mentally ill, has had little impact on the day to day lives of
those who find themselves within either the mental health system or the system of
institutional aged care. It is in an attempt to answer why such a state of affairs
should continue to exist that the present thesis has been written.
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Chapter One:

i]

Vulnerability - Philosophical

philosophical foundations

In a most general sense to be vulnerable is taken to be liable or susceptible to hurt,
harm or injury. The Macquarie Dictionary for example defines vulnerability as
‘susceptible to being wounded, liable to physical hurt...open to attack or assault [and]
weak in respect of defence.’15 Whilst the idea of vulnerability can be applied widely,
so that we may say a poorly constructed building may be vulnerable to earthquake
damage or a barren hillside is vulnerable to soil erosion in particularly wet weather, I
am not concerned with the application of the term outside the realm of human
experience or relationships. Poorly constructed buildings or barren hillsides cannot
be said to have interests and so their vulnerability is not of the same order as that
which applies to humans.

In a similar vein I would make a distinction between the vulnerability experienced by
non-human animals to that experienced by humans. Whilst non-human animals,
even the most primitive, could be said to have a valid interest in what happens to
them16 such animals are not members of a moral community. Whilst they may have
relationships with each other, although not in the same way that humans have
relationships, and perhaps can even be said to fulfil certain roles in respect to one
another, nevertheless such roles and relationships are fundamentally different to that
engaged in by humans. It seems reasonable to suggest that non-human animals do
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not make moral judgements about the appropriateness or otherwise of actions, nor
do they enter into relationships with others of their species that inspire a whole range
of mutual expectations and obligations in the way that humans do. The assumptions
embraced within the notion of ‘a moral community’ encourage us to view others of
our kind as vulnerable and thus demand that we consider our relationships to them
with respect to their well-being. Within this thesis when I use the term ‘vulnerable’ I
have in mind certain specific and distinct characteristics that apply only within the
context of the relationships that humans share with each other.

i] vulnerability, interests and the rational actor

Vulnerability has traditionally been portrayed in terms of the individual’s response to
‘challenging or threatening environments’, where ‘individual-environment
transactions’ are played out within the context of situations that threaten an
individual’s safety, security or ongoing personal well being. Vulnerability has to do
with the individual’s ‘lessened potential capability’ for successfully dealing with such
environmental challenges.17 Vulnerability describes an individual’s increased
susceptibility to negative consequences when exposed to particular risk factors.18
Whereas ‘risk’ identifies features within the environment that may impact upon
individuals resulting in ‘an elevated probability of an undesirable outcome’ so that, for
example, children who experience ‘harsh and inconsistent parenting’ are more at risk
of delinquency than those whose parents experience chronic poor health,
vulnerability identifies an ‘individual susceptibility to harm or injury.’19 Vulnerability,
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according to this definition, has to do with personal attributes whether biological,
social or situational. In other words, whether or not vulnerability as a construct is
applied to population characteristics measuring relative risk in terms of
morbidity/mortality data with an emphasis on predictive outcomes that may guide
policy initiatives,20 nevertheless there is a sense in which vulnerability is
(subjectively) an intensely personal phenomenon. In general I agree with Spiers who
writes that:

‘People experience the troubles and turmoils of life in ways that cannot be
captured simply by biomedical comparison to normative standards of risk. By
reducing vulnerability to an epidemiological term, we reduce our vision of the
world.’21

In this thesis I am interested in vulnerability as an experience of individuals. For
whilst it is clear that vulnerability is a socially ascribed characteristic, ascribed by
either the person concerned or the society in which she lives, it is important not to
underestimate the impact that vulnerability has on the way that individual lives are
lived. In making this comment I am acknowledging a Foucauldian approach to
vulnerability displayed in some of the literature. For example Hallahan, whilst
acknowledging that vulnerability ‘is often linked to being powerless to defend oneself
[against environmental threats] or even to perceive and challenge the threat’, writes
that vulnerability describes ‘features of the environment [rather than] an attribute of
the person.’22 She warns that to stray down the path of regarding vulnerability or

20

Francois Delor and Michel Hubert, ‘Revisiting the concept of vulnerability’, Social Science &
Medicine, 50 (2000), pp 1557-1570.
21
Judith Spiers, ‘New perspectives on vulnerability using emic and etic approaches’, Journal of
Advanced Nursing, 2000, 31(3), p 715.
22
Lorna Hallahan, ‘Exploring Partisanship: Towards an Emancipatory Paradigm of Independent Social
Advocacy’ in. Marie L. Caltabiano, Richard Hil and Rosemary Frangos [eds] Achieving Inclusion:
Exploring Essays in Disability, James Cook University, Centre for Social and Welfare Research, 1997,
pp 35-51.

35
powerlessness as a feature of the individual is to run the risk ‘of only ever seeing
[people] as weak, trapped, as forever undermined by their impairments [and to]
overlook their capacity for empowerment.’23 A similar approach is identified within
writings on disability. Oliver suggests that whilst there is a popular understanding of
disability ‘as an individual, intensely personal problem’,24 it is primarily social attitudes
reacting to physical (or emotional, or psychological) difference (or impairment) that
results in a person being disabled. In this sense ‘disability is something imposed on
top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from
full participation in society.’25

Yet it is surely quite reasonable to suggest that there are some individuals and some
groups that no matter what their environments or their situations can be defined on
the basis of their disability or, and more to the point, on the basis of their vulnerability.
As Gaylin points out, what characterises the human new born is its utter
helplessness and dependency and he notes that the irony of mankind lies ‘...in the
miserable, extended, helpless state in which we are born and remain for so long untoward in the extreme, and unparalleled in the animal kingdom.’26 To be a neonate
or an infant is to be vulnerable. To suffer from end stage dementia is to be
vulnerable. To lie in a persistent vegetative state is to be vulnerable. It is to be
unable to survive without the care and protection of others.27 It is to be at constant
risk of harm, insult, and injury and if, as Handler has suggested, ‘empowerment is the
ability to control one’s environment’, then vulnerability represents the absence of
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control over crucial features of one’s existence and the necessity that one rely on
others for safety, security and in extreme cases for survival.28

Within discussions on vulnerability certain themes are constant. Vulnerability is
dependence; it is powerlessness; it is to lack (either physical or moral) autonomy; it is
to rely on others for care, protection and in many cases for one’s very existence. It is
often (and particularly with those such as children, the chronically mentally ill and the
frail aged) to have one’s goals determined by outside agents. In an early review of
the literature on vulnerability and ageing, Fry suggested that at the heart of the
concept is a lack of or an erosion of personal control over the environment within
which one operates.29 For many older people who confront vulnerability it is this
theme of ‘loss’ that is most important. This loss may be a reduction in former levels
of physical health and thus reduced mobility and independence, the enforced social
isolation of the elderly too frail to leave their homes. It may, in more extreme cases,
be a loss of control over one’s thoughts, feelings and actions, over one’s mental
processes in all their form, structure and content. This is the loss that is associated
with chronic Neuro-degenerative disorders such as Parkinson’s Disease or the
dementias. Here the loss may be a loss of a previous ability to think, to reason, to
identify oneself as a thinking, reasoning, experiencing being who can make
judgements, who can reflect on a course of action and who can proceed with the
expectation that one will be able to achieve certain desired outcomes.

At this level the idea of loss is well described by Simone Weil who, whilst employing
the term ‘affliction’ rather than ‘vulnerability’, yet her description describes powerfully
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the degree of loss that accompanies some of the ways in which people can be
described as vulnerable. To acknowledge the reality of affliction or vulnerability,
writes Weil, is to say to oneself that,

‘…I may lose control, through the play of circumstances over which I have no
control, over anything whatsoever I possess, including those things which are
so intimately mine that I consider them as being myself. There is nothing I
might not lose…’30

To be vulnerable is to inhabit what Zaner describes as the world of ‘the other.’ To be
vulnerable is to be ‘a person set apart’. It is to have ‘one’s usual relations with others
[and] one’s sense of self and the world…compromised.’31 It is an existence beyond
the archetype of the rational, autonomous, independent and assertive moral agent
that so powerfully lies at the heart of the sorts of creatures we take humans to be. To
be vulnerable is to be confronted with a situation that is in some way hostile to one’s
interests. In this way when I use the term ‘vulnerability’ I am identifying a situation
wherein one’s interests are in some way under threat or at risk of harm. Thus my
discussion of vulnerability inevitably leads to a consideration of ‘interests’ and what I
mean by invoking such a term.

The word ‘interest’ embraces the idea ‘of being affected by something in respect of
advantage or detriment.’32 When we use the term ‘interest’ we have in mind
something that is to the advantage of the individual or a particular state of affairs that
is to her benefit or would be of value to her. In talking about one’s interests I am
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referring to certain features of an individual’s life rather than that which might be
expressed in terms of collective or group based aims or ambitions. Also I do not
want to become involved with discussions in any specific sense about what personal
goods may be prioritised or ranked as ‘one’s interests’, and who may be responsible
for ranking or prioritising them. In saying this I acknowledge an ongoing debate that
sees a good deal of overlap between ‘interests’, ‘needs’ and ‘wants’, and in particular
distinctions that have traditionally been made (notably by scholars on the left)
between ‘true’ and ‘false’ interests.33 In general terms I agree with John Rawls who
writes that, ‘society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage [that] is typically
marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests’. As Rawls points out, there is
an ‘identity of interests’ because people realise they need others to achieve ends
collectively they cannot achieve individually, whilst at the same time there is a
‘conflict of interests’ because not only does each person wish to pursue their own
particular ends in life but also each generally prefers a greater to a smaller share of
what are effectively finite goods.34

Rawls does not specify what these interests actually are although, as his (in
particular, feminist) critics have pointed out, implied within his writings is the voice of
the rational, autonomous, liberal individual, functioning assertively within the narrow
confines of a market economy, an economy that is based upon social
competitiveness and economic individualism. It is this voice that has tended, suggest
those such as Benhabib and others, to exclude all other voices and all other
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formulations of political and economic life.35 Debate around the concept of interests
recognises a variety of often discordant and conflicting voices, values and
experiences. As one group of Frenchwomen observed in 1789: ‘Just as a nobleman
cannot represent a plebeian and the latter cannot represent a nobleman, so a man,
no matter how honest he may be, cannot represent a woman.’36 What then can we
say about interests without becoming embroiled in debates about contexts, priorities,
authorship and values?

One way of describing my position on the relationship between interests and
vulnerability is to say that we can think of interests as operating on [at least] two
distinct levels. On one level are those interests, what we might call ‘first order
interests’, which can be described as the ability of a person to function as a rational,
autonomous and moral being. On another level are what we might refer to as
‘second order interests’; the preferences, choices, appetites or inclinations that
people characteristically embrace on a daily basis that make life pleasant, interesting
or in some way of special concern and relevance for each particular individual.

The distinction between these two levels of interest is not new. Robertson, for
example, differentiates between ‘competent’ and ‘non-competent’ interests.
Competent interests are those that are essential to the lives of a competent actor and
the choices and decisions such actors make, whilst non-competent interests exist on
a much simpler level and do not rely on an established competency for their being
and continuation.37 In similar vein Dworkin suggests that our ‘critical’ interests are
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morally more significant than our ‘experiential’ interests.38 Critical interests embrace
notions of projects, ideas, schemes and strategies that we consciously adopt and
which give our life a form and structure in an ongoing continuity or narrative, which is
reflective of a deeper sense of value and personal identity. Interests such as these
make our lives better and more meaningful from the point of view of an autonomous
human self. Experiential interests involve more the day to day minutiae of life; sitting
in the sun, listening to music, eating ice cream and so on that is important primarily
on a level of experiential enjoyment. Dworkins outlines the difference between
critical and experiential interests by saying that,

‘having a close relationship with my children is not important just because I
happen to want the experience; on the contrary, I believe a life without
wanting it would be a much worse one.’39

However in order to have an ongoing and coherent ‘narrative’, or indeed to be
‘competent’, one must first be a rational agent. As Goodin suggests, we need to
acknowledge that there are some central or fundamental interests, what I call ‘first
order interests’, that are crucial in enabling an individual to act as a rational,
autonomous and moral being and exist apart from and prior to an individual’s more
particular interests.40 These first order interests may be regarded as the ‘necessary
means to any particular ends a person might choose to pursue’ as an expression of
their rational, reflective nature.41 In this regard first order interests are global and not
situation specific. Whilst particular ends may vary according to whim, preference or
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inclination, first order interests remain constant. Such interests are the prerequisite
for one to engage in the sort of lives that we characteristically expect humans to both
value and engage in. First order interests allow individuals to embark on complex
forward thinking scenarios, interactive strategies, ‘if-then’ contemplation, and critical
moral evaluation. They enable the establishment of what Miller describes as ‘a life
plan’;42 something that is central to the individual’s way of life in terms of the aims,
ambitions, meanings and activities that establish her identity and mark her as unique
and distinct from her fellows.

This description of humans and human life is highly idealised and, as I shall later
show, is flawed in certain crucial respects. [Importantly it overstates the degree to
which we actually, consciously and intentionally choose the values we embrace and
the sorts of lives we lead]. Nevertheless at this point I simply state what seems
relatively uncontroversial and that is: if one is to embark on the sorts of actions that
are typically assumed only humans can embark on and what is understood to be a
typically valued human sort of a life, one must be a rational, autonomous and moral
agent. If one cannot act as an agent in this way then, on my account, one is
vulnerable.

ii vulnerability and relationships

To be vulnerable in the way that I have described the term is to have one’s ability to
act as a rational, autonomous and moral agent in some way reduced or impaired. It
is because we live in a moral community, wherein the ways we act towards others
are subject to an ongoing and critical moral evaluation that the question of how we
ought to behave toward the vulnerable presents itself and demands a response.
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What are the terms of the relationship between the vulnerable and others who stand
in regard to them and may have a duty to care and protect?

Difficulties emerge in answering this question. One problem is that, in both morality
and law, there is often no universally agreed upon approach that defines who is
obligated, why they are so obligated and the extent of their obligation. Some have
argued for an extreme minimalist position of moral duty towards those in need.
Nozick, for example, maintains that whilst it is morally right to rescue those in need it
is not morally wrong not to rescue, even when such a rescue can be undertaken with
ease.43 His position seems to derive from the view that any moral demand that
requires we act in a particular way for the benefit of another is an undue imposition
that limits the rights of free agents to act as they choose. Such a view posits
individual liberty, or the ‘freedom to act’, as a fundamental human value that ought
not be compromised or reduced in any way. This perspective is challenged certainly
by Mill in On Liberty who asserts that one is indeed morally bound to rescue because
it maximises the liberty of the person so rescued.44 In the following section of this
discussion I maintain that Nozick’s view is indefensible in the light of arguments by
both Rawls and Kant and also by appeals to the logic that sustains the social and cooperative nature of human life.

With regard to legal obligation in general a cleavage can be noted between common
law and civil law countries on the requirements to rescue. Cadoppi puts the issue
bluntly:
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‘If a man walks through Trafalgar Square and sees an unknown child
drowning in the famous fountains, he is not bound under English law to do
anything at all. If the same person is sitting by Bernini’s marvellous fountain
in Rome’s Piazza Navona, he will be guilty of a criminal offence if he does not
rescue a child in a similar plight.’45

This suggests that, at the very least, different legal constituencies display a disparity
between the different legal obligations that ordinary people may have toward those
who are vulnerable. In common law countries (most notably, Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom and the USA) the ‘bad Samaritan’, that is one who chooses not to
rescue another who is at risk of harm, is treated, as Feinberg has identified, ‘with
grudging tolerance’.46 Halsbury’s Laws of England puts the matter succinctly.

‘Save in exceptional circumstances the criminal law imposes no obligation on
persons to act so as to prevent the occurrence of harm or wrongdoing. There
is no general duty to prevent the commission of a crime; nor does a person
commit a crime or become a party to it solely because he might reasonably
have prevented its commission. Omission to act in a particular way will give
rise to criminal liability only where a duty so to act arises at common law or is
imposed by statute. Such a duty is exceptional and the criminal law does not
require a person to be his brother’s keeper.’47
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But Cadoppi’s point [above] is somewhat overstated. He later explains that whilst the
criminal law within civil law countries does recognise a general duty to rescue those
in peril, no such parallel recognition exists within common law countries. The
emphasis on general is important for as McCall Smith points out, ‘the common law is
not implacably hostile to the notion that liability for a failure to act may sometimes
quite properly be imposed’, and he documents numerous instances within common
law countries where such an obligation has indeed been found to exist.48 In Jones v
United States of America the court outlines at least four situations where a failure to
rescue was held to constitute a breach of legal duty. These were,

‘…where a statute imposes a duty to care for another…where one stands in a
certain status relationship to another…where one has assumed a contractual
duty to care for another; and…where one has voluntarily assumed the care of
another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from
rendering aid.’49

As McCall Smith makes clear, what is important is the context within which one finds
oneself with regard to the vulnerable, where ‘context’ embraces certain ‘proximity
creating’ factors that engage one as having a range of legal duties toward those who
are at risk of harm or who are in situations of danger. These ‘proximity creating’
factors in part turn on the role that one may (intentionally or otherwise) have played
in being instrumental in the situation in which the vulnerable find themselves. For
example, whilst it may be true that if I come upon a child drowning at the beach I am
under no legal obligation to rescue, or if I see a man about to hang himself I am
similarly under no obligation to intervene, a different situation would be presented if,
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for example, I suggested to the child in question that she swim in an area I knew to
be unsafe or if I gave the man a length of rope and instructed him as to which tree
might best take his weight.

But my concern in this section is not to engage in discussion of how different civil law
or common law jurisdictions impose different legal requirements upon people and
their dealings with those who can be said to be vulnerable. Rather, I want to suggest
that no matter what jurisdiction one finds oneself in it is fair to say that there are
primarily two sorts of relationships that can be said to exist between those who are
vulnerable and others who stand in regard to them and may be seen to have some
duty or obligation to care and protect.

The first type of relationship is a ‘general’ relationship. General relationships are
those we have simply by virtue of our being rational, autonomous and moral agents;
beings who are capable of intention, who have knowledge about actions and
consequences, choices to act upon and the ability to accept the responsibility for
behaviour freely engaged in. This is the world of the rational, reflective agent. By
calling these relationships ‘general’ we recognise that they exist beyond any specific
and structured roles that people might occasionally occupy. Such relationships
provide a sort of morally codified ‘background noise’ which offers a moral pathway to
guide people in the way they relate to others, vulnerable or not. Yet the dynamics of
these relationships are often open to a variety of interpretations, analysis and
understandings all of which are reflective of varying opinions, values, mores and
moral positions that different people might adopt. General relationships often
function beyond the legal framework. They invoke obligations which are primarily
defined by custom, convention or accepted moral practice and appear, on the
surface at least, to be based on the premise that where the interests of others are
particularly susceptible to our actions and choices then we have certain, primarily
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moral, obligations to act in a way that maximises their well-being, or minimises the
extent to which they are harmed.

When we move beyond such ‘general’ relationships to embrace ‘special’
relationships, then duties and obligations, in both legal and moral terms, come into
sharper focus. Special relationships are those that emerge from the formal and
highly structured roles or positions that individuals often inhabit and that demand a
particular conformity to certain professional standards or codes of conduct. For
people such as policemen, lifeguards, doctors, nurses, even parents, the notion of a
legally enforceable duty obligates such individuals to particular standards of
behaviour. Such people, in the course of their professional lives, have an identified
legal obligation to act in certain ways and a failure to act in accordance with that
obligation may attract both criminal and civil liability. This introduces the notion of
‘duty of care’. Whilst the existence and extent of this ‘duty’ may often be a case for
debate, nevertheless it is apparent that some occupations by their very nature
embrace such a concept. Certainly whenever a relationship is a protective one that
incorporates expectations that one will act in a particular way toward those one has
responsibility for in the course of their occupational activities, a failure to protect may
render one liable to both civil or criminal action.

The terms and conditions that exist within the confines of a special relationship can
be seen as ‘cordoned off’ from the more general relationships that people may be
engaged in. This is certainly the case within common law countries such as
Australia. For example, outside the special relationship between nurse and patient, a
nurse, ‘as far as the common-law principles are concerned [has] no legal duty to stop
and render assistance in any type of emergency, and that includes a motor vehicle
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accident.’50 Similarly, although a parent has a legal obligation to provide a certain
standard of care and protection toward her child, she is not under any such legal
obligation as far as any other child is concerned. Once one has freely embarked
upon a special relationship with the vulnerable then one is bound in certain very
precise legal ways to certain forms of conduct that have currency only within the
particular relationship. Outside the relationship the legal rules are different. This
difference can be seen with respect to the idea of positive and negative duties. As
Goodin points out, when special relationships are invoked, ‘…positive duties (duties
to aid others) [are] strictly on a par with negative duties (duties not to harm others);
neither [are] necessarily any stronger or more compelling than the other.’51 However
beyond legal relationships this is not the case. If I am driving down a deserted
country road and I come upon a stranded motorist my responsibility to aid her (a
positive duty) cannot be as strong as my duty not to harm her (a negative duty).

A similar situation exists with respect to accountability. Within special relationships
people are held responsible in accordance with some standard that is expected of all
people who occupy similar positions. As McDonald points out, all doctors are
expected to behave in a certain way when confronted with sick people, in a way that
those who are not doctors are not expected to act. Medical practitioners are
expected ‘to exercise that degree of care and skill which is to be expected of the
average practitioner of the class to which he belongs.’52 Similarly, ‘a person using or
answering to the title “Nurse” will be judged according to the standards expected of a
qualified nurse.’53 Those who fail to live up to the expectations of their role may be
liable to professional censure, litigation or even criminal action depending upon the
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particular circumstances. In this way those who occupy special relationships with
regard to the vulnerable are held legally accountable both for what they do and for
what they fail to do.

But why is it that we hold those who stand in special regard to the vulnerable legally
bound to fairly rigid codes of behaviour? The answer to this question provides an
important clue not simply as to what it means to be vulnerable but also to what it
means to be human. To be vulnerable is, as I have argued, to be compromised in
terms of one’s ability to act as a rational, autonomous and moral agent. Thus the
vulnerable are unable to ‘act for themselves’ to ensure their own safety, security and
well-being and they require others to ‘act for them’. In this way the relationship
between the vulnerable and those who stand in special regard to them is powerfully
unequal. We recognise this inequality (the vulnerability of one group and the
authority, dominance and power of another) by placing strict limits on what can be
done by those who have a special relationship to the vulnerable. And the reason
why we place such limits on the actions of one group of people is because although
we talk in legal terms when we think of those who have special duties toward the
vulnerable, fundamentally we recognise that the relationship is a moral one. The
relationship between the vulnerable and those who stand in special regard to them is
based on the recognition that all humans are moral creatures who must, as Kant
asserted, be seen as ends in themselves rather than as means to the ends of others.
It is this assertion that I wish to explore in the next section.

iii vulnerability and the moral imperative

At the heart of any relationship that exists between the vulnerable and those who
stand in either general or special regard to them is a moral imperative. Indeed it has
often been assumed that a sympathy toward others is an inescapable part of being
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human. As Epictetus says in his Discourses; ‘Have we not natural fidelity, natural
affection, a natural disposition to help others, a natural disposition to forbearance?’54
The moral requirement to come to the aid of others was certainly suggested by
Bentham who asked that ‘in cases where the person is in danger, why should it not
be the duty of every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without
prejudicing himself…?55 Yet to say that we are ‘naturally disposed to help’ or ‘why
ought we not help’, seems insufficient to addressing the crucial question of why I
should actually seek to aid another who is in some form of distress.

I think a satisfactory solution to this can be found in both Rawls and Kant. John
Rawls argues that ‘[to] help another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that
one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself’, is an example of what he
calls a ‘natural duty’.56 Rawls follows Kant on this. In The Metaphysics of Morals
Kant makes it clear that ‘…to promote according to one’s means the happiness of
others in need, without hoping for something in return, is everyone’s duty.’57 For
Kant the rationale to rescue, to aid those who are at risk of pain, harm or injury, in
other words to come to the aid of the vulnerable amongst us, is located within each
person as a rational agent. Thus he writes that,

‘…everyone who finds himself in need wishes to be helped by others. But if
he lets his maxim of being unwilling to assist others in turn when they are in
need become public…then everyone would likewise deny him assistance
when he himself is in need, or at least would be authorised to deny it.’
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Consequently, argues Kant, the obligation to assist those who are in need

‘is a universal duty of human beings just because they are…rational beings
with needs, united by nature in one dwelling place so that they can help one
another.’58

Kant locates moral action, in this case the duty to rescue, within the image of the
rational. The principles that guide moral behaviour are those that are capable of
being universalised to all rational agents everywhere regardless of personal interest,
inclination, even sentiment or sympathy. This is the world of the ‘noumenal’ self, able
to stand beyond time and causality, relationships and interests, and establish moral
principles that will genuinely harmonise the interests of all rational agents. To aid
others is rational. It is a universal moral duty of all rational beings. In this sense it is
in accordance with a categorical imperative.59

If Kant locates the duty to aid in terms of man’s rationality, Rawls emphasises man’s
sociability. The most important reason for aiding those in need ‘is its pervasive effect
on the quality of everyday life.’ In other words, ‘the public knowledge that we are
living in a society in which we can depend upon others to come to our assistance in
difficult circumstances is itself of great value.’60 Whilst utilitarian conceptions are also
important, that is we help others because some day we may need their help in
return,61 the main value of this natural duty to aid is that it both sustains and indeed
reflects man’s essential nature as a social, and sociable, being. It recognises that
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man is not isolated or independent rather he is social and interdependent. To refuse
to aid would thus be to deny man’s essential cooperative nature and thus undermine
the conditions required for cooperative society itself to flourish. Perhaps alluding to
the Hobbesian image of man in his natural state, Rawls asks us ‘to imagine what a
society would be like if it were publicly known that this duty [to aid others] was
rejected.’ It would, he says, ‘express an indifference if not disdain for human beings
that would make a sense of our own worth impossible.’62

There is also another point worth mentioning about the relationship between law and
morals. Whilst legal positivists may argue that the legal and moral are, or ought to
be, two separate and distinct entities, with the law being conceptualised as a (valuefree) system of rules and conventions backed by sovereign authority for the
regulation of human conduct and sustained by sanction, there is clearly a close
connection between the areas of law and morality. I think Moore is correct when he
says that ‘the content of much of our law is the same as the content of much of our
morality’, and that legal precepts are in fact, in general, built upon moral ones.63
Within some areas of law this is certainly the case. For example ‘legal rights to
property, to liberty, or to equality depend on moral rights to those things; legal liability
to punishment or damages depends on moral responsibility.’64 Like Moore I suspect
that in fact we can find moral justifications for a diverse range of areas such as tort
law, contract law and property law.65 Without going into this argument I think we can
fairly say that it often seems that moral laws tend to drive the legal ones. That is we
establish ways of acting and codify such actions in law primarily because we think
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this is the appropriate way to behave, that this is moral and ethical, or it is ‘good’ to
act in this way and so we construct legal arrangements to reflect these moral
assumptions.

Of course this is not always the case. For example it does not matter if we
collectively drive on the left or the right, but this sort of ‘housekeeping’ rule
notwithstanding, I think it is reasonable to say that generally the law tends to be
based upon and reflect moral and ethical notions of how people ‘ought’ to behave in
particular situations and circumstances. Yet there remains a rather more subtle way
in which both law and morality are related and that is in the view that both hold of
what sort of a being is the subject of their attentions. As Fuller suggests, the law has
a particular (moral) view of what constitutes man, and so he writes that ‘to embark on
the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules involves of
necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent,
capable of understanding and following rules.’66 Such a view also presumes the
existence of a shared understanding of rules and the role that such an understanding
has as a basis for both moral and legal action. In addition, the notion of a ‘shared
understanding’ presumes or suggests one who has highly developed skills of
thinking, integrating, decision making, consenting and communicating.

A system of law, then, is dependent upon a particular view of man, one that sees him
certainly as a rational, autonomous agent, a being capable of making judgements
about possible actions, of embracing intention to act and of accepting consequences
for the acts he performs, but it also assumes a being who is a moral agent as well.
Indeed people are moral actors before they are legal ones. This means that laws
that are viewed in some way as being unfair, unjust, inequitable, or skewed to reflect
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certain privileged interests, will be deemed in some way to have failed the crucial test
of moral appropriateness. Laws that fail such a test may be regarded as having lost
their moral authority, and societies who tolerate a preponderance of such laws are on
dangerous ground, both in terms of morality but also in terms of legal, social and
political authority.67 Rawls is making a similar point in the first chapter of A Theory of
Justice when he says that, ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions…[and that]
laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or
abolished if they are unjust.’ It is man’s ‘shared conceptions of justice [that]
establishes the bonds of civic friendship’ and when these bonds are weakened or
diminished, as they are with laws that have no moral standing, then the thread of
society is in danger of being unravelled. In Rawls’s words, ‘distrust and resentment
corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men to act in ways they
would otherwise avoid.’68

At this point I would make some general comments about my position so far, both by
way of summary but also with an eye to future discussion. Vulnerability as I have
defined it, is the inability of an individual to function as a rational, autonomous and
moral agent. As a result those who are vulnerable are dependent upon the care and
consideration of others in order to secure their basic needs and interests which they
may be (temporarily) incapable of meeting or even recognising. Thus people are
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vulnerable when, at various stages of their lives, they are unable to act ‘in their own
regard’ and are forced to rely on others to ‘act for them’ to secure their well-being,
care and protection.

The relationship between those who are vulnerable and others who stand in some
regard to them can be thought of in terms of either a ‘special’ or a ‘general’
relationship. Special relationships describe those who have some responsibility to
the vulnerable, such as doctors, nurses, psychiatrists, policemen and the like, with
that responsibility emerging from the particular roles or occupations that relevant
people inhabit. Special relationships often encompass strict legal criteria, and legal
and professional sanctions apply to those whose acts fall below some fairly well
defined standard. General relationships, on the other hand, are primarily moral
demands that people act in a particular way to those they find vulnerable, but such
relationships are open to question from competing moral judgements about how
people ought to act, or even whether they ought to act at all. Crucially though I
suggest that any relationship between the vulnerable and those that stand in regard
to them is moral in both its structure and content. That is, we behave toward the
vulnerable, toward the very young, the sick, the dying, the mentally ill, those with
dementia and so on because of the ‘oughts’ contained within moral discourse.

The ‘oughts’ which guide our actions when considering how we should behave
toward the vulnerable may be inspired by a variety of traditions – some of which
invoke the spectre of rights and some of which do not. The comments earlier by
Epictetus suggest that we often help others not because they have a moral right to
our help but that our helping is due to some natural inclination to reach out to those
who are in need. And whilst both Rawls and Kant suggest that the duties we hold to
others are grounded in the moral rights that others possess, still the implication
remains even here that the act of caring and helping is in some way part of that
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constellation of behaviours that rational and sociable beings typically engage in – and
do so beyond the justification of rights. We might assume that even within a Kantian
or Rawlsian world, if it were agreed that not all rational beings could be said to have
rights, then requirements to help would still exist. Or would we argue that we only
ever help others if it can be shown that others are rights bearing creatures?

Other traditions approach the vulnerable without any sustaining force of rights.
Christian theology and virtue ethics for example, can certainly account for obligations
and duties toward the vulnerable that are not grounded in any view of rights,
correlative or otherwise. Christian theology would lay emphasis upon notions of
brotherhood, acts of compassion, our duties and obligations to the vulnerable being
part of a wider act of embracing the Divine. Virtue ethics may identify caring for
others as part of a repertoire of responses that the virtuous person may be required
to do for no other consideration than that of acting virtuously. And with respect to
what I will later discuss as ‘the narrative of everyday lives’, why is it that we act with
care towards others? Why does the general medical practitioner stop at a roadside
accident to render assistance? Is it because she is compelled to offer aid to a rights
bearing creature – or does she assist because of a strong sense of duty and
obligation (perhaps driven by Christian charity or the demands of her profession). As
we have seen above, once she is engaged in the caring process at the scene of the
accident certain rights and expectations that emerge from her professional role may
come into play, but this does not explain her act of stopping in the first place –
especially when she could have easily and anonymously driven past.

Despite the ‘promise’ that individual rights holds out for vulnerable people – that it
can ensure care and protection, this promise has often not been fulfilled. In later
chapters I will argue that the failure of rights is premised upon its inability to take
account of the sort of people that humans are and the sort of situations that humans
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often find themselves in, as well as the direction the thrust of rights takes. This
direction has its focus on the recipient of rights, the one who possesses rights, rather
than upon the agent who acts, the one who has duties or responsibilities to discharge
in order that rights be engaged. But next I want to turn my attention to this idea of
vulnerability and to explore exactly what we mean when we say of people that they
are vulnerable.

ii]

dimensions of vulnerability

‘She beckons me with her index finger. We both stare into the mirror
together. “There is a girl over there exactly like you”, she says excitedly. I
realise it is my reflection and she no longer recognises the mirror…This
intelligent woman now has no reasoning powers, no concentration, no
patience, no understanding of the simple matters, her ability to put words
together has gone. She has lost her independence and relies on others to
give her a shower, to keep her clothes clean, to dress and undress, to cook
for her and even to tell her when she is tired and hungry…The mother I have
today suffers from Alzheimer’s disease.’69

[In disorganised schizophrenia] hallucinations and delusions…are profuse
[with the sufferer] subject to bizarre ideas, often involving deterioration of the
body. He is constantly changeable breaking into inexplicable fits of laughter
and crying…behaviour is marked by a pattern of silliness and
absurdity…giggles childishly…speaks incoherently, stringing together similar
sounding words and inventing neologisms…His life seems a tangled skein of
delusions, mannerisms, and busy, inconsequential rituals…He frequently
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deteriorates to the point that he becomes incontinent, voiding anywhere and
at any time…completely neglects his appearance, never bathing, brushing his
teeth or combing his hair.’70

‘Your newborn baby’s behaviour is a series of reactions to what he perceives
as random stimuli. He has instincts and reflexes but no knowledge and no
experience. He does not know that he is himself, that the object he sees
moving in front of his face is his own hand or that it remains part of him when
it has vanished…He does not know that you are people either. He is
programmed to pay attention to you, to look at your faces and listen to your
voices. He is programmed to suck when you offer him a nipple. He is
programmed for survival but he knows nothing.71

The above examples of vulnerability present a powerful image of individuals who are
compromised in terms of their ability to function as rational, autonomous and moral
agents with regard to their own best interests. Yet vulnerability can confront people
on varying levels and to varying degrees. Not all vulnerability is as profound as that
presented above. It seems fair to say that people can be ‘more or less’ vulnerable
just as people can be ‘more or less’ rational, independent, autonomous, caring,
selfish, overweight or industrious. Vulnerability is, like the other variables I have
mentioned, a ‘degree-vague’ term, yet this ought cause no conceptual confusion.
The fact that we are often unable to be precise about the dimensions of relevant
variables does not render the variables themselves either meaningless or invalid.
For example, on the colour spectrum there is a point where orange merges into red
so that it becomes impossible to distinguish between the two. At some stage a
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colour may be ‘more or less’ orange or ‘more or less’ red but this does not invalidate
either orange or red that in most cases all but the colour blind would agree upon.72

If we accept that people can be ‘more or less’ vulnerable then there are two possible
ways we can proceed to elaborate further on this concept of vulnerability. First we
can identify vulnerability as encompassing a variety of distinct qualitative dimensions
and second we can propose both a stronger and a weaker sense of the term ‘being
vulnerable’. With regard to the former I want to suggest that we can see vulnerability
as either permanent, transitory, or episodic. Within the category of permanent
vulnerability we may place the chronically and profoundly intellectually disabled,
(those who suffer from severe autistic disorders for example) those with advanced
stages of dementia, those with serious birth trauma, some chronically mentally ill and
so on. People in this group may be viewed as incapable of rational, autonomous or
moral action in any meaningful sense of the way we employ those terms. Such
individuals have a total dependence on the care and protection of others for all
aspects of their daily life. By calling vulnerability permanent I have in mind the
unremitting and perpetual nature of the impairment with afflicted individuals requiring
continuing, ongoing and permanent specialised care by others.

Vulnerability may also be viewed as transitory. This level of vulnerability suggest a
resolution. Thus we include within this group the neonate, infant or child, or even the
healthy assertive adult who is anaesthetised and undergoing an operation. What is
expected is either the emergence to the status of a fully rational, autonomous agent,
as in the case of the former, or a return to such status, as with the latter.
Nevertheless inhabitants of this group remain totally dependent on the care and
protection of others for the duration of their vulnerability. Neonates and very young
children depend upon the care and protection of a responsible other, most often their
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parents, to care and protect them, whilst those undergoing operations depend upon
the expertise of medical professionals for similar consideration. Whilst neither group
can be described as rational, autonomous or moral creatures still, in the first case
such ability may be seen as a potential whilst in the second case it can be seen as
interrupted.

Finally we may view vulnerability as episodic. As the name implies this suggests
intermittent episodes of vulnerability in those who otherwise function as rational,
autonomous and moral beings. In this group we may include, for example, those
who experience recurring acute psychiatric illnesses that regularly demand the
intervention of others who are called upon to act in a capacity to care and protect. In
episodic vulnerability sufferers may demonstrate a profound impairment of normal
functioning, as in the case of someone with severe recurring bouts of catatonic or
paranoid schizophrenia or even someone whose manic episodes leave them
seriously impaired with respect to their ability to make reasoned and logical decisions
about their life. In this category we may also include those who are confronted with
profoundly stressful life situations such as being diagnosed with a life threatening
illness, a marriage break up, the death of a spouse or a child. It is certain that
incidences such as these will engender different responses in different people based
upon other factors (emotional responsiveness, personal resilience, support structures
and the like). And whilst such episodes may conclude with a return to normal levels
of functioning, hence my definition of episodic vulnerability, within the context of
experiences as these there will be a great variance in people’s ability to function as
‘normal’ rational reflective agents. Indeed it would seem axiomatic to suggest that
crisis situations have the potential to erode one’s ability to function as a fully
developed rational, autonomous and moral agent.
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Within the above categories of ‘permanent’, ‘transient’ or ‘episodic’ we see the
essential features of vulnerability as I have described them. First, is the individual’s
inability to function as fully developed rational, autonomous and moral beings that we
typically take humans to be. Second, when there is a relationship between those
who are vulnerable and those who stand in regard to them and are charged with their
care and protection, this relationship is often institutionalised. By ‘institutionalised’ I
mean that there are codes of practice, expectations of behaviour, a codification of
rules, professional ethics and, in a broader sense, the fact that those who are
vulnerable are often cared for within the confines of particular social arrangements.
These arrangements may be located within the hospital, the nursing home, the
psychiatric clinic or the family. Vulnerability implies one whose first order interests
are threatened and another who stands in regard to them and has either a legal or
moral duty to care and protect. Finally, the relationship between the vulnerable and
those who have certain obligations toward them is driven by moral concerns. Whilst
such relationships are often codified within legal frameworks, nevertheless the
reason why we care for and protect the vulnerable is because of the moral concerns
we have for them. It is the moral ‘oughts’ contained within the relationships we have
to the vulnerable that compel us to act in certain ways.

But apart from dividing vulnerability into distinct dimensions, we can also differentiate
between vulnerability in a strong sense and vulnerability in a weak sense. This
distinction is crucial for in this thesis whilst I acknowledge that some who are
vulnerable are still able to engage and employ the idea of rights to advantage, others,
particularly those whose vulnerability is profound (those with mental illness and
dementia for example), are increasingly unable to make use of rights talk. As stated
previously (in the introduction) as vulnerability increases it appears that rights talk
becomes less able to secure the care and protection so desired. And in this thesis it
is to the severe end of vulnerability that I address my comments. Thus in the
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introduction to this section I presented three examples of vulnerability in a strong
sense. Certain forms of dementia, severe mental illness and infancy represent
vulnerability at its most profound. These states are characterised by an emphatic
absence of any ability to function as a rational, autonomous and moral agent. The
new born, those in end stage dementia and the profoundly psychotic each share a
lack of rational capacity, an absence of independent action, and an inability to care
for themselves in even a minimal sense so that, left to their own devices, many will
simply die.

But of course not all people are vulnerable to this dramatic extent. For example,
whilst young children are vulnerable and liable to (physical, psychological and
emotional) harm, injury or death if not cared for, they are not as vulnerable as
neonates who have no rational or autonomous capacity. Neonates have a tenuous
grip on life. Left alone they will die and they will die very quickly. Vulnerability here is
a life and death issue. Children left alone are much less vulnerable and unless
encumbered by chronic injury or illness have a much better chance of survival. Yet
the differences are perhaps not that great. A substantial proportion of the world’s
children live an existence without any parental or adult supervision still they survive.
But they survive in a demeaned existence which is less than what we expect as a
minimum standard for all humans to enjoy. This tells us that vulnerability is more
than physical threats to one’s existence – it exists on the psychological and
emotional level as well. At what point in human development can the individual
function independently? The question need not be answered here. What is clear is
that there are gradations of vulnerability.

With regard to the elderly we can make a similar point. Not all the aged suffer from
dementia and, as Carney has pointed out, we ought not automatically pathologise
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those who are elderly.73 Yet both the aged and the frail aged and particularly those
who live in residential aged care facilities face a variety of issues and problems which
render them vulnerable in at least the weaker sense of that term. I am referring here
to the complex of, in particular, biological and social issues that often confront those
who are elderly. Most obvious are the physical realities of being aged, especially the
‘old – old’74, whether this involves ‘normal’ age related deterioration such as decline
in memory, judgement, cognitive processes, a loss of mobility, and thus an increased
ability to perform basic acts of self care, 75 an increased susceptibility to illness and
so on, 76 or more specific clinical states such as Parkinson’s Disease and other age
related conditions. Added to this is an often allied loss of autonomy, an increased
marginalisation and dependency77 and a forced reliance on structures and institutions
over which they often have little or no control or influence. The vulnerability of the
elderly may be contained within the perceptions that the elderly themselves have
about their own fears, limitations, and threats to their personal wellbeing and survival
emanating from their own frailty relative to others in the population.78 Thus whilst
many aged both inside and outside institutions are not vulnerable in the strong sense
of that term, they are nevertheless vulnerable in a weaker sense in that physical and
social factors intervene to reduce their ability to function as fully developed
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autonomous and independent beings, and force them to rely increasingly on the
actions of others to secure their interests and well being.

And this provides us with the key to the understanding of the idea of vulnerability. To
be vulnerable has to do with one’s inability to function as a rational, autonomous and
independent being and to be forced to rely on others for some (greater or lesser)
degree of support, assistance and protection, and in some cases for one’s very
survival. And so we can propose this idea of vulnerability in contrast to the concept
of the rational, assertive and independent moral agent who both identifies her own
self interests and sets about in a single minded and self assured way to achieve
those interests. Indeed it often appears that we have become so focussed on the
idea of the individual as a rational, autonomous and moral agent acting in her own
best interests that we too often forget of the innumerable periods in one’s life when
such a state of affairs does not accurately reflect what it means to be human. We all,
for example, begin life in a state of utter vulnerability, depending upon others for our
very survival. Many of us will become aged and frail aged and so our choices and
options will be heavily circumscribed as a direct consequence.

Yet between these extremes of infancy and old age it would still be folly to assume
that the image of the rational, assertive, autonomous and independent rights bearing
agent holds sway. Beyond infancy and old age where we may readily accept that the
threat of vulnerability is ever present, we seek comfort in the belief that humans are
typically rational, autonomous and moral creatures who identify, seek and assert their
own best interests. Yet this archetype is not in harmony with the world as we know it,
for a multiplicity of influences and incidents can intervene to reduce our ability to
function in a way that we take for granted is characteristically human. A variety of
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illnesses, whether life threatening or not, the experience of chronic pain,79 anxiety,
drug addiction, alcoholism, separation and divorce, the death of a loved one, financial
ruin, chronic anxiety, the various forms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and the
like, all these and many other instances besides have the capacity to reduce our
ability to function as the rational agents we assume that humans are. Take, for
example, the increasingly common incidence of stroke, or cerebrovascular accident.
Whyte and Mulsant write that, ‘in the United States, there are approximately 600,000
new cases each year’ and that there are currently some 4.5 million survivors.80
Stroke is often accompanied by, and associated with, a whole range of disabilities
such as, increased cognitive impairment, loss of health, of occupation, of social role,
of independence, an increased incidence of depression, suicidality and mortality.81
At such times and in such circumstances we are vulnerable. At such times and in
such circumstances we are forced to rely on others for our care and protection.

There are then, many points in our life when we are unable to behave as the rational,
autonomous and moral agent that is encapsulated within the liberal notion of human
rights. In the next chapter I want to explore this point more fully, but at the present I
would content myself with the following position: that there is indeed a prima facie
case to be made that suggests the image of the rational, autonomous and moral
agent that lies at the heart of the rights paradigm is often insufficient to describe all
the many and varied ways in which humans are characteristically human. In order to
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adequately and convincingly account for what it means to be human we must first
recognise the reality of human vulnerability. For it is a fact of human existence that
before man is rational he is not-rational; before he is independent he is dependent;
before he is a creature capable of a moral calculus, he is amoral – that is, before he
can hope to aspire to the rational reflective and responsible agent we typically take
humans to be, he is vulnerable. And it is also a fact that vulnerability is a constant
companion of humans throughout the life span. Not always dominant, to be sure, but
always a companion – like a shadow it stalks the rational, autonomous individual
constantly threatening his very existence. If this is correct then it becomes of crucial
importance as to how we approach those amongst us who are vulnerable; in what
way do we depend upon other people and what sustains, in philosophical terms, the
relationship between the vulnerable and others who may be called upon to care and
protect. In the next section I want to briefly address one particular and current way
that we approach these questions.

iii]

vulnerability and human rights

When confronted with groups and individuals who are vulnerable, whether we think
of this vulnerability as expressed in a strong sense or in a weak sense, we have
tended to frame our responses in terms of rights and in particular in terms of human
rights. We have made the assumption that the rights response is the most effective
way to deal with the vulnerability that some groups and individuals experience. In
Australia in recent years we have become familiar with notions of children’s rights,82
the rights of the frail aged in residential aged care facilities83, the rights of the
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homeless,84 and ‘the human rights of people with mental illness’, to cite a recent
federal report of that title.85 By engaging the rights response we seek to establish a
normative moral framework within which relationships between the vulnerable and
those who are charged with their care and protection can be structured. Emerging
from this framework we seek strategic benefits for vulnerable people that aim to
minimise the effect of their vulnerability from whatever contexts such effects are
generated. By invoking human rights we seek two interrelated goals. First, we seek
to confirm our commitment to the moral worth and value of such individuals, and
second, we hope to protect these individuals against the worst features of their
vulnerability. In this way we both re-affirm and re-establish man as a rational,
autonomous actor. Through the medium of human rights, vulnerability is challenged
and the moral agent is ascendant.

Modern human rights theory, even that which goes beyond civil and political rights
and encompasses social, economic, cultural and collectivist dimensions, embraces
and enshrines the concept of the rational, autonomous and moral individual. This
rights bearing individual, whom Kant identified as a rational being, ‘…a subject of
ends…’ and who ‘…must be made the ground for all maxims of action’, lies at the
moral and political hub of discussions about human rights.86 And although Kant
makes a distinction between the phenomenal world (of appearances) and the
noumenal world (of things in themselves), nevertheless it is the view of the rational
man, the noumenal individual, that lies at the heart of the liberal view of human
rights. In Kantian terms, the world of human rights is bounded by the rational actor
who, in recognising both his own rationality and the rationality of his fellows, is
impelled to act in certain ways that exist beyond narrow self interest. It is this notion
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of ‘shared rationality’ that lies at the heart of both Kant’s philosophy and human
rights.

To talk of human beings is thus to talk of beings with rights; rights that emerge out of
individual rationality. It is to acknowledge the concept of the individual as rational,
autonomous and independent, as bound to other rational, autonomous and
independent individuals in a system of mutually advantageous rights; a community of
equals, each rational, purposeful, assertive and self-willed, and with individuals
themselves the best judge of their own unique self interest. To embrace rights is
therefore to embrace both a particular idea of what it means to be human as well as
to commit oneself to ensure some form of protection for that idea. As Kenneth
Minogue once remarked, human rights can be seen as a form of ‘protective moral
armour’ designed to shield individuals against a hostile and potentially invasive
world.87 This view establishes people as responsible moral actors, agents capable of
making choices about how they act and treat others as well as beings who are
inherently valuable and worth protecting. It also establishes people as individuals
who can articulate and assert their own interests in the face of the interests of others.
Human rights seek to establish man’s ‘humanity’ as well as to offer effective
protection for that humanity. To deny people their rights is thus to treat them as less
than the rational, autonomous and moral agents that we take all people to be. It is to
undermine their interests. It is to diminish their standing as moral creatures. To
embrace human rights is to embrace the notion of man as a rational, autonomous
and moral agent whilst at the same time it is to seek to protect him against those who
would do him harm.

87

Kenneth Minogue, ‘The History of the Idea of Human Rights’, in. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin
[eds], The Human Rights Reader, New York, Meridian Books, 1979, pp 3-17.

68
Yet this view of man has only an occasional relationship with reality. As I have
suggested throughout this chapter, the idea of vulnerability challenges, compromises
and undermines the view of man that has traditionally underpinned the rights
paradigm. At its harshest, vulnerability in the strong sense, the picture of man is of
one whose capacities for rational, autonomous and moral action are non-existent.
This is the experience of the infant, the chronically mentally ill, the sufferer in end
stage dementia. But even vulnerability in the weak sense contradicts our view of
man as a rational, reflective actor. We are presented then with two possible views of
what constitutes the individual. On the one hand we have, as Kitwood has
suggested, ’...the individual...of bourgeois commonsense, the owner of property, the
possessor of legal rights…self determining through the rational pursuit of his own
ends…’ a perspective, he asserts, that ‘has crept unrecognised into moral theory and
become accepted as the criterion of a universal humanity.’88 On the other hand we
have a picture of one who, although capable of rational thought and action, is
nevertheless beset by many periods in her life when such rational, reflective action is
impaired, diminished or even non existent. Thus Kitwood notes that in contrast to a
view which sees humans ‘as rational, whole, and competent...therapists draw
attention to widespread impairment, alienation and fragmentation’ amongst people,
which is demonstrated by individuals who ‘...have come to the end of their personal
resources [and suffer] “burn out”, anxiety, depression, and a whole variety of stressrelated illnesses.’89

There is therefore an apparent contradiction between the human rights view of man
and the view of the individual that emerges from within the picture of his vulnerability.
In emphasising man as a rational, autonomous and moral agent we have tended to
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ignore the many times in his life when he cannot be so described. But also, in
emphasising rights we have tended to minimise duties. Both in our picture of the
individual and in the social, political and economic arrangements we have set in
place, ostensibly to protect the vulnerable, we have tended to ignore the duties that
are required in order for rights to be effectively engaged. This is particularly so in
Australia with respect to the aged in residential facilities and in respect to the
mentally ill. The terms and scope of duties have been largely ignored. In some
cases we have made them optional. Consequently effective human rights protection
for vulnerable people, especially the aged and the mentally ill, has been erratic at
best and in some cases non-existent. I intend to discuss the plight of these two
groups of people at some length later in the thesis. In the final chapter I will present
an argument for the care and protection of vulnerable people that pays due attention
to the importance of the duties we owe the vulnerable, but for now I want to reflect
upon what it means to be vulnerable from the perspective of the individual subjective
encounter.
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Chapter Two:

i]

Vulnerability - Personal

introduction

When we describe someone as being a rational, reflective agent we are often led to
say that the individual in question is a ‘person’ or that she possesses ‘personhood’.
People who talk this way do so in order to make a distinction between different types
of human beings or, to be more precise, between human beings with different
attributes or abilities. Some human beings, those who are clearly and indisputably
rational, autonomous and moral agents for example, are defined as being ‘persons’
or in possession of ‘personhood’. Others, particularly those who cannot be described
in terms of a rational reflective ability, are often regarded as either having a
diminished personhood or in some cases as having no personhood at all. In a recent
textbook on nursing and ethics the authors ask the rhetorical question of why it is that
we make the distinction between being a person and being human. Their answer is
that in so doing we help to establish who has priority in the allocation of goods and
services, or ‘who have priority for being helped to live and those who are valued as
being less important.’ As they make clear ‘…one needs some criteria for deciding
who lives or dies [and] those with severe mental, social or emotional incompetence
may not qualify as persons.’ In other words ‘when there is only so much room at the
table, hard choices have to be made.’90

Thus there is often a distinction made in the literature between ‘persons’, those who
have a certain intrinsic worth and value, who are the bearers of rights and because of
this who have entitlements to the allocation of resources - and those, let us call them
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‘non-persons’, who have much less value, minimalist rights and little entitlement to
resources. This distinction seems clearly made by the authors of the nursing
textbook quoted above. It is also made by those such as Singer, Tooley, Khuse and
others.91 Most bluntly Tooley has argued that,

‘an organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept
of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and
believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.’92

Such a position clearly has profound implications for a whole range of people. Part
of the problem is of course that there is a burden of responsibility for those so
afflicted to convince others that one is indeed a ‘continuing subject of experiences’
and if one is unable to convince others of this fact then one is on shaky ground
indeed. In this way Tooley’s argument, and arguments like his, are based not so
much on the ‘possession’ of such abilities as it is upon the ‘demonstration’ that one
can be described in this way. The distinction is important and I think one that is too
easily ignored. It is by no means always possible to be precise about making
distinctions between persons and prospective non-persons, and there are many
groups of individuals who must sit uncomfortably on the knife edge between these
two discreet conditions; for example those who suffer from autism, Motor Neurone
Disease, Parkinson’s Disease, Huntington’s Chorea, and various forms of dementia
to name but a few. Further, there is enough research to suggest that simply because
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people cannot assert their personhood in traditional ways it does not mean that
personhood is absent.93

Nevertheless discussions about personhood and its dimensions do connect us to the
sorts of problems that confront those who are vulnerable, because those who are
vulnerable can be said to have their personhood compromised at least in the
traditional sense of what constitutes being a person. Traditionally, when people
invoke the concept of personhood they invoke notions of being a rational,
autonomous and moral agent and certainly if these qualities are compromised or
diminished then (in traditional terms at least) notions of personhood appear under
threat. But what do we mean by these terms? In the following I want to first answer
that particular question and then reflect upon what it means to have these qualities in
some way impaired. In that way we can better appreciate what it means to be
vulnerable in the way that I am employing that term.

ii]

on personhood

By invoking the concept of personhood we are making a distinction between those
beings who are members of a particular species and those beings who are members
of that species with certain defining abilities. What are the abilities in question and
what is it that is taken as constitutive of being a person? John Locke’s answer to this
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question is probably still the most well known and the most succinct. In An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding Locke writes that the term ‘person’ refers to one
who is

‘…a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and
places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable
from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible
for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive.’94

It is from the ability to think, to reason and to reflect that the nature of personhood is
most usually defined. It is from the individual’s ‘reflective awareness’ (which is not
only to know but to know that one knows) that develops ‘…the ability to engage in
imagination, self scrutiny, scientific hypothesising, philosophical speculation, the
evolution of a self concept…[as well as] ethical concerns [such as] a sense of right
and wrong, good and bad, transcendent values, and scales of values.’95 Personhood
is thus grounded in or predicated upon, (but not confined to) notions of agency. As
Lowe puts it, to be a person is essentially to be ‘…something that acts and perceives
and knows that it does so: it is [to be] a perceiving self-conscious agent, or,
alternatively, an active, self conscious percipient,’ or at the very least it is to be
something that has the capacity to act in this way. 96

Thus the idea of personhood has traditionally been described in terms of other
concepts such as consciousness, self-concept, self awareness, intentional behaviour
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and the ability to construct and to carry out projects, as well as some essential
feature of moral awareness. Quinton, for example, suggests five criteria of
personhood; consciousness, rationality, agency, morality and what we might call a
sensitivity to the aims, aspirations and ambitions of others demonstrated through the
ability to form and sustain relationships.97 This implies at least two paradigms (interrelated rather than distinct) which can be described respectively as metaphysical
personhood and moral personhood and which can be seen as providing the
philosophical context from which notions of personhood emerge or are most usually
constructed.98

Metaphysical personhood mirrors that of Locke fairly closely and suggests an entity
may be regarded as a person if it displays a certain mix of rather precise cognitive
abilities. These are most often defined as individual rationality, the possession of a
personalised self concept, an awareness of one’s continuing existence over time, an
ability to demonstrate a degree of autonomous action, and the capacity to engage in
some form of effective communication.99 This approach is most clearly revealed in
the writings of Singer, Feinberg and Tooley. Singer has suggested that persons are
‘self-conscious or rational beings.’100 What makes a being a person in a ‘morally
relevant sense’ and thus places such beings in line for special consideration not due
other animals, are powers of ‘self awareness…rationality… moral sense …autonomy
or some combination of these.’101 Similarly Feinberg suggests that personhood
consists of consciousness, a self concept, self awareness, the capacity to experience
emotions, to reason, to have understanding, to plan, to act subsequent to plans and

97

A. Quinton, The Nature of Things, London, Routledge, 1973.
Tom L. Beauchamp, ‘The Failure of Theories of Personhood’ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4
(1999), pp 309-324.
99
ibid, pp 309-310
100
Peter Singer, ‘Value of Life’ in. Encyclopaedia of Bioethics. Vol. 2, p 823.
101
Peter Singer, ‘Embryo Experimentation and the Moral Status of the Embryo’ in. Eric Matthews and
Michael Menlowe [eds] Philosophy and Health Care, Aldershot, Avebury, 1992.
98

75
to experience pleasure and pain.102 Tooley, as we have seen, has argued that such
cognitive abilities form the basis not only of the ownership of rights but also, and by
extension, a moral entitlement to exist.

Others have sought to be even more precise about the criteria of personhood.
Fletcher’s definition includes neo-cortical activity, an IQ at least in the region of 20 to
40 points, the existence of a sense of past and future with self-awareness,
consciousness of others, the ability to communicate and the ability to form and
sustain what is defined as ‘significant’ relationships.103 In distinguishing between
being human from being a person Bandman and Bandman suggest that whilst the
former is biological, the latter is (crucially) biographical.

‘One who has hopes, plans, projects, a past, the sense of the present, joys,
frustrations, the capacity to regret, and a sense of a future with expectations
and prospects, all of which presuppose consciousness – such a being is said
to have a life as a person. If one can plan a vacation, drive a car, play a
musical instrument, or have some similar project, then one is living a
biographical life and said to be a person.’104

Contrasted with metaphysical personhood is moral personhood. Moral personhood
lays emphasis upon man as a moral actor. It assumes that one is a person if one
‘…is capable of making moral judgements about the rightness and wrongness of
actions and…has motives that can be judged morally.’ To be a person is to be a
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moral agent. It is to be one who understands ‘moral reciprocity and the communal
expectation that they will treat others as moral persons.’105

The idea of persons being ‘moral actors’ involves both distinctions between what
constitutes ‘good’ as opposed to ‘bad’ behaviours as well as an ability to make
evaluative judgements between alternate ways of being. Two contexts are implied
here. One has to do with moral communities who establish rules that evaluate moral
conduct and the other has to do with the moral actors that inhabit such communities.
With regard to the notion of moral communities the emphasis is upon social
structures composed of rational, self conscious entities who have agreed upon some
(albeit minimalist) shared notion of appropriate ways of acting, of moral standards, of
rules of conduct and who are able to accept, as well as ascribe to others,
responsibility for actions. To refer to moral communities is to assume the existence
of beings who can make morally relevant evaluations about standards and codes of
conduct. To assume that such beings exist is also to assume that they are beings
who are capable of making choices, of rationally deciding between different courses
of action and being able to give reasons in terms of rationality and morality for why
they acted so.

The other context has to do with the sort of lives led by those who live in moral
communities. This recognises that only persons have the potential to make
qualitative and evaluative judgements about standards of acting that for them
represent the pursuit of the good. I am referring here to discussions by both
Frankfurt106 and Taylor107 on the distinction between first and second order desires.

105

Tom L. Beauchamp, op cit, p 316. [f/n 98 at p 74]
H. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy, 67:1
(Jan 1971), pp 5-20.
107
Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1985.
106

77
Whilst both humans and animals may have first order desires, defined as wants,
motives or choices, humans alone possess ‘…the capacity for reflective self
evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.’108 Second
order desires are the ability to evaluate desires and make judgements that some are
desirable and some are undesirable. This is a ‘qualitative evaluation of desires’ that
recognises that not all wants are of the same order or on the same level. But it also
recognises that to persons how they are and the type of individual they are is
important. The way they live lives, whether to be honourable, or virtuous, or
courageous, or noble, their ability to reflect on qualitative standards of being that
drive areas such as the arts, music, literature, language, psychology and moral
discourse, is fundamental to being a person.

On this reading then, there is a distinction to be made between persons and agents.
The two are not synonymous. To be an agent is to act with regard to one’s own
interests. Such a definition may often include higher order animals. Indeed we could
suggest that all animals may to a degree possess agency in some sense especially if
we define agency as self interest followed by a crude goal directed intentionality. Yet
non-human animals are generally not regarded as having personhood and the
reason for this is that they are not viewed as moral actors. To be a person is
certainly founded upon or predicated upon a conscious, reflective, rationality
(agency) yet personhood goes further and embraces a moral dimension. That is, to
be a person involves both the ability to make moral judgements, to see oneself as a
being who is capable of ‘praise and blame’, whilst it is also to understand oneself on
a evaluative and qualitative level that encourages us to constantly define and
redefine both our world and who we are in the world in a way that allows us to be
moral beings that are in unique ways distinct from all other beings.
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Put another way, when confronted with beings, whether human or non-human, that
display rational, autonomous or moral capacity we are led to identify personhood,
whereas for those who display no such attributes or abilities we often (it is said) find it
difficult to attribute any sense of personhood to them.109 As Lowe points out, ‘when
we want to consider what sort of evidence we look for if we want to detect the
presence of a person…we do not in fact necessarily look for bodily characteristics of
any sort: [rather] we look for intelligent activity, and where we find it we attribute its
source to a person.’110 Perhaps, and more importantly, when no intelligent activity is
found, when one is confronted with an individual who displays no rational, reflective
activity, then, on the above premise, many find it difficult to attribute personhood.
The emphasis is thus upon persons defined in terms of rational, autonomous and
moral agents. In traditional terms at least this is what personhood identifies. This
raises difficult moral issues, not the least being what happens to those humans who
cannot be defined as persons, and of course why ought moral consideration attach to
certain cognitive and intellectual qualities? Whilst these are important questions to
address, in the following I want to focus primarily on the traditional approach to
personhood. Certainly it seems that we would all agree that no matter what we saw
as essentially constitutive of being a person, in some way the ‘being’ of a person is
necessarily diminished if that individual cannot be regarded as a rational,
autonomous or a moral agent.
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iii]

personhood and rationality

It is rationality which provides the ‘intelligent activity’ upon which the concept of
personhood has traditionally been founded. There are at least two ways in which we
can understand the notion of rationality. These I identify as ‘agency-based rationality’
and ‘virtue-based rationality’. Agency-based rationality, or what we may call ‘the
common sense approach’, has to do with the ability of individuals to act out of reason
and in pursuit of certain goals or ends that they view as desirable. Virtue-based
rationality, on the other hand, derives in large part from Kant and, as Lindley points
out, has not to do with ‘the authorship of beliefs, desires, emotions and actions...[but
with] their acceptability.’111

To act rationally according to Kant is to divorce oneself from personal inclinations,
desires, feelings and wants, to go beyond whim, ambition and narrow self interest
and to act in accordance with certain universal moral principles. To describe some
moral principles as ‘universal’ is to say that they can be applied equally to all rational
beings everywhere and be recognised as a way such rational beings ought always
be treated. Thus such principles transcend any notion of narrow self interests or the
demands of one’s own particular situation. Kant’s view of rationality is intrinsic to and
underpins both his notions of moral action and autonomy and by extension his view
of the person. To be a person, according to Kant, is to be a rational and autonomous
individual, what he calls ‘the subject of a morally practical reason’.

In The Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that rational actions are
those based upon laws themselves derived from what he calls ‘the categorical
imperative’. In practical terms this demands that one ought to adhere to the maxim
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to ‘act in such a way that you…treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an
end.’112 This requires the individual to transcend his own particular interest and act
as if the interests of all people were as equally as important and valid. Writing in The
Metaphysics of Morals he says that ‘moral personality is…nothing other than the
freedom of a rational being under moral laws,’ and in a footnote says that, ‘the less a
human being can be constrained by natural means (by force or authority) and the
more he can be constrained morally (through the mere representation of duty), so
much the more free he is.’ 113

Rationality for Kant is thus to act out of concerns for rationality (i.e. ‘pure’ rationality)
alone, that is, to be moved only by what is rational in a universal sense and not by
one’s own perspective. In this way Kantian rationality transcends self interest. Yet
Kant’s view of rationality is fundamentally at odds with what we see as descriptive of
ordinary people. The most telling criticism of ‘pure rationality’ is that the moral actor
is in some way portrayed as disembodied from the conditions of his own social
existence, yet at the same time is called upon to make moral judgments that assess
how one should act in the real world of human roles and relationships. In trying to
‘factor out’ notions of self interest, which Kant sees as a deceptive and misleading
basis for moral action, Kant has, according to Sandel, denied too much of the human
situation and located too much in the transcendental.114

The relationship between individuals and their interests is precisely the point at which
Kant’s virtue based rationality differs from agency based rationality, or what we may

112

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork to the Metaphysic of Morals, Quoted in H. J. Paton, The Moral Law,
London, Hutchison, 1948, p 91.
113
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals [translated and edited by Mary Gregor, introduction by
Roger J. Sullivan] Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p 147.
114
Michael Sandel ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’’ Political Theory Vol. 12,
No. 1, February 1984, pp 81-96.

81
regard as the common sense approach to rationality. When we talk about rationality
in common sense terms we are firmly locating people within the context of their own
social being and we are making judgements about the appropriateness or otherwise
of their behaviours and actions within this context. Whereas Kantian rationality
eschewed self interest and the pursuit of the individual will, the common-sense
approach to rationality seeks precisely these ends. In this way agency based
rationality is strategic rather than virtuous.

Agency based rationality demands that one has the ability to reflect upon one’s
actions, choices, options and possibilities and to construct responses that are valid
according to one’s personal life, a life that is located within a social and cultural
context. As Epictetus tells us in his Discourses, it is man’s rational faculty alone that
enables him to make judgements, ‘to approve or disapprove’, concerning how he
ought to act for it is this faculty alone ‘...which contemplates both itself and all other
things.’ ‘The rational faculty,’ he writes ‘..is the only faculty that we have received
which examines itself...and examines all other faculties.’115

This logical reflective approach is echoed later in the writings of both Hobbes and
Locke. Writing in Leviathan, Hobbes says that, ‘when a man Reasoneth, hee does
nothing else but conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a
Remainder, from Subtraction of one summe from another…’116 But reasoning for
Hobbes is not simply a mechanistic faculty or ability. Crucially it is a reflective
process, ‘a good and orderly Method’117 he calls it, engaged in by rational, reflective
beings to regulate the framework of their lives whether this embraces philosophy,
law, politics, geometry, logic and so on. And reasoning is not embraced in the
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abstract as Kant might have us believe. Reason begins by describing (naming) the
world that people inhabit (information obtained from the sense) and moves on from
that point to understanding and action. Writes Hobbes;

‘The use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of
one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled
signification of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one
consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion,
without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was
grounded and inferred.’118

Reason is for Hobbes man’s sine qua non. ‘Right reason’ as Hobbes puts it, is after
all ‘the undoubted word of God’ to be ‘employed in the purchase of Justice, Peace,
and true Religion.’119 Although some have argued that Hobbes’ man is best
described in terms of his appetites or passions120 I agree with both Goyard-Fabre121
and Gert122 that it is in fact man’s ability to reason that defines him. Reason subdues
the passions and encourages man to seek his best interests.

Of course we assume that it is reason that drives action. An essential part of being a
rational agent is the ability to control our emotions and not to be overwhelmed by
them. Strong passions (love, hate, envy, lust, greed, ambition) if followed without
reflection or assessment or consideration of potential risks may simply hasten our
118
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own destruction. An important part of being a rational agent is to stand apart from
our emotions and to assess the costs that any potential action may have for us.
Those who cannot do this, who are led in a very reactive sense by their emotions
with no regard for the impact their actions will have on others or themselves, we
regard as unpredictable, dangerous or irrational. When confronted with such people,
with those who cannot be rational in a strategic sense, then we are encouraged to
impose external measures of control to supplant absent internal measures.

In like vein Locke too made it clear that it was man’s ability to engage in rational
contemplation as ‘a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection’, that
defined him as a person. Reason is, says Locke, ‘the discovery of the Certainty or
Probability of such Propositions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at by Deductions
made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties, viz. by
Sensation or Reflection’.123 It was the ability to reason that separated ‘man from
brutes’.124 Similarly it was defects in rationality that define both ‘madmen’ and ‘idiots’.
Madmen may have retained the ability to reason but, says Locke, ‘having joined
together some Ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths; and they err as men
do, that argue right from wrong Principles….’ But idiots, he says, ‘make very few or
no Propositions, and reason scarce at all.’125 Further, a lack of rational ability can
also be found in children but as Locke makes clear this is amenable to upbringing by
which children, through industry and education, become rational agents that attain
full adult (or person) status.
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Agency based rationality describes actions that are based upon desires that are valid
or understandable within the context of an individual’s personal existence and are
directed towards ends that are themselves equally valid and understandable ‘...as
something a person would want.’126 Thus when the idea of ‘personhood’ is
embraced, it is to identify more than simply a rational agent yet it is difficult to
imagine this idea of personhood in the absence of an agency based rationality. In
talking of rationality we are acknowledging not simply that man is an animal
characterised by his ability to think (to plan, to calculate, to act), but more importantly
it is to think in a way that enables him to both reflect on what he thinks and to engage
in a sensible and continuous dialogue with others of his kind. As Crowley writes (and
it is a point which could easily be seen as a rebuff to anti-psychiatrists), rationality ‘is
a faculty which permits a human being in full possession of his senses to act in a way
which others in his society find intelligible.’127

As an agent who thinks, rationality serves the prioritising of certain specific goals
amongst a whole range of possible goals. Rationality on this level recognises, as
Hume puts it, ‘that…in adapting means to ends [we] are guided by reason and
design, and that ‘tis not ignorantly nor casually we perform those actions, which tend
to self preservation, to the obtaining pleasure, and avoiding pain’.128 As an agent
who reflects (Frankfurt’s ‘second order desires’), rationality serves a critical
evaluative function that offers an account of what was done and why one course of
action was preferred to another when one is confronted by a whole variety of
possible actions. Finally rationality involves recognition that the choices adopted by

126

Michael S. Moore Law and Psychiatry: rethinking the relationship, op cit, p 101.[f/n 53 at p 51]
Brian Lee Crowley, ‘Character, Depth and Rationality: On the Reality of Liberal Man’ in. The Self,
The Individual and the Community: Liberalism in the Political Thought of F. A. Hayek and Sidney and
Beatrice Webb, Oxford, Clarendon, 1987, p 175.
128
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Edited, with an Analytical Index by L. A. Selby-Bigge,
2nd Edition by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978. Book I, Part III, Section XVI.
127

85
an individual must be seen within the context of possible choices by numerous
individuals. Thus the individual

‘…realises that she must choose among many possible ways of life, and that
the breadth and richness of her choices depend on the existence of other
persons choosing in other ways. She therefore sees her life in a social
context, as made possible through interaction with others – interaction which
of course also makes possible their lives.’129

Human rationality is thus strategically social.

iv]

personhood and autonomy

The concept of autonomy is closely bound up with the notion of personal or individual
freedom. We are autonomous when we are free to make our own decisions about
how we ought to live and we are free only to the extent that autonomous
(independent, self-initiated, rational) decision making is possible. It is this
association between freedom, rationality and autonomy that Locke is appealing to
when he described man as a rational, autonomous actor who had joined with other
equally rational, autonomous actors to give their consent to be governed, with the
expressed aim of preserving their natural freedom and individuality. Locke spoke of
the ‘…equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being
subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man’,130 and that liberty itself consisted
in the ability of the individual ‘…to dispose, and order, as he lists, his Person,
Actions, Possessions, and his whole Property, within the Allowance of those Laws
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under which he is; and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of another, but
freely follow his own.’131

In talking about autonomy and freedom in this way, Locke was endorsing a
fundamental historical shift that was occurring in the way that the individual was
conceived. To be sure notions of individual freedom and liberty did not begin or end
with Locke, but Locke does represent a dramatic shift in the way that freedom and
autonomy (particularly its social, political and economic variant) was conceptualised.
The individual in Locke’s political theory was vastly different from pre-modern man.
In pre-modern society, for example, the idea of the individual existing in some way
apart from the social institutions and structures within which men found themselves
(church, state, city, occupation, family) was unknown. Man regarded himself, and
was regarded by others, in terms of his association with other men and his place in
the overall social order. As Fromm points out

‘a person was identical with his role in society; he was a peasant, an artisan,
a knight, and not an individual who happened to have this or that
occupation…He did not conceive of himself as an individual except through
the medium of his social (which was then also his natural) role…[and neither
did he] conceive of any other persons as “individuals” either.’132

In the Middle Ages, as Burckhardt argues in his well known thesis, ‘man was
conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation
– only through some general category.’133 Such a view is diametrically opposed to
our modern day conception of what it means to be an autonomous individual. Indeed
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our modern day view owes much to Locke, where the emphasis is upon one who,
whilst enmeshed within social networks of varying kinds, can nevertheless still
remain beyond such networks and retain a social, political and economic identity that
is in some way distinct from all others with whom one interacts.

Whilst the idea of freedom as autonomy has its roots in John Locke, it is to be found
also within both Kant and in particular in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. Kant’s view of
the rational individual was discussed above where it was noted that rationality
consisted in the ability of the individual to stand apart from the social roles she
occupied and to judge values, beliefs and ideas according to the dictates of a reason
that transcended self interest. According to Kant it is only this individual who can be
said to be autonomous; that is, to be fully autonomous one has to be fully rational.
The truly autonomous person is one possessed of a pure rationality, one who seeks
only those actions that are in harmony with certain moral principles; principles which
are capable of being universalised beyond narrow self interest; principles that any
rational individual in any situation would want to apply as a guide to ways of
behaving.

For Mill, to be autonomous, or to be an ‘individual’ for Mill did not use the term
‘autonomy’ directly, is to be firmly grounded within the social and political order and
to be able to subject that order to intellectual scrutiny in a never ending quest for
ultimate truth. Autonomy for Mill is not an end in itself. The purpose of autonomy is
to be able to question traditional and accepted norms no matter how inconvenient,
irritating or uncomfortable such questioning might be, in order to arrive at what is, for
oneself, the correct way to live. The truly autonomous person, according to Mill,
questions all social values and beliefs, including her own, in order to arrive at truth.
Thus Mill sought to minimise interference in the lives of others. His well known
‘liberty principle’ is a call to respect the autonomy of others, for in the absence of
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certainty over how one ought to live, each person must discover for herself the
correct life to choose. Whilst Mill acknowledged that a community could exercise
power over another to prevent him doing others harm he was adamant that ‘over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.’134

Despite problems inherent in the works of Locke, Kant and Mill our present day
approach to autonomy in general reflects the writings of these individuals. Locke for
example puts the rational, autonomous, rights bearing individual who freely gives his
consent to be governed as the very reason for the existence of the liberal state. Yet
Locke clearly excluded atheists, women and slaves from his conception of social
participation and political liberty.135 From Kant came the idea that rational beings
ought to be seen as ends in themselves, as beings of unconditional worth and value,
rather than as means to the ends of others. But in his emphasis on the subjection of
the individual will to norms that can be universalised and applied to all rational beings
Kant emphasises that freedom is thus acquired by a life of duty136 whilst posing a
view of autonomy and rationality that seems far removed from the sorts of problems,
dilemmas and issues that confront individuals in a social reality. And whilst Mill
argues that the individual is sovereign over all acts and actions that affect only
himself – the distinction between ‘self-regarding’ and ‘other-regarding’ behaviours –
his position falters on the recognition that in fact no such distinction can (in the
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majority of cases) be easily made. Also, Mill the utilitarian is no doubt forced to admit
that if it satisfies utility that no-one be autonomous then indeed heteronomy ought
prevail.

Nevertheless, such comments aside, our modern approach to autonomy reflects
elements of the above authors. In particular it reflects that of Mill. As opposed to
Kantian universality, Mill doubts that ethical norms can be universalised and that
individuals can ever be ultimately certain about the nature of reality and the nature of
truth. People, that is rational, autonomous and moral agents, have to seek in a
purposefully reflective way the truth that is meaningful to themselves. To have ‘truth’
imposed by others is as demeaning as it is illogical. It is demeaning for it reduces
humans to less than the rational creatures that we know they are, and it is illogical for
no-one can be certain that their particular view of reality is in fact the correct one.
Individuals ought to shape their own lives in a way that reflects their own rational
ends for it is in this shaping, this affirmation of one’s own will and personality
thoughtfully considered and unhindered in its expression that the mature,
independent and autonomous individual emerges. As Mill makes clear;

‘The human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental
activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice.
He who does anything because it is the custom makes no choice. He gains
no practice either in discerning or desiring what is best. The mental and
moral, like the muscular powers, are improved by being used….He who lets
the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need
of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.’137
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Thus our modern view of autonomy has come to mean, as Miller puts it, ‘…the right
to make one’s own choices, [with]…respect for autonomy [being] the obligation not to
interfere with the choice of another and to treat another as a being capable of
choosing.’138 To be autonomous is to be a self with particular ideas and reasons for
acting and it implies freedom from external influence, control, manipulation or
coercion. It is to have a will of one’s own and to act in pursuit of freely, self chosen
goals.139 And whilst it is clear that no-one can exhibit a total independence from
external forces, autonomy has come to mean the intellectual capacity which enables
us to submit such forces to critical evaluation. Thus a person is autonomous, as
Lukes points out, ‘…to the degree to which he subjects the pressures and norms with
which he is confronted to conscious and critical evaluation, and forms intentions and
reaches practical decisions as a result of independent and rational reflection.’140

But whilst autonomy is certainly grounded in the intellectual and moral capacity to
make and establish choices and preferences, it is also directed toward the practical
expression of needs and interests. That is, simply making judgements about how
one would like to act is not enough to satisfy autonomy. It is also important to be
able to act. Thus autonomy can be compromised in a variety of ways. Whilst we
would all agree that the infant, the baby, the profoundly mentally ill and those with
dementia all lack a self governing ability consistent with autonomy, it is clear that the
degree of independence required for us to assume autonomy is present can be
absent in a variety of different situations and to varying degrees. The aged, for
example, and particularly the frail aged, may experience impaired autonomy in their
inability to do for themselves the everyday sorts of tasks that we normally take for
granted and do (largely) without thinking; cooking, cleaning, dressing, bathing,
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walking to the shops and so on. All of these tasks may now depend upon the
assistance of others to a greater or lesser extent. People with disabilities may
require goods and services provided either by society or by particular individuals that
enable them to lead lives approaching what the rest of us take for granted. And
some individuals may have impaired autonomy by the very fact of the groups they
belong to; Aborigines, the homeless, the unemployed, the poor, those in areas of
regional and rural Australia with minimal public services – schools, hospitals, medical
practitioners and the like.

Autonomy then is not simply about a moral or an intellectual ability, it is also about
physical capacity and indeed what we might refer to as a social capacity. It is
important not to separate the phenomenal and the noumenal. People are more than
simply isolated units of rational and autonomous energy. They are also social
creatures living within a physical-biological framework, and autonomy must be judged
against the totality of the sorts of ways that human lives are led. Not only have we
tended to judge autonomy simply on a moral – intellectual dimension, but also we
have tended to see autonomy as dominating all other moral concerns. Thus Smith
has raised justifiable concerns that has seen ‘respect for autonomy’ emerge as a
prime consideration in moral action over riding all other issues and considerations
such as, for example, resource allocation, the role of duties, notions of virtuous
behaviour amongst professionals and so on. As she points out, it is increasingly
assumed that once individual autonomy is assured then no other moral concerns
need to be addressed.141 On a similar note, Callahan suggests that there are
assumptions embedded within the idea of autonomy that tend to undercut the social
and communal ties that bind individuals and encourage us (wrongly) to assume that
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individuals are nothing more than isolated ‘morally self enclosed [and] self
encompassed animals’, and that all obligations owed others (and that others owe us)
can be reduced simply to respect for individual autonomy.142

This is not to say that humans are not capable of either rational or autonomous
action and behaviour – certainly they are, although as I will argue in a later chapter
our commitment to such concepts often appear to be out of all proportion to a large
amount of evidence to the contrary. What I am suggesting is that this view of
autonomy, as with the view we have of rationality, does not account for all human
behaviour or experience by any means. Humans undergo marked periods of their
lives when such rational and autonomous action is beyond them for varying reasons.
In these periods they are vulnerable and in these vulnerable periods we often apply
notions of rights, in particular human rights, to secure their care and protection, with
the intention of minimising the degree to which they are vulnerable – the degree to
which they are impaired in their ability to be the rational and autonomous creatures
we typically take humans to be. And if our emphasis upon the individual rights that
vulnerable people are entitled to ultimately fails to secure for such people effective
care and protection, then we are forced to consider other approaches that may offer
a better chance of success.

v]

personhood and the moral agent

It is appropriate to reflect on moral agency after rationality and autonomy, for it is the
capacity to engage others morally that makes humans distinctively human, or, for
those that talk in terms of ‘personhood’, that forms the essential ingredient of what
constitutes being a person. It is, I suspect, generally agreed upon that certain higher
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order non-human animals are capable of varying degrees of rational behaviour. I
think also that we could reasonably extrapolate from this fact to assert that some
degree of (at least) crude autonomy is a likely part of such animals’ existence even if
only in a mechanistic sense. But as Scarlett makes clear, the ability to engage in a
moral discourse is a facet of human interaction that is singularly unique. It is only
humans, for example, who are capable of forming a moral community and it is this
that encourages us to treat them differently. Humans can reason, have intention,
have ideas of right and wrong, employ concepts such as virtue and vice to attach to
specific actions and by which they evaluate the sorts of actions they engage in.
Animals, however ‘…are not guilty, whatever the offence may be. They sometimes
do undesirable things, and sometimes we apply punishment to train them not to
repeat the damage. And sometimes we kill them to make sure, as in the case of
man-eaters and savage dogs. But we do not hold that they are to blame.’143

When we are referring to humans as moral agents we are of course suggesting that
the ability to make moral judgements is different to the ability to make good or bad
moral judgements. In popular parlance people may refer to others as being ‘amoral’
or of having ‘no morality’, but this usually denotes a hostility to specific actions or
behaviours rather than a considered view that the individuals concerned have no
capacity for moral judgement at all. To be a fully developed human is to have such a
capacity and those who have no such capacity, or those in whom this capacity is to
some degree impaired, we regard as being both unpredictable and dangerous, and
thus corrosive of the moral community, as well as being in some way less than fully
developed humans.
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One is reminded here of Adam Smith’s comment concerning ‘moral sense’. In The
Theory of Moral Sentiments he writes that;

‘According to some the principle of approbation is founded upon a sentiment
of a peculiar nature, upon a particular power of perception exerted by the
mind at a view of certain actions or affections; some of which affecting this
faculty in an agreeable and others in a disagreeable manner, the former are
stamped with the characters of right, laudable, and virtuous; the latter with
those of wrong blameable, and vicious.’144

Smith tells us that the sentiment deriving from a ‘particular power of perception’ is
referred to by some as ‘a moral sense’. When we talk about human beings acting as
moral agents it would seem to be this ‘moral sense’ that we are alluding to.

To have a moral sense refers to a capacity to distinguish between acts on the basis
of their appropriateness from a moral point of view. It is to see ourselves and others
as beings capable of moral choice. It is therefore to be able to make distinctions
between ‘want’ and ‘ought’. To be a moral agent is to be held culpable or
responsible for the acts that one does, or that one fails to do. This is why it is
appropriate to talk of moral agency after one talks of rationality and autonomy, for
one must first be both rational and autonomous before one is held morally
accountable. Required for moral agency is what Moore refers to as ‘the tie of
practical reason’; it is to be ‘obligated by moral norms’ and only those who are so
obligated, that is those who are rational and autonomous beings, can be held
responsible when their actions breach moral norms.145
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In similar vein when we talk of moral communities, the sort of communities inhabited
by persons, we are making an assumption that there are beings capable of making
choices, of rationally deciding between different courses of action and able to give
reasons, in terms of rationality and morality, for why they acted so. As Englehardt
has pointed out, ‘the very notion of a moral community presumes a community of
entities that are self conscious, rational, free to choose [that is, autonomous] and in
possession of a sense of moral concern.’ The relationship between moral
communities and persons is thus crucial. Without persons there can be no moral
communities, for such a community is based upon the ability to be rational, reflective
and autonomous, to be responsible and accountable. Thus he writes that;

‘One speaks of persons in order to identify entities one can with warrant
blame and praise, which can themselves blame and praise, and which can as
a result play a role in the core of moral life. In order to engage in moral
discourse, such entities will need to reflect on themselves, they must
therefore be self conscious. They will need in addition to be able to conceive
of rules of action for themselves and others in order to envisage the possibility
of a moral community. They will need to be rational beings. That rationality
must include an understanding of worthiness of blame and praise: a minimal
moral sense.’146

Yet whilst a ‘moral sense’ depends upon both rationality and autonomy it also
includes something else, for there is some doubt that rational thought and action
alone is sufficient to guarantee a moral agent. Certainly there are some groups of
people who are beyond the reach of moral laws because of their inability to make
reasoned judgements about how they should act in particular circumstances with
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respect to moral behaviour. To quote Moore again, ‘they are not…sufficiently rational
that they can reason about moral or legal norms and adjust their behaviour to them.
In a phrase, they are not good practical reasoners.’147 This clearly applies to infants
and very young children, indeed Locke for example saw no difference between ‘all
children and idiots’, neither having ‘come to the use of reason’,148 but it also applies
to others such as those with dementia, the intellectually impaired and in some cases
it will apply to those who are profoundly psychotically disturbed. The general
proposition is that people cannot be held accountable for what they do or for what
they fail to do if they are incapable of discriminating between what is approved from
what is not approved according to social rules. To this extent to be a moral agent is
thus to be an individual ‘who acts for intelligible ends in light of rational beliefs.’149

But is a rational and autonomous capacity enough to guarantee a moral sense? I
suspect not. The human community is not established simply by the presence of
rational and autonomous beings. A degree of sociability is required and sociability
implies rule making and rule following. It also implies engaging others on a
dimension of empathy and altruism. As Aristotle makes clear in his Nicomachen
Ethics, socialisation and enculturation within the human enterprise is antecedent to
being a fully rational and moral being. Socialisation embraces language, an
internalisation of the norms and values of the social group, a concept of personal
existence (ego) and an ability to distinguish between ‘I’ and ‘thou’ yet also to see that
‘I’ and ‘thou’ are part of an interdependent, communal, cooperative enterprise. It also
suggests the ability to care for others, to respond to their needs, to engage them
within the context of everyday lives. In Hyde’s words, it is to ‘place ourselves in
communion with what we find outside ourselves’,150 and arguably this has as much to
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do with early childhood issues of nurturing, caring, dependence and attachment as it
does the ability to be a rational and autonomous actor.

vi]

vulnerability and the personal encounter

There are many instances within the life of any given individual when she may be
vulnerable, that is, when she finds it difficult or even impossible to function as the
rational, reflective agent which we assume is so characteristic of the human
condition. As I have already noted we all begin life in an intensely vulnerable state.
The neonate, the infant and the very young child are all profoundly vulnerable and
without the constant care and protection of others many, if not most will die. It often
appears that we assume that the life journey is one which, although beginning in
intense vulnerability, eventually emerges into an adolescence and adulthood that is
characterised by a more or less permanent state of rational, reflective moral agency.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Not simply are many of us unable to ever
reach that ideal, but all of us at various stages of life are confronted with periods
when we fall far short of the image of the rational, autonomous individual. I have
previously described vulnerability as ‘permanent’, ‘transitory’, or ‘episodic’. In this
way it can embrace conditions as diverse as autism, Down’s syndrome, cerebral
palsy, foetal alcohol syndrome, mental illness and the dementias, to a variety of
social experiences such as separation, divorce, the death of a spouse or child,
bankruptcy and so on, all of which, depending on the personal resilience of the
individual concerned, have the potential to reduce or diminish our ability to function
as the rational, reflective agents we typically take humans to be.

Not all vulnerabilities are profoundly debilitating. Some, for example, may simply
impair our ability to make decisions, in the short term, good enough to maximise our
best interests. Other vulnerabilities go to the heart of what it means to be a rational,
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reflective agent and impair our ability to even approximate acting as the sort of
person we assume humans can be. It is when we think of vulnerability in this latter
way that we most usually engage notions of rights, with the aim being the care and
protection of compromised individuals. In the remainder of this chapter I want to
consider just one example of vulnerability. My focus is on what it means to be
vulnerable from the point of view of both the individual concerned and the sorts of
relationships that the vulnerable person may share with others who are engaged to
care and protect. My intention is to embrace the notion of vulnerability from the point
of view of those who experience it first hand. This is ‘…vulnerability…as a lived
experience’,151 and there is certainly a degree to which vulnerability can only be fully
appreciated by encountering it from the perspective of the individual who is
vulnerable and considering that individual within the context of the relationships she
shares with others.

dementia as vulnerability

Arguably no other condition poses such a profound threat to the integrity of the
human personality as does dementia. Indeed dementia may be conceptualised (and
often is by those that talk in this way) as the very destruction of the person, as the
obliteration of personhood. According to Smith, whilst

‘…cancer kills you…it doesn’t remove your very humanity…It doesn’t turn you
into a vegetable…But a person with a serious dementia is no longer human.
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He’s a vegetable. That’s devastating. Fearsome. Terrifying, to anyone
who’s ever seen it – the thought that it could happen to you.’152

Within dementia we see vulnerability at its most powerful. Notions of harm, of
danger, of powerlessness, of loss and of dependence are confronting. What is
increasingly eroded in dementia is the ability to act as a rational, autonomous and
moral agent – the kind of individual who has been the focus of my discussion over
the preceding pages. What is engaged is the demand that one rely on others, initially
for aid, help, comfort and support and eventually for one’s physical survival.

Dementia has become a public health issue of some magnitude particularly in
Western society where the population’s life expectancy is increasing. In the United
States, for example, dementia affects between 5%-8% of those over 65 years of age,
15%-20% of those over 75 years and between 25%-50% of people over age 85.153
Australian figures tend to mirror those from the US. In 1995 over 250,000
Australians were identified as suffering from dementia.154 According to Hampson

‘currently [2000] 2-3 per cent of Australians aged 65-74 have some sort of
dementia, with 5-6 percent of these experiencing moderate to severe
symptoms. Of people aged 70-74, about 11 per cent have dementia. Above
this bracket the figure rises steadily until, beyond 80 years, almost 20 per cent
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are afflicted. By the time we reach the age of 85, the odds of our suffering
from dementia are more than one in four.’155

As the population inevitably ages so the numbers of people who suffer from the
various forms of dementia will similarly increase. And whilst the term ‘dementia’ has
become something of an umbrella term under which a variety of age related
neurodegenerative disorders are clustered,156 it is clear that ‘the general picture is
similar in all – a progressive disintegration of intellect, memory and personality
…[with]…a uniformly hopeless prognosis.’157 To have dementia is to slowly lose
one’s ‘functional and cognitive capabilities that previously made it possible…to
interact with the world in a meaningful way.’158 Rationality is diminished and is finally
non-existent. Autonomy is destroyed and the moral actor vanishes, and this long
before the individual herself suffers biological death. Having said this what does
dementia mean both for those who suffer from this illness and for those, family,
friends and professional carers, who are called upon to care and protect?

Although current tools for establishing a diagnostic criterion for describing dementia
provide little comprehension for the impact the condition has on both individuals and
carers, such an approach is nevertheless a useful starting point for an understanding
of the illness. DSM-IV describes ‘the essential feature of a dementia [as being] the
development of multiple cognitive deficits that include memory impairment and at
least one of the following cognitive disturbances: aphasia, apraxia, agnosia, or a
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disturbance in executive functioning.’159 Memory impairment, both as the loss of
previously learned material or the inability to retain new information, is crucial. Those
who suffer from dementia often present with minor, and then an increasing,
impairment in memory. ‘They may loose valuables like wallets and keys, forget food
cooking on the stove, and become lost in unfamiliar neighbourhoods. In advanced
stages of dementia memory impairment is so severe that the person forgets his or
her occupation, schooling, birthday, family members, and sometimes even (their)
name.’160

Lishman describes a three stage approach to Alzheimer’s disease, the most common
form of dementia, which can be reasonably extrapolated to cover dementia in
general. He notes an initial phase, lasting some two to three years, characterised by
‘failing memory, muddled inefficiency over the tasks of everyday life and spatial
disorientation’ with occasional mood disturbances of agitation and restlessness or
apathy and lack of spontaneity. A second stage reveals greater intellectual and
personality disintegration. Symptoms such as dysphasia, apraxia and agnosia
emerge. Parkinsonian characteristics such as disturbances in posture, gait and an
increased rigidity in muscle tone are evident. Occasionally marked psychotic-like
symptoms such as delusional ideas or auditory or visual hallucinations may appear.
Finally in the third stage there is increased vegetative signs. The patient becomes
bedridden, is doubly incontinent, develops severe rigidity and tremor with ‘forced
grasping and groping’ and sucking reflexes and finally shows a marked bodily
wasting.161
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Such clinical descriptors give only a hint of the personal deterioration involved in the
dementing process from the point of view of the impact on individuals and carers.
Having read the above we still feel somewhat removed or ‘abstracted’ from the
degree of vulnerability experienced by dementia sufferers. Blondin provides an
antidote to such rather sterile accounts by breaking Alzheimer’s down into six distinct
stages, and outlining the both the impact for the individual and the types of
responses engendered from families, thus placing the dementia sufferer within a
social and personal/interpersonal framework.162 In stage one Blondin identifies ‘early
confusion’, where the sufferer has difficulty in concentrating and difficulty with
learning new tasks. Such memory problems (typically the first sign of a dementing
process) often establish a point of conflict with immediate family, demonstrated as a
loss of empathy and increased irritation with forgetfulness. In stage two, ‘late
confusion’, it may become clear that some form of pathology is at work. The person
in this stage often gets lost in familiar places, forgets appointments, forgets to pay
bills and shows a loss of interest in and a withdrawal from formerly enjoyable
activities. Apathy, social isolation, an increasing tendency to be irritable, agitated
and quarrelsome with family and friends may also emerge as a feature. Denial that a
problem exists (from both the person and immediate family) is interfaced with
mounting family conflict, arguments and frustrations.

Stage three reveals ‘early dementia’. Here the person may forget the names of
‘significant others’, most notably more distant family (grand children, cousins, aunts
and uncles) and friends. Wandering and getting lost is an increasing problem and
more obvious cognitive deficits are revealed, such as finding the correct word to
describes feelings, events and people. Often at this stage the person becomes an
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identified problem. In stage four, described as ‘middle dementia’, the sufferer needs
ongoing supervision in even the simplest of tasks. Washing, bathing, dressing and
undressing, toileting, cleaning and cooking, all become fraught with difficulties and
dangers. In middle dementia personality changes are clear. The individual
characteristically displays outbursts of fear, anger and hostility both in a verbal and
physical form that reflects their own sense of intellectual and personality
deterioration, fragmentation and loss. They may also be sexually disinhibited. The
alienation felt by the sufferer is mirrored in many respects by an alienation and loss
experienced by those closest to him. The concept of the sufferer as one who is
losing or has lost their own personal identity, what is commonly called their
‘personhood’, is often invoked at this stage.

From this point on, stages five and six, what Blondin calls ‘middle – middle dementia’
and ‘late stage dementia’, demonstrate inexorable deterioration in all aspects of
physical functioning. The individual is now a patient, one who requires assistance in
all aspects of daily life, from dressing, to bathing to going to the toilet, to feeding
themselves. In these stages there is, for the most part, no level of functioning that
can be identified as indicative of the person’s former intellectual, psychological or
emotional existence. In this stage many sufferers do not recognise their own spouse,
their children, their siblings, friends they have known all their life, their own name or
even their reflection in a mirror. They may not speak at all or if they can their speech
may be so garbled and unintelligible as to be largely incoherent to other people.

The impact upon family can be profound and devastating. Hampson presents a
bleak picture.

‘As the patient slips through the stages from memory loss to complete
dependence, it is the fate of many carers to find their world revolves
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increasingly around the patient’s needs to the exclusion of all else. But still
carers keep going. Many are driven beyond their limit by the spectre of the
nursing home. Some see it as a betrayal, evidence that they have ‘given up’
on a partner.’163

Dementia is a vulnerability that embraces families and family relationships as ‘more
than two-thirds of people with dementia live at home and the majority are cared for by
family members.’164 Typically the carer is female, either spouse or eldest
daughter.165 The former is usually herself elderly and perhaps frail, and the latter
probably in her 50s who, after raising a family and caring for her own children, now
finds herself returned to the mothering role – responsible now for the care of an aging
parent and often at great cost to herself and her own family relations.166 Caregivers,
whether male or female, have their own unique set of emotional problems that are a
direct consequence of caring for a loved one whose personality is inevitably
deteriorating before their eyes and whose behaviour can be increasingly
unpredictable, erratic and challenging. These ‘emotional problems’ are described in
terms of grief, anger, demoralisation, guilt and fatigue, as carers are faced with the
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inexorable destruction of the individual, a formerly rational, autonomous and moral
agent who was once a recognisable human person.167

The concept of loss is powerfully associated with the process of dementia. This loss
embraces the periods prior to and subsequent to the death of the dementia sufferer
and embraces themes such as; a loss of both person and relationship; the loss of
hope; the experience of pre-death grief; the expectancy of death; a post death relief;
and care giving reflections.168 The title of the work by Cohen and Eisdorfer, The Loss
of Self, appropriately sums up this sentiment.169 Commenting on this phrase Ronch
writes that it ‘eloquently and comprehensively describes what happens when
progressive neural devastation makes a person vanish while still physically in our
midst.’ And she continues that this ‘…loss of self happens before the very eyes of
the person whose self is vanishing.’

‘The basis of unique personal identity established over the life span
eventually deteriorate. Characteristic style and patterns of doing things
become ephemeral as memory, thought, language and all other aspects of
cognition deteriorate.’170

As one carer so eloquently put it:
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‘Alzheimer’s disease seems to rob the human body of everything except the
soul.’171

Thus the question that confronts carers is often ‘what is left of the person’ whom they
once recognised as a rational, autonomous, and moral agent; a perceiving,
reasoning, reflective being whom they engaged in ongoing communication and with
whom they may have shared intense emotional feelings and relationships? This
person, now diagnosed with dementia, may be institutionalised, as most of those with
moderate to severe dementia are, and may display a range of behaviours which
include biting, screaming, pacing and other repetitious actions as well as angry
outbursts, delusional and paranoid thoughts, and as a consequence may be subject
to restraint, medication or segregation. They are almost certain to be incontinent of
urine and faeces and will have lost the capacity to feed, cloth or wash themselves or
even to remember or recognise the very people with whom they have lived for most
of their lives. 172

vii]

dementia, vulnerability and human rights

It is clear that dementia represents a powerful example of vulnerability in the way that
I have portrayed that term. To have dementia is inevitably to be consigned to an
existence wherein one is increasingly unable to function as a rational, autonomous
and moral agent. The impairment is physical, psychological and moral. It is chronic
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and irreversible. Beginning slowly, and by degrees, it becomes inexorable and total.
As it progresses it inspires an increasing degree of commitment on behalf of those
who are care-givers, whether these are family members or professionals. Without
this commitment to care and protect, the dementia sufferer’s existence would be very
miserable indeed. The scope and extent of this commitment is often, and
increasingly, framed in terms of rights; sometimes legal but increasingly, in Australia
at least, moral rights – moral rights described as ‘human rights’ the individual
entitlements of individual people, ascribed to people to ensure their care and
protection.

By invoking the spectre of individual rights, framed within the confines of human
rights, and by applying these individual rights to the care and protection of vulnerable
peoples – in this case the frail aged with dementia – we seek to both affirm our
commitment to the moral worth of such individuals and as well we hope to protect
those with dementia from the worst excesses of their vulnerability. Human rights, as
I identified earlier, can in this respect be seen as a form of protective moral armour.
Yet the care and protection of those with dementia depends not so much upon any
particular resources that afflicted individuals can muster, as it does upon the acts,
actions and behaviours of others. The characteristics of dementia, the memory loss,
the increasing confusion, the apathy, the social isolation, changes in mood and
behaviour, the occasional (and increasing) outbursts of anger, as well as the erosion
of the ability to do even the simplest of tasks (washing, bathing, dressing and
undressing, toileting, cleaning, cooking and so on), all of these signal the decay of
personal resources and the demand that the individual increasingly rely on others for
survival.

Such a description of the person with dementia seems strangely at odds with the
concept of the rights bearing individual. This is not to say that the person with

108
dementia ceases to be a rights bearing creature, but it is to say that the survival of
this person depends not so much upon the rights she possesses as it does upon the
attitudes that those who care for her have. The day to day survival of the demented
elderly depends wholly upon the commitment to care and protect that significant
others, either family or professional carers, may identify with. In a sense the idea of
human rights with its intellectual and philosophical foundations rooted firmly within
the context of the rational, assertive, articulate, autonomous and moral individual,
one who identifies and articulates and claims her just moral entitlements, is strangely
abstracted from the personal experience of dementia. What will ensure the well
being of those with dementia is not their ability to articulate their rights, for they
cannot. Nor is it their ability to claim their rights, for again they cannot. Rather, what
is instructive as to how the dementia sufferer will fare is the commitment to care and
protection that caregivers have, as well as the degree to which relevant institutions
and structures are sensitive to the needs and interests of those who are so disabled.

The above comments apply to many types of vulnerable groups and individuals – in
particular they apply to those whose vulnerability is at the moderate to severe end of
impairment. But in our rush to award a whole diverse range of vulnerable peoples a
variety of human rights, we seldom stop to think of the multiplicity of impediments
(personal, social, political, economic) that impact upon their situation and effectively
neutralise their ability to engage the human rights that we so enthusiastically attribute
to them. It is no doubt true that, as Hart has written,

‘rights are typically conceived of as possessed or owned by or belonging to
individuals, and these expressions reflect the conception of moral rules as not
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only prescribing conduct but as forming a kind of moral property of individuals
to which the individuals are entitled’,173

yet it is also clear that the simple ownership or possession or ‘entitlement’ of human
rights (or indeed any form of rights at all) is never enough to protect the vulnerable. It
is also true, to quote Hart again, that ‘…to have a right entails having a moral
justification for limiting the freedom of another person and for determining how he
should act’,174 yet this again seems something of a hollow comment if one person is
vulnerable and the other person is asked to care and protect yet feels no
compunction to do so.

Hegel’s point that ‘it is uncultured people who insist most on their rights, whilst noble
minds look on other aspects of the thing’,175 may be closer the mark when we
consider the relationships between those who are vulnerable and those who stand in
a certain regard to them and are charged with their care and protection. If human
rights provide little or no guarantee of protection for vulnerable peoples, as they
certainly appear to, then what can stand in their place or, more to the point, what
principles of action can we employ to engage the rights that vulnerable people
already have? If people cannot assert, claim or demand their rights, or if such
assertions, claims or demands fail to engage their rights, how can we (as
professionals, as relatives, as friends, as carers) proceed? This will be the theme of
our final chapter. At this point I want to return to the notion of vulnerability and
consider the relationship between vulnerability, human rights and the liberal state
and, in some detail, to outline the view of man that is encapsulated within the liberal
democratic concept of human rights. This will set the scene to discuss my assertion
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that the human rights view of man crucially misinterprets what it means to be
vulnerable and in so doing renders human rights largely irrelevant for the care and
protection of vulnerable peoples.

111

Chapter Three:

i]

Vulnerability - Political

vulnerability, human rights and the contract theorists

So far I have argued that one is vulnerable when one is unable to act as the rational,
autonomous and moral agent that we typically take humans to be. Whilst
vulnerability itself can be thought of as existing on a variety of dimensions [infancy,
childhood, chronic mental illness, dementia for example] and to varying degrees [I
have identified ‘transitory’, ‘permanent’ and ‘episodic’], it nevertheless suggests one
who is impaired with respect to his own interests and another who stands in regard to
him and is called upon to care and protect; that is to secure those interests for him.
The relationship between one who is vulnerable and one who stands in regard to him
can be thought of as a moral relationship. How we act toward others of our kind
reflects important underlying moral assumptions that define much of what we as
humans do and who we as humans are.

When we are confronted with vulnerable groups and individuals we commonly invoke
the concept of human rights. As I have suggested, by engaging the rights response
we seek to reaffirm the moral worth and value of those who are vulnerable and as
well we seek to protect those so described from the worst excesses of their
vulnerability. This has certainly been the case within the liberal democracies. Within
such polities we have tended to see human rights as an effective means by which the
vulnerable are afforded a degree of care and protection that reflects both their special
needs as vulnerable people, as well as what is due them on the basis of what is
owed to all people everywhere. Whilst it is clear that there is an important connection
between vulnerability and human rights, there is also a connection, though less
obvious, between vulnerability, human rights and the liberal state. To a large degree
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liberal democracies are described by the rights they accord their citizens. Those
societies that do not embrace notions of individual rights cannot in any real sense be
described as either ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’. Thus whilst human rights can be seen as
a response to vulnerability they can also be seen as the basis for the liberal
democratic state. In this way the liberal democratic state itself can be seen to be
grounded both in the idea of human vulnerability and at the same time to be a
response to that vulnerability.

In this chapter I want to consider two interconnected ideas. First I want to examine
the relationship between vulnerability, human rights and the liberal state. Second I
want to outline the view of man that has traditionally been encapsulated within the
liberal democratic concept of human rights. With regard to the first issue we can
present the idea of vulnerability as an important yet oft ignored strand of liberal
democratic thought. Vulnerability, as I describe it, can be portrayed as lying at the
heart of the contract view of civil society, particularly as that view is expressed within
the works of Hobbes, Locke and Rawls. Within each of these theorists the idea of
certain fundamental rights, presented as ‘natural rights’, ‘the rights of man’ or simply
‘human rights’, establishes a compelling reason for man entering civil society.
Human rights, according to this view, can be seen both as a response to the inherent
vulnerability of man in his ‘natural’ state, whether this was the ‘state of nature’ as
proposed by Hobbes and Locke or the ‘original position’, as proposed by Rawls, as
well as encapsulating the idea that man is a rational, autonomous and moral
individual. In this way we can understand human rights as establishing the basic
conditions necessary for a person to act as an agent with respect to her own
particular interests.

In the second part of this chapter I want to consider the view of man that is contained
within the liberal democratic concept of human rights. This individual is traditionally
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described as a rational, autonomous and moral actor who is independent and
assertive when it comes to identifying and securing her own interests and well being.
This is also the image of the individual which is presented within the writings of
Hobbes, Locke and Rawls. In other words, the notion of what constitutes an
individual is common to the contract theorists, to the type of person fit for liberal
society and also is the archetype for one who possesses human rights. Such a
discussion is important for as we saw in the previous chapter in our discussion of
dementia (and as I shall argue again later), this image of man is at odds with what it
means to be vulnerable. Indeed it is because the human rights view of man fails to
accurately describe what it means for individuals to be vulnerable, and as well fails to
take account of the sorts of social contexts that vulnerable individuals often find
themselves in, that the concept fails to protect the vulnerable in general and
particularly fails to protect those most vulnerable.

ii]

vulnerability and the contract theorists

In Hobbes and Locke’s account of ‘a state of nature’, man’s vulnerability is
confronting. Before he enters civil society mankind ekes out an uncertain and
dangerous existence. To Locke the state of nature is ‘a State of perfect Freedom’ by
which men order their affairs ‘their Possessions and Persons as they think fit…’176 It
is ‘a State also of Equality’ in which ‘all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no
one having more than another.’177 In the state of nature, says Locke, man is ‘lord of
his own Person and Possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no Body…’178
Hobbes of course agrees with this essential character of man’s natural state. Before
civil society is constituted amongst men, all live together without ‘a Common Power
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to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.’179 It is a
time when there is ‘no government at all’ and ‘no common power to feare’,180 a time
before any civil authority to regulate men’s actions, to manage conflicts, resolve
disputes, settle arguments, to dispense justice and enforce laws. The state of nature
is a time when men are forced to seek their own well being, self interest and survival,
according to their own talents and devices.

And herein lies man’s vulnerability dramatically exposed. Hobbes in particular is
emphatic. Without a common power to regulate social life all men naturally have a
right (Hobbes calls it a ‘natural right’) and entitlement to all things. ‘Nature hathe
given to everyone a right to all. That is, it was lawfull for everyman in the bare state
of nature…to doe what hee would, and against whom he thought fit, and to
possesse, use, and enjoy all what he would, or could get.’ ‘In the state of nature’,
wrote Hobbes, ‘to have all, and to do all is lawfull for all.’181 For Hobbes this situation
ensured that the state of nature was in fact a state of war. In De Cive he makes it
clear that ‘the state of man without civill society…is nothing else but a mere warre of
all against all…’182 It is not, says Hobbes, that men are naturally wicked or evil;
indeed they are not.183 Rather it is this ‘radical individualism’184 that sees men living
together without any superior on earth to regulate social life, with each man
competing with each other for often limited resources, and each judging his own
needs, welfare and interests greater than his fellows (which men in general always
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tend to do - both within the state of nature and beyond it), that puts men into a state
of inevitable conflict with each other.

It is this ‘natural equality’, this lack of any authority to impose law and order that
encourages a state of war. As Hobbes makes clear, in the state of nature ‘…if any
two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they
become enemies and …endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another.’185 Life is
uncertain and dangerous. Each man is a threat to each other and all are vulnerable,
for even the strongest can be subdued or killed by the weakest.186 And even if war is
not a permanent state of fighting yet there is what Hobbes called a ‘disposition’ to
fight; the constant threat of violence when no man can be sure if he is safe or in
danger; it is a time when ‘…every man is enemy to every man…wherein men live
without other security, than what their own strength…shall furnish them…’ and,
concludes Hobbes, there is ‘…no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear,
and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short.’187

The dramatic picture of human vulnerability that Hobbes presents us with is not
shared by Locke. The distinction that Locke makes is between ‘a state of nature’ and
‘a state of war’, the two being separate realities. In the former, men live together
‘according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge
between them…’ whilst in the latter ‘…force, or a declared design of force upon the
Person of another, where there is no common Superior on Earth to appeal to for
relief…’ describes the relationships between men.188 As Locke makes clear:
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‘Want of a common Judge with Authority, puts all Men in a State of Nature:
Force without Right, upon a Man’s Person, makes a State of War, both where
there is, and is not, a common judge.’189

In the state of war says Locke, a person ‘…attempts to get another Man into his
Absolute Power…[it being]…a Declaration of a Design upon his life…[to] use me as
he pleased...and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it…i.e. make me a slave.’190
This is quite different to a state of nature, which Locke suggests is a state of perfect
freedom and equality with men living together according to the dictates of reason.
Yet Locke must surely admit that the sense of danger, of uncertainty, of doubt, of
ambiguity, indeed the overwhelming sense of vulnerability must be ever present in a
situation wherein there is no established law or authority to regulate actions between
men. Again it is not that men are evil, in fact most men may indeed live by that
unwritten law of nature which both writers agree is the voice of reason applied to
human affairs, rather the problem for men, and it is a problem which ensures his
continuing vulnerability, is that not only are evil men not deterred by laws and
authority, for there are none, but most crucially one does not know who is evil and
who is not. As Hobbes tells us, and this must apply equally to Hobbes’ state of
nature as to Locke’s:

‘for though the wicked were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot
distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating,
subjugating, selfe-defending, ever incident to the most honest…’191
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Locke’s state of nature, rather than being an idyllic paradise, is in fact constantly at
risk of descending into chaos and war. Disagreements will always occur between
men and such disagreements are liable to descend into conflict wherein the only
appeal for the individual is to heaven.192 Man may indeed have perfect freedom and
equality in the state of nature, ‘yet the Enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and
constantly exposed to the Invasion of others.’193 The state of nature is structurally
flawed. First because there is no clear and settled standard by which men can
establish right and wrong, and second because there is no impartial or disinterested
judge. With regard to the first point, the law of nature, reason, may offer guidance to
men but men are often ‘…biased by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of
study of it [and] are not apt to allow it as a Law binding to them…194 With regard to
the second point, without any common and impartial judge men are themselves ‘both
judge and executioner’ in all matters and are of course ‘partial to themselves’, and so
are liable to ‘Passion and Revenge [which can] carry them too far, and with too much
heat, in their own cases: as well as negligence, and unconcernedness…in other
Mens.’195 Mankind’s vulnerability then is as marked here as it is within Hobbes’s
writings and we are left thinking that Locke’s state of nature is not too different from
that of his predecessors.

In considering Hobbes and Locke it is clear that the image of the vulnerable
individual powerfully underpins their work. Yet this would seem to be at odds with
the actions of man who, in the state of nature, already appears to be a rational
reflective being. After all, when confronted with the uncertainty and danger of his
pre-social state, man uses reasoning to see that his best interest lies in establishing
a compact with his fellows and consenting to the law and order of civil society and
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does this not suggest one who is already rational and reflective? The short answer is
that there is no contradiction here. We must make a distinction between one who
reasons and one who is rational. In the state of nature we may say that man’s
rationality is crude. It extends simply to the ability to reason. That is, if I do this then
I will achieve certain immediate outcomes.196 A rational agent can certainly reason
(reasoning ability is surely at the heart of rationality), yet to be rational embraces
much more than simply making a judgement that to escape constant danger is a
better course of action than to endure it. True rationality, the considering of one’s
best immediate interests and the considered reflection of preferred paths that one’s
life ought to take, seem out of place in the Hobbesian state of nature. To be truly
rational and reflective one must seek the peace and security of civil society.

But there is another point worth mentioning about Hobbesian vulnerability. In the
state of nature man as a moral actor does not exist. Mankind’s vulnerability is not
simply compromised by his crude rationality but also by his lack of moral capacity.
Those incapable of moral acts we do not regard as fully developed human beings.
Moral action, the ability to ‘praise and blame’, to hold and be held accountable in a
moral sense, to judge standards against a notion of right or wrong, is not applicable
within the state of nature as there is simply no standard of right or wrong, certainly no
standard beyond self interest that all would agree upon. As Hobbes makes clear, in
the state of nature ‘…notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have no place
[for] Where there is no common power, there is no Law: where no Law, no
Injustice…’197 And whilst it is clear that one may offend against God or break the
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laws of nature, nevertheless ‘Injustice against men presupposeth Humane Lawes,
such, as in the State of Nature there are none.’198 Moral action as we understand it
must wait for civil society, for man made laws and a constituted authority that
provides a framework within which men are empowered to make moral decisions and
be judged on the decisions they do make. In the state of nature we have an image of
man who is driven by reason, by a crude sense of being rational, yet who is without
any moral sense at all.199

But autonomy also is illusive in Hobbes’ state of nature. In his pre-social state man is
an individual, but only in the sense of being an isolated, egoistic individual devoid of
any social union with his fellows. To say that pre-social man is autonomous is to
confuse autonomy with isolationism. True autonomy is of value only when expressed
within the social context of men interacting with other men yet at the same time
establishing their own unique identity that is free from coercion, compulsion and
duress. In the state of nature all is competition and conflict, or at least the threat of it.
Autonomy, based upon Kant’s view as the ability to seek out those actions that are in
harmony with certain moral principles and which transcend narrow self interest, is
denied, partly because there will be no moral principles beyond self interest and
partly because moral action in an environment where such consideration is not
reciprocated will hasten one’s destruction rather than secure one’s well being.
Similarly, if we see autonomy in Millean terms as a faculty that allows us to scrutinise
social beliefs and values in search for some ultimate truth, then such a position has
no place before the social contract. Mill’s ‘liberty principle’ is clearly not applicable
here.
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With regard to Locke we are entitled to make similar comments. It seems not too
radical to suggest that even in Locke’s state of nature the full development of
individual potential must be limited, even if the state of nature does not degenerate
into a state of ‘enmity and destruction’, that is a state of war. In his natural state man
cannot function as a rational, autonomous and moral creature. As we have pointed
out before, even if only some are not guided by the demands of rational reflection
and moral consideration the impact upon all is surely profound. The entire social
fabric is threatened. And if we do not know who these individuals are then the whole
of social intercourse is fraught with dangers and uncertainty. The notion of the
rational, autonomous and moral agent cannot find expression in one who is
continually looking over her shoulder in a perpetual condition of uncertainty about her
future, or suspicion about her associates, or a fear that events may take a sudden
turn into chaos or violence where the safety and security of all is threatened. This is
not to say that the rational reflective agent, as we understand that term, is impossible
within Locke’s state of nature; it is only uncertain. And it is this uncertainty that, like
Hobbes, Locke claims will compel man to make an agreement with his fellows to quit
the state of nature and enter into civil society. Thus, civil society can be viewed as
the necessary condition for development of rational, autonomous and moral agents,
just as the state of nature can be seen as the epitome of human vulnerability.

Like Hobbes and Locke, John Rawls hypothesises individuals existing in a pre-social
state wherein they contract with each other to artificially construct social and political
life. In his original thesis200 Rawls hypothesises rational beings, who are rational in a
considered and reflective sense, existing in what he calls the ‘original position’; where
individuals exist behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ which prevents them from knowing
anything about themselves as they will be when finally they emerge into society. Yet
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in this situation they are called upon to construct certain principles of justice that all
would agree upon and which will form the basis of the social life (institutions and
social arrangements) they are yet to confront. This is what Rawls calls ‘justice as
fairness’. According to Rawls, in the original position

‘…no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor
does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like…[his] conception of the good or
[his] special psychological propensities…’201

Since all are completely ignorant of life beyond this original position no one is able to
design a principle to favour their condition within civil society and neither are any able
to bargain with others concerning their future position; because as men do not know
what interests they will have they cannot bargain to secure them. All men know for
certain is that they will have interests and they will all have a desire to further them.
It seems that they are all aware that there will be a degree of conflict regarding those
interests, because as each individual pursues his own ends each naturally seeks a
larger rather than a smaller share of the benefits of social life. And because these
benefits will be finite there will be competition for them. On this basis men must
design a civil society.

The idea of vulnerability pervades Rawls yet in different form to that which we saw in
Hobbes and Locke. In the original position individuals are less than the rational,
autonomous and moral agents that we take humans to be. Rather they are, as
Rawls’ critics initially pointed out, better seen as ‘disembodied spirits’, devoid of and
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abstracted from social existence and social being.202 For Rawls this arrangement is
necessary to enable such individuals to make decisions unfettered by self interest,
the sort of self interest that inevitably arises from one’s location in a social reality.
The end result seems to be that those who inhabit the original position cannot be
viewed as moral or autonomous beings in any way that we might understand these
terms. They are rational, says Rawls, but they are isolated units of pure rationality,
devoid of any morality or autonomy both of which are essentially dependent upon the
relationships with which one engages others.203

Yet from this position of ‘pure vulnerability’ there is an apparent awareness that a
more tangible form of vulnerability is possible. That is, in the original position, there
is the awareness that some will do very badly out of social life. Each knows that she
will emerge into civil society yet no-one knows what her situation will be when she
arrives. No one knows what her social or economic existence will be and neither
does she know what will constitute her personal and psychological profile. And
neither do people know what ideas and beliefs they will have, although all know that
they will hold religious, philosophical and political points of view. Individuals will
emerge as bankers, lawyers and doctors, whilst others will emerge as unemployed,
as homeless or abandoned or suffering from mental illness or even dementia. Thus
it is against this spectre of continued vulnerability within society that the parties agree
upon a particular form of social and political arrangement, one that hopefully protects
individuals from the worst excesses of prospective vulnerability.
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The choices these rational entities make reflect what they regard as the best means
of satisfying whatever interests may emerge as their own once they enter society,
without of course knowing in advance what those interests are. These interests
Rawls defines as ‘primary goods’ which are ‘things…a rational man wants whatever
else he wants.’204 Men choose that type of society which maximises their ability to
escape from being vulnerable, to escape from having their ability to act as rational,
autonomous and moral actors diminished. And although Rawls says that men would
reject a utilitarian form of social structure, still there is something utilitarian about the
choices they make: they choose that form of social life that maximises their ability to
function as rational, autonomous beings and they reject any form of social
arrangement that might compromise such a possibility. For it is only when men are
rational, autonomous and moral creatures, when they are free from vulnerability that
they are able to maximise their full potential.

Rawls’s theory has of course aroused criticism. Sandel and Taylor for example have
argued that it is not possible to conceptualise the individual as in some way free from
or ‘abstracted’ from the connections of society, custom and morality and exist as
detached from her desires and self interest.205 A related criticism might be to ask
how such individuals in the original position can possibly negotiate with each other
when the act of negotiation itself implies communication and communication implies
language. Language in turn may be viewed as one aspect of the framing and
describing of man’s social existence. Language emerges from within the social world
and both describes that world and communicates its signs, symbols, significance and
images to others. Hence there can be no language that exists beyond man’s social
existence. Thus the question emerges as to how people in the original position can
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conceptualise and communicate to each other those symbols and images they can
reasonably have no knowledge of, for they are symbols and images of a reality they
have not yet encountered.206

In response to such criticism, Rawls has countered that his conception of man in the
pre-social state is political rather than metaphysical.207 That is, he is not proposing a
view of the nature of man, (‘claims about the essential nature and identity of
persons’).208 Rather, he is proposing an idea of the person in the original position as
a device for reflecting and clarifying those basic principles of justice upon which
institutions and social engagements may be structured. As he points out, ‘the
description of the parties [in the original position] may seem to presuppose some
metaphysical conception of the person, for example, that the essential nature of
persons is independent of and prior to their contingent attributes, including their final
ends and attachments, and indeed, their character as a whole’. Nevertheless, he
suggests, ‘…this is an illusion caused by not seeing the original position as a device
of representation’.209

But does a metaphysical conception of the individual still creep into Rawls’
argument? Rawls himself acknowledges the problem whereby a metaphysical
conception of the person may yet be assumed or implied by the use of the concept of
persons (‘the basic units of deliberation and responsibility’) as moral and political
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agents. But, he asserts, not only does no metaphysical doctrine about the nature of
persons appear within his argument or is required by his argument, but also if such
presuppositions are involved then, they are generalist and certainly not identifiable
with any particular metaphysical perspective.210 Still such arguments are not directly
relevant to my point. My present intention is to highlight how we can see within
Rawls’ project a view of individual vulnerability and how we can see his project, in
part, as a response to that vulnerability, and it certainly seems consistent to assume
that the idea of vulnerability is a motivating factor behind the choices made in the
original position.

Still I would make one point about the actions of agents in the original position. In
this state I may reason that if I emerge into civil society as a rational, intelligent,
assertive and healthy male adult in a well to do family then my wellbeing will not so
much depend upon engaging individual rights, particularly human rights, for my
personal, psychological, emotional and economic resources, not to mention my
family connections, will see me through. But if I emerge into society as a
quadriplegic, or someone who is poor, female, who suffers from chronic mental
illness or who has middle or end stage dementia, then in such cases notions of rights
may be of little use to me. Indeed, my well being may depend not so much upon any
notion of rights that are attributed to me but on notions of duty and obligation that
those who are charged with my care and protection may have. If this is the case
then I may argue, in the original position, that the principles that govern the
organisation of social institutions ought reflect a strong conception of duty than any
minimalist rights.

My reasoning is that for the intelligent, assertive and healthy amongst us, good
outcomes are (relatively) easily assured, but for those who are impaired in some way
210
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(and especially for those who are profoundly impaired) and who depend on others for
their survival and existence, the issue is not so much what rights they are entitled to
as it is what conception of duties others have. Given I realise that although humans
are defined in terms of their rational, reflective capacity, it is the periods of intense
vulnerability within their lives that pose the greatest threat to their self interest I may,
in my caution, opt to maximise notions of duty. In addition I may subscribe to the
view, expressed by both Hobbes and Locke, that when it comes to their own interests
humans tend to promote themselves and tend also to minimise the interests of
others. What may counterbalance this position? An emphasis upon rights, even
minimalist, may not seem as good a choice to me as a strong commitment to duties
and obligations of some sort. This option is not intended in any way to undercut
Rawls’ project, rather it may provide a plausible alternative; wherein notions of duty
and obligation, along with a minimalist conception of rights, may sustain social
institutions and provide ‘..willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free
and equal persons.’211

iii]

human rights and civil society: the contractarian response to
vulnerability

The solution that the contract theorists propose for the innate vulnerability that
mankind experiences within the state of nature is civil society. In the above I have
focussed on Hobbes, Locke and Rawls – the former two going so far as to construct
a view of human social interaction in a ‘pre-social’ state. But Hobbes and Locke
were not alone in juxtaposing man’s ‘natural’ state (and its inherent failings) to the
security and protection of ‘civil’ society. Equally well known is Rousseau who, writing
in The Social Contract, presents a view of the state of nature that is not dissimilar to
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either Hobbes or Locke212. In Rousseau’s state of nature all men have a ‘common
liberty’ wherein each man ‘is the sole judge of the proper means of preserving
himself’ – the first law of nature requiring man to ‘provide for his own preservation’.
Prior to the social contract man has ‘…an unlimited right to everything he tries to get
and succeeds in getting..’ and man’s ‘natural liberty…is bounded only by the strength
of the individual…’ It is this that creates the dangers that Hobbes, in particular,
describes so powerfully. Whilst in the state of nature there is indeed ‘a universal
justice’, inspired by reason and occasioned by God, yet it is clear that such natural
laws are insufficient to regulate conduct between men. As Rousseau comments:
‘They merely make for the good of the wicked and the undoing of the just, when the
just man observes them toward everybody and nobody observes them towards him.’
What is needed are ‘conventions and laws’ that ‘join rights to duties’ and replace
man’s ‘…natural liberty’ with a civil liberty that establishes not just civil rights and
protections but importantly ‘a moral liberty, which alone makes [man] truly master of
himself.’

Pufendorf also presents a view of man in his natural state which is, as Tully so rightly
points out, ‘rich and unsurpassed’213 in both its imagery and intensity. Pufendorf also
closely approximates the writings of Hobbes in his portrayal of man’s overwhelming
vulnerability. The state of nature is, writes Pufendorf, ‘…attended with a multitude of
disadvantages…’ and he asks us to

‘…picture…a person (even an adult) left alone in this world without any of the
aids and conveniences by which human ingenuity has revealed and enriched
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our lives, you will see a naked dumb animal, without resources, seeking to
satisfy his hunger with roots and grasses and his thirst with whatever water
he can find, to shelter himself from the inclemencies of the weather in caves,
at the mercy of wild beasts, fearful of every chance encounter.’214

Typically, in the state of nature man ‘…is protected only by his own strength…’ and
again there is no authority to judge disputes and settle conflicts and to dispense
justice and ensure law and order. In an echo of Hobbes he writes: ‘There is the
reign of the passions…war, fear, poverty, nastiness, solitude, barbarity, ignorance,
[and] savagery…’ But within civil society there is ‘…the reign of reason…peace,
security, wealth, splendour, society, taste, knowledge, benevolence.’ And so he
reminds us that ‘…the true and principal cause why [men] abandoned their natural
liberty and had recourse to the constitution of states was to build protection around
themselves against the evils that threaten man from man.’215

But despite both Rousseau and Pufendorf juxtaposing man’s ‘natural’ to his ‘civil’
state, and despite also the image of vulnerability that serves (to a greater or lesser
degree) as a backdrop to their work, I do not intend to proceed with either of these
writers. As regards Rousseau, civil society comes into being to provide security and
protection for man, certainly, but the notion of rights, as those fundamental or
inalienable qualities that we associate initially with Hobbes and particularly so with
Locke, are missing. In fact Rousseau’s concept of ‘the general will’ which he
presents as a kind of collective of individual wills seems to suggest quite illiberal and
despotic tendencies that take us away from the perspective on rights that I want to
focus on. Rousseau’s picture of the general will functioning as ‘a moral and
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collective body’, a ‘public person’,216 is all-powerful and incorporates into its persona
all the ‘multitude (of citizens – of individual wills) so united in one body.’217 In
speaking of the sovereign authority Rousseau writes that,

‘As nature gives each man absolute power over all his members, the social
compact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members
also…(with) the Sovereign…the sole judge of what is important.’218

And further that

‘…whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the
whole body.’219

Thus Rousseau’s view of civil society tends to take us away from the perspective of
universal rights as establishing individual moral entitlements.220

And although Pufendorf assuredly has a ‘rich and unsurpassed’ notion of the state of
nature from which, in emphasising man’s vulnerability he deduces a sociability that
impels men toward the security of civil life, he has no established concept of natural
rights as articulations of specific individual interests and as justifications for the
establishment of civil life in the way that Hobbes and [in particular] Locke do.
Certainly Pufendorf was a natural law theorist who identified moral authority as
stemming from God and, further, he argued that the natural law right of self
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preservation was both the origin of all rights and the origin too of political
arrangements.221 It is true also that he advances the notion that rights need to
correspond with duties and in fact it is clear that in this regard Locke drew a good
deal of inspiration form Pufendorf.222 But Pufendorf is not part of the human rights
tradition and so I do not want to stray into arguments and discussions that take us
away from my central concern, the focus of which can best be dealt with by a
discussion of Hobbes, Locke and Rawls. In saying this I recognise there is debate
over when this tradition began and which thinkers it contains, and whilst some seem
to identify a human rights thread that begins [implausibly I would suggest] with
Antigone or even Christ, in this thesis I subscribe to the view that its genesis is more
likely to be found in Hobbes and later in Locke.223 From these two writers in
particular came the essential feature of rights as the medium through which interests
are both articulated and secured.

Within Hobbes and Locke man’s innate vulnerability within the state of nature is
resolved by the making of a compact, an agreement by which each individual gives
up his ‘natural right’ to all things and submits to the will of a constituted authority. For
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Hobbes, man’s problem lies with this concept of a ‘natural right’. In Leviathan he
makes it clear that ‘…as long as this natural right of every man to every thing
endureth, there can be no security to any man, [no matter] how strong or wise…he
be…’224 The solution is obvious and it is ‘that a man be willing, when others are so
too…as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall…lay down this right to all things;
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other
men against himselfe.’225 What is needed is to supplant this ‘natural right’ with a ‘civil
right’, that is, to substitute a ‘right to all things’ by a limited and well defined notion of
right which is enforced and sustained by a civil law that all have agreed to at least by
virtue of agreeing to join together to enter civil society. In other words, to ensure their
security men must agree with each other to subject themselves to the will of the
sovereign and to place themselves under his will. In order to escape from the
inherent vulnerability of the state of nature Hobbes writes that ‘there was requir’d to
the security of men, not onely their Consent, but also the Subjection of their wills in
such things as were necessary to Peace and Defence..’226

As Hobbes sees civil society as a solution to man’s inherent vulnerability so too does
Locke. Locke asserts that men join with other men and freely give their consent to
be governed ‘…for their comfortable, safe, and peaceful living one amongst another,
in a secure Enjoyment of their properties…’ It is man’s vulnerability that drives him to
civil society and like Hobbes civil society is based upon the freely given consent of
those about to be governed. As Locke says, it is only consent ‘…which did, or could
give beginning to any lawful Government in the World.’227
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‘…[T]he beginning of Politick Society depends upon the consent of the
individuals, to joyn into and make one Society; who, when they are thus
incorporated, might set up what form of government they [think] fit.’228

But not only is the concept of civil society a response to mankind’s vulnerability, so is
the notion of fundamental rights. In Hobbes the idea of a human right exists only in a
embryonic state. Indeed much debate has been directed to the question of, ‘is
Thomas Hobbes a human rights theorist or not?’229 Certainly Hobbes does embrace
at the very least two of the fundamental principles of human rights doctrine. The first
is that all legitimate government is based solely on the freely given consent of
individuals, and the second is that the ‘end game’ of politics has to be about the
security and well being of the people - even though within Leviathan this idea of the
‘well being of the people’ must be viewed within the context of the sovereign’s
[almost] absolute power.230 Despite the obvious absolutism within Hobbes the point
of the compact is clear and that is the security, protection and interests of the people.

It is within Locke that we find the first major statement of rights that endure into civil
society; rights that reflect the ongoing benefit of individuals and that are actively held
against other individuals and indeed against the state. (The idea of ‘actively’ is
important for if one cannot ‘act’ – as with the demented elderly or the mentally ill –
then one is left wondering exactly what benefit comes from this sort of right?)
Reflecting on Hobbes, Locke asks why men would escape from the state of nature
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only to give themselves up to a despot not bound by any laws?231 Rather, says
Locke, political authority lies with the community. In political society ‘the Community
comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all
Parties; and by men having Authority from the Community, for the execution of those
Rules.’232 As he points out ‘those who are united into one Body, and have a common
establish’d Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies
between them, and punish Offenders, are in Civil Society one with another.’233 Men
enter civil society for specific reasons, says Locke, and these are to protect those
basic and fundamental rights that men held, but could not enjoy, within the state of
nature.

‘The great and Chief end…of Men’s uniting into Commonwealths, and putting
themselves under Government, is the Preservation of …their Lives, Liberties
and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.’234

Locke’s concept of ‘property’ has caused much controversy and indeed, as Laslett
observes, is the weakest part of his theory, combining notions of a man’s person and
his liberties to that with which a man has mixed his labour. Nevertheless ‘it is
through the theory of property that men proceed from the abstract world of liberty and
equality’ which is the state of nature with all its dangers and uncertainties, ‘to the
concrete world of political liberty guaranteed by political arrangements.’235 Property,
however we conceive it, is at risk in the state of nature and out of mankind’s
vulnerability comes the desire to enter civil society and to protect his basic liberty and
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liberties. Thus the connection is made by Locke between mankind’s vulnerability,
civil society and (a particular kind of) human rights.236 Once in civil society man
constructs artificial arrangements to protect his natural rights, such as a
representative assembly of taxpayers to authorise taxation (‘that men might have and
secure their properties’) and an independent judiciary so that none may be unjustly
penalised.

Whilst few have doubts that Locke is indeed a human rights theorist, he is not one in
the way we currently think of human rights. For example Locke’s community of
consent giving, rational, self governing individuals did not include, at the very least,
women, atheists, slaves and men who owned no property. That would be enough for
any modern day thinker to be regarded as quite hostile to our notion of human rights.
But Locke is an example of the way that men’s thought is often taken to be more than
what they intended. In the present day we find within Locke, human rights principles
that we can easily identify with: government by consent, the locus of political
authority lying within the community, individual rights, personal liberty, representative
democracy, limits placed upon the authority of government, the rule of law and ideas
of tolerance. And certainly at the heart of Locke’s approach we can find the all
pervasive image of vulnerability.

Within natural law theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, and even Rousseau and
Pufendorf, we find the concept of vulnerability inextricably linked to man’s passage
from the state of nature to civil society. But it is within the writings of Hobbes and in
particular Locke that we find the connection made between vulnerability, rights and
civil society – where the possession of certain fundamental rights, which are
themselves the expression of the individual interests of the rational actor, form the
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basis for the civil and political arrangements that characterise life in the modern
liberal democratic state.

John Rawls continues this theme but with important differences. The discussion in A
Theory of Justice focuses on what sort of social organisation will satisfy the rational
interests of rational men and according to what principles relevant institutions can be
identified and structured to give voice and expression to these interests. In this
discussion, and later in his Political Liberalism, Rawls identifies the idea ‘…of certain
basic rights, liberties and opportunities (of a kind familiar from constitutional
democratic regimes)…’ together with the assigning of a special priority to these
rights, liberties and opportunities and as well various measures provided to ensure
citizens can make effective use of these goods.237 These principles are an essential
part of what Rawls calls ‘…a liberal political conception of justice.’238 Thus the
principle of a civil and political equality in terms of the ownership of rights and
entitlements attaching to individual persons form the basis of Rawls conception of the
liberal state. And as well the principle of a procedural equality inevitably attaches to
parties in the ‘original position’.

‘It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are
equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing
principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance
and so on.’239

In the original position the notion of equality is surely extended to include more than
just the process of choice, for respective parties must also be regarded as equal in
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terms of their ignorance of their lot when they finally emerge into civil society. In this
way they are all equally vulnerable. Further there is equality in terms of their
disinterest as regards one another and one another’s interests.240 Further they
acknowledge that no ones interest are any more important than anyone else’s, a
crucial part of what constitutes equality.241 Rawls also assumes that these
individuals possess a certain equality of understanding of the dynamics of human
social life, which certainly suggests an equally sophisticated level of intelligence.
Thus he writes that ‘it is taken for granted…that they know the general facts about
human society…political affairs…the principles of economic theory…the basis of
social organization…[and] the laws of human psychology.’242

In the original position the parties are what Rawls refers to as ‘representatives of free
and equal citizens’. He is at pains to point out (in rebuff to the communitarians) that
this original position is hypothetical and nonhistorical. It is ‘a device of
representation’ and not a metaphysical statement about the nature of persons.243 It
provides a basis for equality where choices can be freely made beyond the intrusion
of other variables such as social position, religious ideas, or political or philosophical
bias. In this ‘original position’ and behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ rational constructed
individuals choose two basic principles of justice, the first having lexical priority over
the second, upon which society and its institutions will be based and upon which
relations between people will be structured. These two principles are,
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‘First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected
to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open
to all.’244

These principles are the basis upon which society is founded and ‘are to govern the
assignment of rights and duties and to regulate the distribution of social and
economic advantages.’245 These principles also distinguish between those aspects
of the social system that define ‘the equal liberties of citizenship’ and those that
‘establish social and economic inequalities.’ Equal liberties are ordered first and are
given priority. That is, it is not possible for people to trade off a lesser share of liberty
to enable a greater share of social and economic goods. That is to say ‘any
distribution of wealth and income, and the hierarchies of authority, must be consistent
with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity.’246 The idea of
equal liberties is fundamental. To argue for less liberty would be irrational and would
compromise the desire that people have to maximise their self interest. According to
Rawls the ‘basic liberties’, we might say ‘rights’, of citizens are; ‘political liberty (the
right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and
assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along
with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and
seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.’ Moreover, says Rawls, ‘these
liberties are all required to be equal by the first principle, since citizens of a just
society are to have the same basic rights.’247
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Rawls holds to the notion of fundamental liberties which he grounds in rational choice
theory. The rights that rational people would agree to are the only ones possible
given the logic that all people wish to rationally pursue and indeed maximise their self
interest whilst at the same time recognising that others have a just and valid demand
to act in similar vein. Further, Rawls suggests that only a society founded upon
these principles of justice, what he calls ‘justice as fairness’ is rational, and that all
other social configurations such as utilitarianism, intuitionist conceptions, classical
teleological conceptions and so on are deficient in certain key areas and are thus
irrational.248 So it is that Rawls, like Locke in particular and Hobbes to a lesser
extent, views both civil society, albeit a particular form of it, and the concept of basic
equality and fundamental liberties, what we would feel comfortable calling human
rights, as a response to mankind’s inherent vulnerability. In Rawls, as with both
Locke and Hobbes, the idea of vulnerability extends into civil life and his theory sets
about to minimise the impact of such vulnerability in the ongoing life of those who
have emerged from the original position.

iv]

the human rights image of man

So far in this chapter I have argued that we can see the concept of vulnerability (the
inability to act as a fully rational, autonomous and moral agent) as a sustaining force
behind the contract theorists. In Hobbes and Locke it is the uncertainties of life prior
to civil society which convinces man that he ought quit his natural state. In Rawls the
concept of vulnerability is equally as powerful even though, as we have seen, Rawls
seeks no metaphysical conception of pre-social man. For him the idea of man prior
to civil society is an artificial device for outlining certain principles upon which the just
society can rationally be structured, yet elements of vulnerability are clear here also.
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The decisions taken in this pre social state can be seen within the context of a
potential or implied vulnerability to the interests of each agent when they finally do
emerge into civil life. Next I have argued that the response to man’s vulnerability is
civil society: an arrangement artificially constructed to serve and safeguard the
interests of consenting members. In Hobbes and Locke man consents to civil life in
order to achieve peace, security and certainty and, especially in Locke, to protect his
natural rights (now civil rights) of life, liberty and property; rights which themselves
seek to ensure an ongoing safeguard against vulnerability in civil society.
Vulnerability is thus vanquished and the rational, autonomous and moral agent is
asserted. In Rawls the interests of rational agents are protected by a certain
arrangement of social life (justice as fairness) which maximises man’s ability to
develop his potential and so become a fully developed human being. Again
vulnerability is checked by a society grounded upon equal basic rights and liberties
and an equality of (social and economic) opportunity for all.

In the remainder of this chapter I want to ask, in what way does the image of man
presented by the contract theorists reflect the image of man contained within the
liberal democratic concept of human rights. To begin with I will consider Hobbes and
Locke – later I will address Rawls. For a start, the emphasis in both contexts is upon
individuals [individuals qua individuals]249 and even when the human rights dialogue
embraces social, economic and cultural dimensions nevertheless the emphasis
remains the betterment of individual life – even if this individual life is contained, as it
typically is, within a communal setting. It is true of course that the concept of the
individual as an ontological entity certainly antedates the contract theorists. For
example it can be found within early Christian teachings, particularly the New
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Testament, where the idea of the individual as a moral essence is one who is held
accountable for adherence to certain codes of conduct that are in line with Divine
command. As Smith points out, ‘…in the Parables and in the Sermon on the Mount,
the form of address is to the individual person.’ 250 And Jesus emphasised equally
the idea that individuals were bound to each other as they were bound to the Divine
so that the address of the New Testament is directed both to God’s people in a
collective sense as it is to the individual members of that collective.

But the individual of the contract theorists, as the individual within the human rights
dialogue, is overwhelmingly a political individual. He is more than Aristotle’s zoon
politikon, for both the contract theorists and the human rights paradigm placed man
as the very reason for the existence of the state. It may be that man achieves the
highest expression of his individuality, certainly in social, economic, moral and
political terms, (even technological terms) within civil society, of which the state is the
most obvious manifestation, but the crucial point is that the rationale for the existence
of this institution is for the benefit of man. Writes Polin:

‘One must not forget that, within the necessary dialectic of the individual and
the state, the very source of this political dialectic is found in the existence of
the political individual, individual and social being at the same time, who is
finally a moral existence.’251

The contract theorists are clear that the reason for the existence of the modern state
is the security and protection of the individual. From Hobbes and Locke in particular
came the image of individual men who were ‘…independent and rational beings…the
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sole generators of their own wants and preferences, and the best judges of their own
interests…’,252 with these wants, preferences and interests being secured only within
the institutional arrangements of civil society. And in similar vein modern [liberal
democratic] human rights theory maintains that although the individual is an
individual within a state structure, and although the enjoyment of human rights
depends upon state institutions and legislative frameworks, still, such institutions and
frameworks are legitimate only to the extent that they acknowledge the moral
primacy of those who live within their borders. Thus modern human rights theory is
predicated upon the rights and freedoms [civil, political, economic, cultural] of
individual humans, and the modern state is lawful (certainly from a moral sense) only
to the degree to which it respects such freedoms.253 Both the contract theorists and
human rights advocates substantially agree on this point.

But the overriding feature of this individual, what distinguishes him or sets him apart
from other creatures, is his rationality. For Hobbes it is man’s ability to reason that
both rescues him from the state of nature and establishes his socio-biological
uniqueness. According to Hobbes it is by the benefit of reason that ‘wee are led as
’twere by the hand into the clearest light’.254 And in comparing man’s natural state to
civil society Hobbes writes, ‘for the naturall state hath the same proportion to the
Civill, I mean liberty to subjection, which Passion hath to Reason, or a Beast to a
Man.’255 It is the power of reason, that ‘law of Nature [which] is given by God to every
man for the rule of his actions’256 that reveals to man he must quit the state of nature
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and enter civil society to ensure his own survival and security. It is as Hobbes makes
clear, a ‘generall rule of Reason’ namely ‘That every man, ought to endeavour
Peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it…’so that ‘the first, and Fundamentall
Law of Nature…is, to seek Peace, and follow it.’ It is reason that enables man to rise
above his animality and to secure his survival beyond the state of nature. It is
‘…[reason] alone [that] is able to secure man against the risks and miseries of his
natural condition.’257

In like vein Locke also ascribes to the view that it is mankind’s ability to reason which
both establishes his humanity and at the same time delivers him from his vulnerability
in the state of nature. As he says in the introduction to his Essay; ‘..it is the
understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives them all
the advantage and dominion which he has over them.’258 And later in comparing
man to ‘beasts’ it is clear that the ability to think as rational, reflective beings is the
critical difference for he says of beasts ‘…that the power of abstracting is not at all in
them; and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction
betwixt man and brutes…’259 According to Locke ‘we are born Free, as we are born
Rational’260 and the liberty of an individual to act according to his own will and
dictates ‘is grounded on his having Reason.’261 Human beings possess reason
because it has been given by God; it is ‘the voice of God’ in man262 and is in fact the
basis for all human action and intercourse and indeed for human social life itself.
Locke makes this clear in the Second Treatise when he writes that it is that ‘which
God hath given to be the Rule betwixt Man and Man, and the common bond whereby
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humane kind is united into one fellowship and societie…’ Beyond reason is
madness, where there is war and force and the ‘wild beast’ and ‘noxious brute with
whom Mankind can have neither Society nor Security.’263 Like Hobbes it is this voice
of reason that advises man to quit his natural state and enter civil society for his own
well being and survival.

The final aspect of the image of this rights bearing individual is the idea of a moral
agent. Whilst the concerns of this individual are often expressed politically, yet they
are essentially moral concerns. In seeking to both explain and justify the existence
and authority of legitimate government the contract theorists recognised that the
reason why government was so important was that it maximised what Reiman has
referred to as ‘the ideal of individual sovereignty’.264 Certainly this is clear within the
writings of both Locke and Rawls, whose prescriptions for civil society encompassed
strict limitations upon the power of the civil authority [however constituted] to interfere
within the lives of the people. But Hobbes too is also keen to maximise individual
sovereignty, although of course in a different way. He is aware that in the state of
nature there is a permanent threat of war between men which renders the business
of society; industry, commerce, agriculture, arts, science and so on impossible. What
Hobbes wants is a settled and agreed upon method for resolving disputes among
men, for establishing law and order and for the protections that men require so they
can carry on their normal everyday lives in peace and security. In other words the
contract theorists, and those that ascribe to the notion of human rights, hold a similar
moral position, namely; ‘…that all human beings are entitled to the maximum ability
to live their lives according to their own judgements, subject to the conditions
necessary to realise this for everyone.’265 And though there are variations upon how
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this principle of individual sovereignty is expressed it is, as Reiman points out, a
moral position ‘because it claims to identify a universal good and a universal moral
right.’266

John Rawls presents us with some differences from the other contract theorists.
Whilst in his original work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls emphasised rationality, in his
later work, Political Liberalism, he has introduced the notion of reasonableness to
account for allied concepts of fairness, mutual obligation and cooperation as qualities
sustaining the just society. The distinction is important. Rationality has to do with the
identifying and securing of preferred ends and the means employed to secure those
ends. Rational agents ‘…adopt the most effective means to ends, or …select the
more probable alternative, other things being equal.’267 But rational agents ‘approach
being psychopathic when their interests are solely in benefits to themselves’268 thus
reasonableness inspires cooperation which encourages the just society. The two
concepts are separate and distinct but they compliment each other [ie. they ‘stand
together’], for they ‘…specify the idea of fair terms of cooperation, taking into account
the kind of social cooperation in question, the nature of the parties and their standing
with respect to one another.’269 According to Rawls

‘merely reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted to
advance by fair cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice
and fail to recognise the independent validity of the claims of others.’270
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Rawls introduces an important and powerful dimension to the construction of civil
society and fleshes out the idea of a just society being not simply a society of equals
but crucially a society in which cooperation and a certain sympathy and affection for
others is embedded within, and is necessary for, its institutional framework.

What then are the key elements of the contract theorists view of man that sit so
comfortably with the liberal view of human rights? First there is the focus on the
individual and the betterment individual life. Second there is the view of the
individual as political actor, the centre of political life whose well being is the very
reason for the existence of the state. Third is the associated concept that grounds
state legitimacy within the freely given consent of individuals. Next is the idea of
rationality. This is a metaphysical construct for Hobbes and Locke, whilst for Rawls it
is a device (moderated by reasonableness) required to sustain his argument that
liberal democracies, as typically conceived (rights based and cooperative) would be
embraced by any logical and rational agent seeking to realise his best interests.
Finally there is the view of the individual as moral agent, a view based upon man’s
ability to rationally choose certain forms of life over any other form and thus to be
held accountable for the choices he makes. Thus the view of the individual that has
been such a powerful focus for liberal approaches to human rights is of a rational,
rights bearing, moral agent; autonomous, self willing and consent giving, one whose
self identified interests and claims lie at the heart of social and political life. In the
modern world human rights have emerged as the necessary conditions required for a
human to exist as the rational, autonomous and moral agent that we typically take
humans to be.

The view that human individuals are creatures with certain basic and fundamental
rights that stand against all others (states and individuals) has emerged as a political
force only since the Enlightenment. It has built upon assumptions by Plato and, in
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the modern world, Kant, who both saw human rationality as that which separated us
from non-humans. Following Rabossi, Richard Rorty calls this view, foundationalism
– metaphysical presuppositions about the nature of human beings.271 It is an
approach to thinking about humans that recently has come under attack, certainly by
Rabossi and Rorty (but I think also from Rawls) as being not so much
epistemologically false as it is simply irrelevant in getting humans to recognise that
they have certain basic qualities in common with other humans and so ought to treat
them better. One reason this approach has had so little apparent success is that to
the extent it focuses upon the rational, autonomous and moral agent – the maker of
claims and the claimer of rights (the archetype of the liberal individual) - it has
nothing to say to those who do not comfortably fit this rather exclusive picture.
Rights theory has traditionally been so overshadowed by the rational agent that it has
too often neglected the reality of those who are not rational.

John Rawls has, as we have seen in this chapter, consciously moved away from the
metaphysical maze. Yet within his work there is little comfort for the sort of individual
I have in mind. For example his (political not metaphysical) view of the person ‘…is
someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating member of
society over a complete life.’272 Social cooperation itself has three elements. It is
‘guided by publicly recognised rules and procedures that those cooperating accept
and regard as properly regulating their conduct’; it involves, secondly, a conception of
fairness in that there are ‘terms that each participant may reasonably accept,
provided that everyone else likewise accepts them’; and third it ‘…requires an idea of
each participants rational advantage or good.’273 My point is, and it is one already
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made (in part) by Rawls feminist detractors,274 that debates between metaphysics
and politics are all very well but his language inevitably hides a reality that effectively
excludes all those who cannot engage, cooperate, recognise, participate, and be
regarded as reasonable ‘free and equal persons’. That is, it fails to address the
issues and existence of particularly vulnerable groups of individuals such as the frail
aged with dementia and the chronically mentally ill. It is not so much that Rawls
excludes such people it is that he does not speak to them. They are effectively
outside the debate. This distinction is important and I will return to it in my final
chapter when I consider the image of ‘the other’ and how we might engage the other.

But hostility toward the image of the rational as metaphysis is not limited to Rawls.
Of late there has been an emphasis upon human rights being informed by an
individual’s capabilities and functioning – a view increasingly put by those such as
Nussbaum and Sen,275 yet even here we have as backdrop the image of the
individual who lives in a world of choosing and choice making, which implies a
predominance of rationality. Reflecting this new approach Nussbaum writes that,
‘enabling people to develop their potential captures the essence of the capabilities
approach’ to human rights.276 And in explaining ‘the central human capabilities and
their correlation to human rights’ she states:

‘The list [of central human capabilities] is supposed to be a focus for political
planning, and it is supposed to select those human capabilities that can be
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convincingly argued to be of central importance in any human life, whatever
else the person pursues or chooses. The central capabilities are not just
instrumental to further pursuits; they are held to have value in themselves, in
making a life fully human. But they are held to have a particularly central
importance in everything else we plan and choose. In that sense, central
capabilities play a role similar to that played by primary goods in Rawls’s
more recent accounts: they support our powers of practical reason and
choice, and have a special importance making any choice of a way of life
possible.’277 [emphasis added AB]

The spectre of rational man still haunts the human rights exercise even here.

In the first section of this thesis I have reflected primarily upon the concept of
vulnerability which I have discussed from the perspective of the philosophical, the
personal and the political. My references to rights have been of necessity brief and
by way of examples to illustrate relevant points. In the next section I want to focus
primarily on the concept of human rights but within the context of their application to
the frail aged and the mentally ill within Australia. My task in the next two chapters
will be therefore first, to outline what human rights promises these vulnerable people
and second, to argue that the concept is largely irrelevant to their care and
protection. In the final chapter I will offer an alternative to caring for vulnerable
people that does not rely for its justification upon the individual rights that such
people are said to be entitled to.
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Chapter Four:

i]

Vulnerability and the Promise of Rights

human rights, vulnerability and promises

When confronted with vulnerable people we have tended to embrace the notion of
rights and in particular human rights. The reason we adopt this approach is because
we recognise that the vulnerable are, in certain crucial ways, less able than those of
us who are not vulnerable to control the circumstances of their existence and without
some form of support or care or protection would fare very badly indeed. Thus a
central theme within human rights is to seek a guarantee for the protection of
vulnerable groups and individuals. This reminds us of Dworkin’s comment about
human rights being ‘trumps’ over all other aspects of politics and policy, or Minogue’s
suggestion that human rights are to function as a form of ‘protective moral armour’.
There is inherent within human rights a sense of an individual’s moral entitlement.
To have a human right is to be entitled to something – particularly, as concerns the
vulnerable, it is often an entitlement to some form of treatment.

By embracing the idea of human rights we do two things. First we seek to establish a
fundamental sense of the equality of all peoples and second we see within human
rights a powerful means to protect those who are vulnerable and so secure for such
individuals a standard of existence (social, political, economic, cultural and the like)
that is commensurate with what it means to be a rational, autonomous and moral
agent. By invoking human rights, and applying them to vulnerable groups and
individuals, we are asserting that although there are some who are clearly
disadvantaged in crucial ways when compared to the rest of us they are,
nevertheless, our moral equals. Despite obvious differences between people in
terms of their abilities or capacities or talents, we regard all people as being equal on
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at least the dimension of moral worth; people qua people. Thus we both hope and
assume that human rights will not only protect people from the worse excesses of the
vulnerability that some experience but will also go some way toward restoring those
individuals to full participation within the social and political body politic.

The attraction of rights talk and in particular human rights talk is that within this form
of discourse there is a moral tone that demands both acknowledgment and
resolution. Groups and individuals embark upon human rights talk because the
moral imperative contained within such talk asserts the (moral) validity of the claims
made in their name. And this is the case at no matter what level we embrace the
idea of human rights. Whether we are debating human rights as underpinnings of
international law in the form of some basic standard that all countries ought to identify
with and endorse, as the ground rules for the establishment of a just and fair society,
or as the rationale for the treatment of specific vulnerable groups and individuals, it is
to this moral imperative that we are appealing.

If we concede the above then it seems reasonable to suggest that we adopt human
rights talk and embrace the moral dimension inherent within such talk because we
seek certain specific outcomes. The outcomes sought depend of course upon the
context within which those who articulate rights concerns are located. Different
outcomes are expected at the level of international jurisprudence than are expected
at the level of domestic politics, but essentially the rationale is the same. We engage
in human rights rhetoric both because it justifies and supports (in a moral sense) our
position and because it provides a framework within which we enclose and frame our
expectations and demands. In other words human rights hold out the ‘promise’ of a
certain state of affairs that those who embark on human rights talk seek to realise,
either for themselves or for those they claim to represent. It is the dimensions of this
‘promise’ that I wish to explore in this chapter. In the following chapter I will argue
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that human rights have failed this promise and that they are inevitably flawed,
particularly as a paradigm of moral rescue for the vulnerable, but first it is imperative
to understand precisely what it is that human rights promises and how its promises
are framed and to whom its promises are directed.

ii]

human rights and street level philosophy

When talking about human rights there are at least two ways that we can approach
such a discussion. One is to consider the ways in which the general term ‘rights’ is
employed within a given body of knowledge. Recognising that the concept of ‘a right’
is anchored within a legal lexicon we could proceed by a discussion that considers
what is meant when we say that someone ‘has a right’ and what sort of relationships
are, by definition, embedded within this premise. From this point we would then
embark on a discussion of ‘human rights’ being one variant of the more general
species ‘rights’. Such an explanation we could call a stipulative definition. This
defines the phrase ‘to have a right’ ‘…by making a proposal as to what it ought to
mean to people… [wherein] …one stipulates (as opposed to discovers) the criteria
that are henceforth to govern the use of a term.’278 The American jurist W. N.
Hohfeld presents an example of a stipulative definition of rights.279 Displaying a
Bentham-like hostility toward ‘…inadequacy and ambiguity of
terms…[which]…reflect, all too often, corresponding paucity and confusion as
regards legal conceptions’,280 Hohfeld sought to bring an order and consistency to
the notion of a legal right.
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Hohfeld proposed four sorts of relationships that were embraced by the general term
‘right’. These were ‘rights’, ‘privileges’, ‘powers’ and ‘immunities’. A ‘right’, often
referred to as a ‘claim right’, is where another has a duty or obligation to let one do or
have something. In this sense rights and duties are coterminous so that one’s right is
equal to another’s duty. A ‘privilege’ or liberty is where one is under no obligation not
to do something. It is ‘…one’s freedom from the right or claim of another.’281 In this
way my right to act in a particular way, for example to speak in public, is a privilege or
liberty since it corresponds to a lack of any duty which prevents me from acting in this
way. A ‘power’ is a legal ability to alter rights or duties or legal relations in some
particular way. Powers impose no correlative duties on another, for example where
one holds a power of attorney or a power of appointment.282 Finally an ‘immunity’ is
a protection against the imposition of certain duties. The most obvious example of
an immunity is the constitutional protection within the United States Bill of Rights
which prohibits any legislature from enacting certain laws which constrain particular
freedoms such as the freedom of speech or assembly.

However stipulative definitions pose certain problems. One is that the term may
cover more than one discipline and in so doing subtle alterations in meaning and
emphasis may emerge. For example Hohfeld’s concern was solely with rights as
legal entities. He did not mention the area of moral rights or duties and it is when we
enter this domain that relationships become increasingly complex and uncertain.
Thus Hohfeld’s conception of a duty as ‘…the invariable correlative’283 of a right so
that ‘when a right is invaded a duty is violated’284 is, within the arena of moral
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discourse in particular, not always applicable. Within the area of moral and ethical
discussion, and indeed within social and political discourse in general, one may
identify many instances where rights and duties are said (by some parties at least) to
exist without any clear or precise correlativity being readily acknowledged – and this
is especially so within the area of welfare rights.285

It may be that, following Mill, we can divide duties into those of perfect obligation,
which imply correlative rights, and those of imperfect obligation, which do not. But
where does the distinction lie? According to both Mayo286 and Meldon287 it lies with
given undertakings that involve contracts, promises and agreements between two or
more consenting parties. But still we seem no closer at establishing general
agreement as to what constitutes that particular brand of moral rights identified as
human rights, for human rights often involve claims and claims often involve the
assertion of one’s entitlement based not upon any prior agreement at all but simply
upon the (perceived) moral entitlement itself. The debates seem never ending. At
the heart of the issue is that discussions within moral and ethical fields generally
constitute normative statements where rights in general, and human rights in
particular, describe what ought to be rather than what actually exists, with there often
being little agreement on the underlying precepts upon which moral rights are
founded. Within positive law there is no such disagreement. We may argue that
some laws are good and some are bad, or that some are just and others unjust, and
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we may even debate to whom the law applies, but we would never argue that the law
did not exist.

If stipulative definitions about moral rights seemed doomed to failure, then another
way to embark on a discussion of rights would be to consider what people have in
mind when they make rights claims. That is, we would disregard discussion about
how a phrase such as ‘human rights’ ought to be used, and rather focus on what sort
of arrangements people actually have in mind when they invoke the term. Such a
discussion may begin by thinking not about human rights themselves but about what
people mean when they invoke the concept of human rights. What arrangements
between people are assumed by those who make human rights claims? In this way
we are not interested in the validity of human rights, that is, are human rights as
opposed to other forms of rights an appropriate subject for discussion and debate
and what course ought this discussion and debate take, (or indeed, and reflecting
upon comments in the previous chapter, is there any metaphysical point upon which
we can anchor human rights), rather we are interested in the application of the idea
of human rights to human problems by those who employ the term to resolve those
problems. Such an explanation we could call a strategic definition.

Strategic definitions of rights focus on the way that talk about rights are employed at
the street level. By using the term ‘street level’ I am referring to an ongoing
discourse that involves those groups, individuals and agencies who employ notions
of rights as a means to achieve certain outcomes. Our interest is directed to the way
that human rights are applied by the various groups and individuals who employ such
talk to achieve certain strategic ends within the social and political marketplace.
Such an approach recognises that those who apply rights [or who claim rights] at the
level of the street, are quite content to leave the philosophical debate about what
constitutes human rights, about issues of the correlativity of rights and duties and the
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strength and direction of such correlativity, about whether human rights can
reasonably be collapsed into Hohfeldian ‘claim rights’ or are better described in terms
of welfare rights, and about the relationships between rights, duties and social
justice, to political scientists, philosophers and lawyers. At the level of the street,
people are interested primarily in outcomes.

Within strategic definitions the idea of human rights can often be seen as derivative.
That is, what people choose to define as human rights tends to reflect not so much
some internal philosophical antecedent as it does their own particular considered
perspective. The inclination to clothe social and political aspirations within the
rhetoric of rights is a common ploy by social reformers and interest groups across the
ideological spectrum. Also, strategic definitions of rights seem based upon empiricist
logic. Human rights are invoked because there is an expectation that they will
provide certain outcomes. With the increasing democratisation of public policy there
is anticipation that policy options will reveal tangible benefits for the ways that
ordinary lives are led. Whatever public policy option people embrace is embraced
because there is an expectation that certain favourable outcomes will be delivered.
In this way human rights are employed because they are convenient social levers to
ensure certain desired outcomes for certain groups.

Having said the above we may now formulate the basic position that people at the
level of the street hold with respect to the idea of human rights. For those who
embark upon rights talk with the purpose of making social, moral or political claims,
the relationship between the holders of rights and those who are viewed as
responsible for the discharge of respective duties may be expressed as follows:

To have a right is to suggest that there is at least one person [A] who ‘owns’
the right as well as there being at least one other person [B] against whom
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this right is ‘held’. In this case [B] may be said to have a duty to [A] to the
extent that [B] may either have to do some action for [A] to realise the
enjoyment of the right, or else [B] may simply have to refrain from impeding
the ability of [A] to act in a manner of [A]’s choosing.

In this way the street level application of rights can be seen to embrace two
concepts. The first is the strict correlativity of rights and duties and the second is
empowerment, and it is these two concepts that both groups and individuals have in
mind when they embark on rights talk and in particular on human rights talk.

To say that correlativity is strict is to say that for every right holder there is a
corresponding holder of duties, with the obligation being either to provide certain
goods or services or simply to forbear. Thus within street level democracy we can
identify two types of rights. The first we may call enabling rights. Here a right holder
[A] is established as well as another [B] (most often the state) who is duty bound to
provide certain goods or services fundamental to the enjoyment of [A]’s right(s). To
fail to provide these goods or services is to fail the moral obligation attached to the
right and to deny the right holder the ability to act in the manner of his choosing. The
second we may call forbearance rights. In this case [B] simply has to stand aside, as
it were, and allow [A] to enjoy his right(s) in whatever manner he sees fit. To intrude,
in this case, and to place constraints upon [A]’s enjoyment of his rights is again to fail
the test of moral obligation. But whatever type of rights are involved, the relationship
between right holder [A] and the correlative duty holder [B] is assumed to be strict,
with [B]’s obligation being either to enable or to forebear; to provide certain goods
and services or to stand aside.

Associated with correlativity is the idea of empowerment. For [A] to have a right
against [B] suggests that whilst [A] is free, [B] is bound by his duty or obligation to [A].
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It is [A] who holds the right, can alter the conditions of it288 can enforce it assert it or
even waive it. Whilst this may not always be the case yet it is true that it is the
claiming, or demanding, or asserting of one’s rights that gives them ‘their special
moral significance’ and, as Feinberg has observed, ‘…enables us to “stand up like
men”, to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of
anyone.’289 In this way individual rights can be seen as the reflection of the interest
of the right holder(s) with, ‘…their special function or significance in moral and
political thought (being) that they represent the individual’s perspective…against the
general or public good or against claims, demands, needs or requirements of others
generally.’290 It is in this way that rights are regarded as empowering and it is this
empowering function that people seek when they make rights claims. Moral rights,
and in particular human rights, mark the boundary of individual autonomy and action,
establish the moral worth and dignity of the person, and enable individual’s to make
what they regard as valid and binding moral claims upon others based upon what
they view as their own entitlements as individuals.291

When people embark upon human rights talk at the level of the street they have in
mind these dual concepts of correlativity and empowerment. Precisely, human rights
are empowering because there is an assumed strict correlativity between rights and
duties, between the rights that people enjoy and the duties that others hold to enable
the enjoyment of such rights. If there was no correlativity then there would be no
possibility of empowerment and one would be no better off with rights than without
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them. If such a case existed, if it were true that rights could never be regarded in any
way as correlative and one’s ownership of rights implied no correlative function at all,
then at the level of the street rights would be abandoned as having no relevance.
With regard to strategic definitions of rights it is outcomes that are crucial.

My above comments are a reflection of the assumptions that stand behind human
rights by those who employ such talk at the level of the street, regardless as to
whether one defines rights in terms of ‘needs’ or in terms of ‘equality’, in terms of
claim rights or in terms of welfare rights. Nolan and Oakes suggest that human rights
can be thought of as both ‘protections from domination as well as protections from
interference.’ The former represents what they describe as a ‘republican’ or ‘needs
driven’ approach. This suggests that some groups require special treatment because
they are poorly strategically placed to articulate their interests, or else they are
structurally disadvantaged in some way. The latter reflects a ‘liberal’ or ‘equality
driven’ ethos. This view stresses ‘equality-driven, civil and political rights defined by
freedom from interference.’292 Whilst those such as Lake have suggested that, with
regard to human rights, ‘equality as sameness does not provide protection’,293
especially for the structurally disadvantaged (the mentally ill, young children, the
aged and infirm, the intellectually disabled) who are excluded from discussions and
decisions about allocation of (political, social and economic) resources, Nolan and
Oakes suggest that ‘a needs based definition of human rights is not widely used in
social or legal discussions of human rights.’294 Needs-based definitions of rights, that
human rights ought be sensitive to the differences in situations and circumstances
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that confront various social groups, might be reflected in the comment by
Charlesworth who suggested that, ‘the essence of the idea of human rights is to
protect vulnerable groups from the will of the majority’,295 yet it is, according to Nolan
and Oakes, ‘a radical view of the purpose of human rights, and one that differs from
traditional approaches that describe human rights using equality rhetoric.’296

In general terms I do not think the distinctions matter that much. Early in their paper
Nolan and Oakes raise what I think is a crucial point when they ‘flirt…with the idea
that when an aggrieved person turns to law they are merely searching for yet another
powerful rhetorical tool with which to convince others that the treatment they have
suffered is an injustice.’297 Of course, as they correctly point out, legal concepts, as
well as philosophical (moral, ethical and political) ones are always open to
interpretation, so that when one has to make a choice between ‘…a description of the
purpose of human rights as treating everyone equally and a description of the
purpose of human rights as protecting vulnerable groups…’ many factors influence
the subsequent choice. Not the least of these factors is ‘…the audience to whom a
particular interpretation of human rights is being put.’298 This tells us, and crucially,
that at the level of the street, not only do people seek outcomes with respect to
human rights, and outcomes that reflect their own particular aims and interests or the
aims and interests of the groups they clam to represent, but also what they define as
‘human rights’ in terms of social and political benefits are fluid. And whilst it is true
that ‘equality’ has traditionally been the focus of the thrust of human rights it is no
less true that ‘needs’ are an equally powerful justification. To put it bluntly, it seems
rather obvious that any human rights theory that failed to protect vulnerable groups
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and individuals (and account for their impoverished need) would be seen, certainly by
mainstream opinion, as lacking not only morally and politically but also intellectually.

ii]

the promise of human rights

In the introduction to this chapter I asserted that when applied to the vulnerable,
human rights seek to establish a fundamental sense of the moral equality of all
persons and they seek to protect those who are vulnerable, that is those who are
impaired in their ability to act as rational, autonomous and moral agents with respect
to their own interests. I suspect that the judgement made by Nolan and Marks, that
human rights can be seen in terms of either republican ‘needs driven’ or liberal
‘equality driven’ urges obscures the reality that in general those who embrace human
rights talk at the level of the street seek to combine these two approaches. In other
words, for those who employ human rights rhetoric for the protection of vulnerable
people, the approach adopted reflects a hybrid of both republican and liberal
traditions.

This is certainly the case within the Australian context. Here no great distinction can
be made about the use of human rights concepts which are, in reality, inextricably
bound to issues of need, equality and social justice. In the following I wish to reflect
on this fact, and also to reflect on exactly what it is that human rights promise
vulnerable people by reference to some of those documents that seek to protect the
human rights of two specifically vulnerable groups; namely, the frail aged in
Australia’s nursing homes and the mentally ill in general.299
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residents’ rights in nursing homes

It would seem almost axiomatic to say that those who live in this country’s nursing
homes are amongst the most vulnerable of citizens, yet the concept of moral
entitlements loosely gathered under the rubric of ‘human rights’ and directed toward
nursing home residents is of relatively recent development. The concept of what we
now refer to as ‘the rights of residents in nursing homes’ emerged within the early
years of the 1980s and against the backdrop of a number of reports that, by degrees,
revealed serious concerns about the quality of life for this growing population. The
McLeay Report of 1982 was one of the first to raise such issues at an official level.300
Here we can clearly see that the rights debate has always reflected both a needs and
an equality philosophy. In fact the Minister for Social Security of the day noted the
necessity ‘… for directing welfare to those in greatest need…’ as well as the demand
‘…to meet adequately the needs of the poorest group in our community.’301 The
Australian Council on the Ageing embedded these concerns within a rights paradigm
by suggesting that;

‘A national policy on care of the ageing should be developed, within which
there should be provision of care of the elderly in “any kind” of setting, the
right to high quality care and the right of the elderly to decision-making in
regard to their own care.’302

Whilst the McLeay Report did not embrace directly the idea of ‘residents’ rights’ as
we now know them, it did bring to the attention of the public the existence of a group
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of people who were united in their collective disadvantage. And it did hint at some of
the structural inequalities that faced these people, in particular the lack of effective
controls over nursing home proprietors and the lack of any mechanism for complaint
and redress for residents. In fact the Report recognised that residents in nursing
homes lacked any effective form of representation at all, so that ‘…many grievances
are never articulated and…the management of institutions have very effective ways
of containing complaining residents by isolation, by restraint and by just ignoring
them.’303 The reality was, as the Report noted, that ‘people who are unprotected in
nursing homes are often afraid to raise their voices in anger or protest.’304 As far as
the relatives of such individuals were concerned, they also

‘…are in a bind if they have been driven to the point of physical and/or
psychological exhaustion by caring and they have managed to find a place
[for their relatives] even in an unsatisfactory establishment. They are unlikely,
unless the problems are really quite dramatic, to do more than express
concern and take away an even bigger load of guilt and anxiety than they had
when they made the arrangements in the first place.’305

The Mcleay Report recognised that the aged within residential facilities were a
particularly vulnerable group of people – impaired often in their ability to function as
rational, autonomous and moral agents, and impaired because of either personal or
structural impediments, or indeed both. The Report also took the first tentative steps
toward establishing a (human) rights based protection for nursing home residents,
but it was the Senate Select Committee Report of 1985 which powerfully and
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effectively laid the groundwork for this philosophy.306 This Committee, more than any
other, revealed many nursing homes to be in dire need of reform. It reported serious
concerns by staff, relatives of residents, and members of the general public, about
the appalling treatment that was often meted out to those who lived as residents
within such establishments, and who relied upon the staff (in their various roles) for
ongoing care and protection. In citing concerns regarding ‘..poor treatment of the
patient, unsanitary conditions, poor food, inadequate control of drugs, improper use
of restraints (both physical and medicinal), assaults on human dignity and reprisals
against those who complain,’ the Committee observed that ‘…the quality of care in
some nursing homes…fall[s] far short of being adequate’ and in fact often contributed
to the deterioration of the patient’s physical health.307

The Committee itself referred to research by other organisations which documented
the appalling conditions under which residents of some nursing homes lived. Two
pieces of research are instructive. One was a weekend ‘phone-in’ conducted by the
Local Government Welfare Association in conjunction with the School of Social Work
from the Western Australian Institute of Technology, in which numerous ‘allegations
of inadequate care were lodged against a total of 25 nursing homes‘ in Western
Australia. Identified was a lack of privacy and lack of independence for residents,
poor quality of food, poor staff/patient ratios, patients left for long periods of time in
soiled beds, patients being showered before 0600 hours to reduce pressure on day
staff and ‘patients left shivering naked outside showers waiting for nursing staff to
return with towels.’308
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A similar survey was conducted following the Perth phone-in, this time under the
direction of the New South Wales ‘Social Welfare Action Group’. Commenting on the
results of this survey the Committee stated:

‘The authors of the survey noted that the nature of abuse reported during the
phone-in was far more varied than anticipated, and ranged from actual
physical mistreatment, such as rough handling and violence, to passive or
psychological neglect and other less visible and more subtle forms of abuse,
such as leaving residents tied to commodes for long periods of time, opening
and scrutinising all their mail, failing to replace lost glasses and dentures, and
generally ignoring both their physical and emotional daily needs.’309

Given the above it was probably inevitable that the concept of ‘residents rights in
nursing homes’ would emerge as a powerful philosophical force. Indeed it was
precisely this emphasis that provided the rationale for what has become known as
the Ronalds Report.310 This report, commissioned by the Department for Housing
and Aged Care, had the specific aim of seeking the effective care and protection of
residents in Commonwealth-funded nursing homes, hostels and geriatric assessment
services and was in direct response to ongoing community debates about the need
to effectively safeguard this group of particularly vulnerable people. As the Minister
of the day, Peter Staples, made clear, the Ronalds Report demonstrated ‘…the
Australian…Government’s firm commitment to social justice: enhancing people’s
rights, ensuring that the benefits of a growing economy are distributed equitably, and
improving equality of opportunity, in short, giving all Australians a fair go.’311 In other
words the way to social justice for all groups in the Australian community was
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through the medium of rights. The concept of rights, and in particular human rights,
would not only secure social, political and economic equality but it would also protect
and secure the best interests of even the most vulnerable in the community. It has
been this combination of needs and equality based interpretations of rights that has
traditionally been the focus of human rights, certainly as far as their expression within
Australia is concerned.

The Ronalds Report was the inspiration for the 1990 publication by the
Commonwealth Government’s Department of Health, Housing and Community
Services which addressed directly the issue of the rights of nursing home residents.
Titled ‘Your Guide To Residents’ Rights In Nursing Homes’,312 the centrepiece of this
publication was a Charter, which set out the individual’s ‘rights and responsibilities as
a resident of a nursing home.’ It was based around notions of quality care that was
appropriate to the needs of the individual, and a variety of civil, political, social and
cultural rights which acknowledged not only the reality that nursing home residents
are often physically and mentally compromised, but also that they are nevertheless
the moral equals of all other Australians.313 In recent years this document has been
revised and updated, no doubt in part to reflect the recent Aged Care Act of 1997, but
also in part as a response to an industry that is perceived to be (still) largely in crisis
and in crisis with respect to what we might refer to (still) as care and protection
issues.314
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At the heart of the present Coalition government’s commitment to the care and
protection of residents within nursing homes is the Charter of Residents’ Rights and
Responsibilities [hereafter the Charter]315, a document which ‘details the rights and
responsibilities of all residents [and] includes personal, civil, legal and consumer
rights and responsibilities…’316 The rights based protections enshrined within the
Charter are fleshed out in a variety of other documents, in particular the publication
by Robert Phillips317 as well as material published by the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Practice Working Group of the Minister for Aged Care’s National Aged Care
Working Forum, 318 a working group under direct government supervision whose role
has been both to introduce a Code of Ethics and a Guide to Ethical Conduct for
residential aged care. These documents provide the basis for the protections
currently offered to nursing home residents They can be viewed as representing the
human rights ‘promise’ to those in aged care facilities.

According to the Charter, the basis of the approach to the rights of nursing home
residents reflects both a civil and political as well as a social justice component. In
the preamble it is noted that ‘a person’s rights do not diminish when he or she moves
into a nursing home or hostel, regardless of…physical or mental frailty or ability to
exercise or fully appreciate his or her rights’. Indeed the Charter emphasises that
‘the personal, civil, legal and consumer rights of each resident…’ remains intact
within the nursing home setting as do those principles of social justice which the
Charter describes as; ‘…equal access to health care, housing and education, and
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equal rights in civil, legal and consumer matters.’ The main text of the Charter
reflects both an ‘equality driven’ and ‘needs driven’ approach to rights and the first
two rights are instructive in this regard. Residents are guaranteed both the ‘full and
effective use of his or her personal, civil, legal and consumer rights’ as well as
‘…quality care appropriate to his or her needs.’

I do not intend to reproduce here each of the 21 individual rights contained within the
Charter, yet it is important to be aware both of the language used and some of the
specific rights embraced, especially when one considers that many in nursing homes
are amongst the most helpless, powerless and dependent individuals in our society.
Apart from the guarantee of civil, legal and quality of care rights, residents are
assured rights to ‘..privacy; …to move freely both within and outside the residential
care service; …to have…individual preferences taken into account; …to continue
[with] cultural and religious practices; …freedom of speech; …personal
independence; …to maintain control over…the personal aspects of his or her daily
life, financial affairs and possessions; …to have access to information about his or
her rights, [and] to complain and to take action to resolve disputes.’ Apart from these
there are numerous rights that address the protection of one’s dignity and respect,
the inclusion of the individual within nursing home activities, the establishing of social
relationships, freedom from reprisals and so on.

The language of rights is the language of ownership, of moral entitlement, of action.
It is the language of the rational, autonomous and self assured individual whose
possession and practical implementation of her rights defines her as actor, as citizen,
as rational and moral agent. The Charter, like most human rights documents, (and
certainly those that apply to the mentally ill and residents in aged care facilities) is a
reflection of this view of the individual as a rational, assertive, reflective agent who is
capable both of identifying and claiming her own interests and this is emphasised in
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two crucial features. One is of course the right ‘to complain and to take action…’,
which includes the right to seek redress for wrongs and to ‘resolve disputes’ and to
have ‘access to advocates’ to aid and support one in doing this, whilst the other
feature is the responsibilities that a resident has toward other residents. These
responsibilities include, naturally enough, a ‘respect for the rights and needs of other
people within the residential care service…’, but also the obligation ‘to care for his or
her own health and well-being as far as he or she is capable [and] to inform his or her
medical practitioner…about his or her relevant medical history and current state of
health.’

These two features reinforce the view of the individual both as agent with respect to
their own interests, and one who is capable of being attributed praise or blame. As
we have seen previously, these two qualities are important in making distinctions
between who is and who is not a moral agent. Moral agents identify and assert their
own interests and are held accountable both for what they do and for what they fail to
do, yet problems emerge if there are both structural or personal impediments
preventing them from acting so. Past reports into the management and day to day
running of nursing homes certainly raised numerous concerns about the care and
treatment of residents, but they also identified the problem of an imbalance in power
between proprietors and residents and to a lesser extent raised the issue of how
does one protect the best interests of those, such as the demented elderly, who
cannot speak for themselves.

If the language of rights is the language of action then what becomes of those who
cannot act, either to assert, to claim, or to demand their rights, or indeed simply to
complain that their rights have been transgressed? If such people cannot articulate
their grievances and if those close to them, family, friends or professionals, cannot or
will not speak for them, then what becomes of their well-being and how is it
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protected? In considering the documents that seek to protect the rights of nursing
home residents it is important to keep in mind the relevance and accuracy of
language that assumes not only that all residents are rational, autonomous and moral
agents (or have such agents to speak for them), but also that residents exist in an
environment that encourages, or at least does not impede, the expression of their
rights. As I shall argue in the next chapter these assumptions are quite wrong.

In discussing the rights of nursing home residents that are described in the Charter,
Phillips notes that these rights can be grouped into seven categories, which he
describes as; rights to quality care, rights to a secure and homelike environment,
rights to privacy, dignity and respect, rights to choice, independence and individuality,
rights to participation, to information and finally the right to complain.319 Under each
heading the rights that accrue to residents are detailed in practical fashion. For
example the ‘right to quality care’ entitles one to ‘quality care that is appropriate to
your needs’ and involves a resident being actively involved in her health care
assessment, receiving information about her state of health so as to make informed
decisions about health care and the right to view her health and care records.320
With regard to privacy the resident is ‘…entitled to personal privacy and to be treated
with dignity and respect.’ This covers issues such as confidentiality of records and
personal information, the provision of a secure space for personal belongings, the
ability to engage in personal activities in private, and the security of one’s own room
and belongings.321
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Of particular importance is the right to complain about anything that impacts on the
life of the resident. To sustain this right ‘each aged care facility must have its own
complaints process’ and must give assistance to the individual who wishes to make a
complaint. Complaints can be made directly to the home in question or they can be
made to the Complaints Resolution Scheme at the Department of Health and Aged
Care, and the complainant can either represent herself or she can seek an advocate
to act for her.322 In fact the rights of the aged are protected, according to information
from the Department of Health and Aged Care, by a variety of processes; resident
agreements, complaint resolution mechanisms, support from advocacy services and
access to the Community Visitors Scheme.323 In the case of an inability to make
complaints or if the complainant feels, or fears, victimisation, the advice offered is to
contact Residential Care Rights. But also each resident has certain responsibilities.
Thus Phillips comments that, ‘you are responsible for your own health and well-being
(as much as possible) [and] you must respect the rights of other residents and staff.’
This involves adhering to house rules, respecting the rights and privacy of other
residents and taking ‘responsibility to care for yourself as much as possible…’

The other document fundamental to the protection of resident’s rights in nursing
homes is the Code of Ethics and Guide to Ethical Conduct for Residential Aged Care,
hereafter referred to as the Code and Guide respectively. This document is of recent
construction and can easily be seen as a direct response to the ongoing concerns in
the community about the parlous state of care and protection offered the aged
residents who occupy the nation’s nursing homes. Addressing these issues through
a rights paradigm, the Code ‘…identifies those values that form the basis of an
effective relationship between the providers of aged care, the staff and professionals
that deliver the care, and the consumers of aged care services’, whilst the Guide
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‘…expands on this to illustrate how these values should, in principle, be interpreted in
the every day environment of an aged care home.’324

Taken together, the purpose of the Code and the Guide can be seen as an ethical
and moral adjunct to the legal requirements of the Aged Care Act of 1997 which
embraces all parties within the aged care sector; proprietors of nursing homes, staff,
residents and their families in a partnership aimed at mutual co-operation, care and
respect - all part of a wider collaboration seeking to ‘serve the needs of frail, elderly
Australians.’ Four aims are described. These are; to identify the values that sustain
the practice of residential aged care; to ensure that provision of care respects what
are described as ‘fundamental human values’; to set moral and ethical standards
which providers of care as well as staff and residents are all expected to adhere to;
and finally to provide the basis for individual organizations to construct written
protocols which set out how they will deliver care with respect to the ethical and
moral standards described under the Code and the Guide.325

So as to ensure there is no confusion or misunderstanding with respect to the moral
imperatives involved, both the Code and the Guide are firmly aligned with human
rights principles. Thus the Code seeks to represent ’the agreed values, expressed
as human rights, to which the partners are committed and upon which their practice
is based’, whilst ‘the Guide sets out for each partner the ethical obligations each has
to the others if each is to respect the human rights of the other partners as set out in
the Code.’326 In this way both the rights that apply to the aged and the values that
sustain those rights are firmly placed within the human rights paradigm. By referring
to them as ‘human rights’ they are established as ‘fundamental human values’ whose
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task is to ensure the care and protection of residents within aged care institutions,
‘…no matter how frail, physically or mentally disabled, or financially, socially or
psychological vulnerable the resident may be.’327

These ‘fundamental human values’, which underpin the human rights of nursing
home residents, are described as follows:

‘i]

the right of individuals to be treated with respect;

ii]

the rights of the individual to life, liberty and security;

iii]

the right of individuals to have their religious and cultural
identity respected;

iv]

the right of competent individuals to self-determination;

v]

the right to an appropriate standard of care to meet
individual needs;

vi]

the right to privacy and confidentiality;

vii]

the recognition that human beings are social beings with
social needs.’328

Within the Code of Ethics and Guide to Ethical Conduct for Residential Aged Care
these seven rights are applied to three different groups of people; the providers of
residential aged care, the staff who attend or care for the residents, and finally to the
residents themselves, although of course the seven rights are interpreted in different
ways depending upon whom they are applied to. Whilst it would be too tedious to
examine each of the seven rights within each of their three formulations, I do
however want to give at least some idea of the way that the concept of human rights
is presented with respect to that most influential of players within the aged care
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industry – the proprietors of residential aged care. Here I am interested in how these
human rights are actually fleshed out and how they impact upon the day-to-day world
of nursing home residents.

With regard to Value One - ‘the right of individuals to be treated with respect’,
providers are entreated simply to ‘promote an environment that engenders mutual
respect including respect for the dignity and rights of all concerned.’ Of particular
concern is Value Two – ‘the rights of the individual to life, liberty and security.’ Here
the provider’s obligation is more detailed. Amongst a number of requirements are
those to promote and provide emotional, physical, religious and spiritual security for
residents; to ‘assure residents that their independence will be encouraged’; and to
provide residents for mechanisms of complaint and redress to external agencies
‘without fear of reprisal’. With respect to Value Three – ‘the right of individuals to
have their religious and cultural identity respected’, the expectation is to ‘provide care
in an environment that supports the cultural and language needs of residents and
their families’, to adhere to religious and cultural preferences with respect to dietary
custom and to provide; ’ease of access to spiritual advisors’ and a place for religious
observance.

Value Four addresses ‘the right of competent individuals to self determination’. This
right involves maximising the residents ‘potential for well-being’, respecting their right
to make ‘reasonable choices’ related to their care, encouraging them ‘to take
responsibility for their actions and choices’ and to ‘provide access to independent
social, legal or other advice and help.’ Value Five is probably the most important of
all rights when one considers that the majority of people who enter nursing homes do
so because they are in some way compromised with respect to matters of self care.
This is ‘the right to an appropriate standard of care to meet individual needs.’ Here
the provider is charged with numerous responsibilities, which include; determining,
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prior to admission, whether or not the facility has the ability to offer an appropriate
standard of care and protection; provide a standard of nutrition care and support that
is ‘appropriate to the needs of the resident in order to maintain optimal health and
well-being’; consulting with residents and their families (or their representatives) with
respect to care needs; ‘provide appropriately qualified staff and staffing levels
necessary for the safe, efficient and effective delivery of care’ and to provide building
structures ‘fittings and furnishings’ that help to ensure ‘the optimal standard of care
for residents.’ The final two values, ‘the right to privacy and confidentiality’ and ‘the
recognition that human beings are social beings with social needs’, are mostly nonspecific and are largely generalist in their approach although there is an intriguing
right which states that providers should ‘enable married couples to live a married life’,
presumably suggesting that some form of sexual contact between married couples,
which is the norm in wider society, ought also be facilitated within the nursing home.

The current document that addresses the rights of nursing home residents [the Code
of Ethics and Guide to Ethical Conduct for Residential Aged Care] may reasonably
be seen as a response to what can only be described as decades of neglect, and in
many cases the outright physical, emotional and at times sexual abuse, of an
extremely vulnerable group of people. I have made some brief reference to the
nature and extent of that neglect and abuse above. The rights model is one that has
been widely embraced as the best means of securing the care and protection of
those elderly in nursing homes, and not only by government but also by nursing
home providers as well as professionals within the industry. Indeed within aged care
in general the issue has not been to ask ‘how effective is the rights approach at
protecting the aged’ so much as it has been to uncritically accept that this is the only
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approach that can secure the care and protection of this particularly vulnerable
population.’329

Few voices have challenged this orthodoxy and those that do are most reluctant to
oppose the concept of human rights in its entirety. For the most part they are simply
content to raise doubts as to the effectiveness of rights in all situations.330 It seems
generally accepted that by assigning to vulnerable groups and individuals certain
‘fundamental human values’, couched in terms of individual human rights, we have
arrived at the best means of providing not simply an effective standard of care and
protection for such people, but also we have the best means of ensuring both social
and political equality, satisfying issues of social justice and securing their moral
rescue. By applying human rights concepts to the aged in residential aged care
facilities we have tended to follow a process of normalisation. That is we have
sought to establish what I have earlier referred to as ‘a fundamental sense of the
moral equality of all persons’, and second we have sought to protect those who are
vulnerable, those who are unable to act as agents in their own interests, from others
[individuals and institutions] who potentially may do them harm. In the next chapter I
will show these assumptions to be erroneous, but for the present I want to make
comment about another group of particularly vulnerable people, the mentally ill.
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the human rights of the mentally ill

In using a term such as ‘the mentally ill’ I am aware that there is still debate about
what constitutes such a category. Does the co-joining of these two terms ‘mental’
and ‘illness’ have any intellectual veracity or is it simply, to employ the language of
the fiercest of its critics, a phrase that some people use to describe others whose
behaviour they find offensive?331 This is a debate that I do not intend to pursue.332 It
surely seems reasonable to say that some people are less able than others to
negotiate their way independently through the world. Some people, by virtue of the
behavioural displays they exhibit, come into contact with mental health services.
Once within the jurisdiction of such services our interest becomes focussed upon the
way these people are treated, and the sorts of relationships that are engaged
between them and other figures within the psychiatric hierarchy. Whether their
apparent inability to survive in the world is the result of psychiatric pathology or not,
hardly seems the point. Whether or not these people are mentally ill in the traditional
sense of that term, or else have simply constructed rather unusual ways to survive in
an alien landscape, again hardly seems the issue. What is the issue is that they, and
the often limited personal resources they possess, are confronted with a system of
immense and often overwhelming power. How they survive within this environment
is the issue. Can the notion of human rights protect them against individuals and
forces that have the potential to threaten and overwhelm them? That is the point and
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not whether or not such people can appropriately be described as ‘mentally ill’, or
whether or not there is actually such a beast as ‘mental illness’.333

The application of human rights concepts to the care and protection of the mentally ill
has, within the Australian context at least, received much currency in recent years.
The impetus for contemporary concern about the treatment of the mentally ill has
been the well-documented events at Chelmsford Private Hospital in New South
Wales,334 Ward 10B of Townsville General Hospital in Queensland,335 and to a lesser
extent those at Lakeside Hospital at Ballarat in Victoria.336 Yet such revelations have
been simply the tip of a rather large iceberg, for the history of Australian psychiatry
reveals a structure that has traditionally been beset by chronic under-funding,
administrative incompetence, governmental neglect, more than occasional corruption
at institutional level, and all too often the abuse and mistreatment of those whom the
system has been charged with protecting.337 In discussing Australian psychiatry from
a historical perspective, Cunningham Dax makes the point that;

‘The general standards of care of the mentally ill throughout Australia have
been remarkably variable depending upon governments, finances and the
calibre of staff employed. It has needed crises to rouse public opinion and to
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drive the authorities to action, which in many cases only resulted in an inquiry
or the formation of a committee or commission to postpone the day on which
some action had to be taken.’338

And it is fair to say that Australian psychiatry has had both crises and commissions of
inquiry in abundance. In fact since 1980 there have been some 23 inquiries at state
and territory level into both the practice and administration of the Australian mental
health system. Brian Burdekin, the former federal Human Rights Commissioner,
reflects on this point. In the first chapter of his 1993 report into human rights and
mental illness in Australia he writes that;

‘In NSW alone, there have been approximately 40 inquiries into psychiatric
facilities and services since the first recorded case of mental illness in 1801.
The majority of State and Territory investigations examined issues such as
maladministration, under-resourcing, overcrowding, abuse and harassment,
and inadequate legislation.‘339

But, as Burdekin laments, ‘the only two which attempted to provide a national
perspective essentially ignored the issue of the rights of those affected.’340 So it was
to this end that the Report of the National Inquiry into the Human Rights of People
with Mental Illness [hereafter the Burdekin Report] was directed. It is not possible
within the context of this thesis to provide a historical summary of the practice of
Australian psychiatry with respect to the treatment of those mentally ill who have
come into contact with the mental health system. The issues are too vast and the
historical landscape too broad. To do justice to such a review would ultimately
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detract from the main aim of the current writing which is of course to focus upon the
idea of human rights. Yet some comment is called for if only to ‘place’ the idea of
‘the human rights of the mentally ill’ within a context, and we can achieve this by
focussing on the Burdekin Report.

The Report itself was a response to what Burdekin described as ‘the revelations of
serious abuses in psychiatric facilities in three different states.’ He was of course
referring to events at Chelmsford, Ballarat and Townsville. Chelmsford was the most
disturbing. At Chelmsford the issue was the use of a technique known as ‘deep
sleep therapy’ which, in conjunction with electroconvulsive therapy – both of which
were often given without lawful or even informed consent - resulted in the deaths of
some 26 people in the period 1964 to 1978. At Townsville the issue was, as
Lawrence describes it, ‘…the inappropriate application of social psychiatry,
family/group therapy and therapeutic principles…[as well as] excessive, inappropriate
and unsafe use of psychotropic drugs…’341 Lawrence describes these events as
‘regrettable’, and suggests that in both cases the abuses ‘stemmed not from a lack of
knowledge, or poor facilities, but from the peculiar and idiosyncratic use of power by
a small number of individuals’, a state of affairs that, she says, ‘can only be
countered by outside independent peer scrutiny.’342 Burdekin however is rather less
sanguine, both about the treatment of the mentally ill in general and the specific and
well publicised instances of abuse such as at Chelmsford and Townsville.

‘Apart from those glaring examples…what the evidence …demonstrates…is a
story of neglect, abuse, discrimination, inefficiency and injustice, and …it is

341

Joan M. Lawrence, ‘Inquiries into psychiatry: Chelmsford and Townsville’, The Medical Journal of
Australia, Vol. 155, November 18, 1991, p 653.
342
ibid, p 654.

180
much more widespread than those localised examples which have had a
great deal of media attention. It is much more insidious.’343

And later, in the opening chapter of the Burdekin Report, he restates his position, not
only with specific reference to Chelmsford but also with reference for the wider
practice of psychiatry in Australia.

‘Placed in a human rights context, the treatment meted out to the patients at
Chelmsford represents one of the most systemic and sustained gross
violations of human rights in this nation’s history. It was a disgrace to this
country, a disgrace to psychiatry, a disgrace to the governments and
bureaucrats who allowed it to happen. Many people lost their lives as is now
a matter of public record. It would be comforting to think that what happened
there…could not happen anywhere else. It would also…be extremely
naïve.’344

One response of the Australian government to the revelations of the events at places
like Chelmsford was to adopt a firm commitment to the idea of the human rights of
those people who suffer from mental illness. Officially the association between the
concept of human rights and the care and protection of the mentally ill goes back at
least to the time of the foundation of the Human Rights Commission of Australia.
Indeed the first Chair of that body, Roma Mitchell, had as early as 1983 aligned the
Commission to the protection of the mentally ill from within a human rights paradigm.
In a paper presented to the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of
Psychiatrists she noted ongoing ‘doubts about the care and treatment, or lack of it,
provided in some mental hospitals…’, and raised particular concerns about the
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involuntary use of psychotropic medications, electroconvulsive therapy and
psychosurgery and noted that these concerns and controversies ‘were fuelled by a
stream of revelations about conditions in some mental hospitals…’345 Like so many,
she saw within ‘human rights’ a promise to secure the care and protection of this
particularly vulnerable group of people.

The commitment to the human rights of mentally ill persons emerged within the
context of the National Mental Health Policy which was endorsed by the Health
Ministers of all Australian States and Territories, including the Commonwealth
Government, in April 1992.346 This policy sought a wide sweeping review of mental
health services throughout Australia, and identified the steps to be taken by all levels
of Australian government ‘in the areas of structural and system reform, standards,
consumer rights, data, legislation and resource priorities.’347 Three broad aims were
identified, namely; ‘to promote the mental health of the Australian community and,
where possible, prevent the development of mental health problems and mental
disorder; to reduce the impact of mental disorders on individuals, families and the
community; and to assure the rights of people with mental disorders.’348 Sustaining
these broad aims were a number of values, both implicit and explicit. Explicit values
included universal access to basic health care, high quality service delivery, equitable
health care financing, a mixed public/private delivery and financing system and
efficiency with regard to resource allocation. But as Stephens and Warren point out
certain implicit values were also embraced, chief amongst these being that ‘resource
allocation and efficiency’ was aligned with ‘economic rationalism’ so that the inherent
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tension between the functioning of modern capitalism and ‘the fabric of the welfare
state’ was largely accepted.349

This tension has created its own particularly unique problems within the Australian
health care system in general and the mental health system in particular. Stephens
and Warren allude to structural problems, such as the perpetuation of ‘the many
forms of inequalities in service provision ranging from urban/rural differences, to
gender, ethnic and age barriers’, not to mention pressures on mental health service
delivery from the demands of a market-driven economy. Whilst these issues are
important and bear serious consideration I do not intend to pursue them in this thesis.
Certainly I agree with Stephens and Warren when they say that ‘any discussion of
mental health policy not firmly placed in the socio-political and health care context
would be futile’,350 but in this work I do not intend to review mental health policy in its
entirety. Far from it. My interest is only in the notion of human rights and the
application of that particular philosophical stance with regard to what must be
considered the rather narrow perspective of the care and protection of the mentally
ill. I will leave rather more broad socio-political analysis to others.

Current Australian commitments to the human rights of mentally ill persons reflect
both the United Nations 1991 Principles for the Protection of and for the Improvement
of Mental Health Care,351 and the Australian Health Ministers Mental Health
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities [hereafter the Statement].352 It is this latter
document that will be my focus in the remainder of this chapter, for it is this document
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that we may regard as driving the government’s philosophical position within the
mental health area as far as the respective rights and duties of both the mentally ill
and those who care for them are concerned. That is, it is this document that holds
out to the mentally ill the ‘promise’ of human rights and defines exactly the terms of
that promise.

In her forward to the Statement, Professor Beverley Raphael recognises the past
abuses that the mentally ill have experienced at the hands of a system that is
charged with their care and protection, even if such recognition is only by oblique
reference. In profound understatement she observes that, ‘until the relatively recent
past, people with [mental health] problems have often felt stigmatised and
discriminated against…[and that]…people with mental illness problems and mental
disorders, and their families, have not experienced the full recognition and support
they require.’ And then she makes the inevitable association between issues of
need, equality, social justice and human rights by stating, with respect to the mentally
ill, that ‘equity, access and social justice have frequently not been available to them’,
and that the intention of the Statement itself ‘is to promote social justice, equity,
access and a compassionate society with mental health as its primary goal.’353

In the preamble to the Statement this sentiment is continued. The preamble notes
that all Australians, mentally ill or not, ‘have certain fundamental human rights’, but
further, that ‘people who suffer from mental illness…should be protected from abuse
and neglect.’ The mentally ill have rights to care, protection, treatment and
rehabilitation, but as well as these they have equal rights ‘to health care, housing and
education, and equal rights in civil, legal and industrial affairs.’ In other words human
rights reflect both equality and needs driven approaches. They are both claim rights
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and welfare rights. By embracing the human rights approach there is the dual
assumption that the mentally ill are not only the moral equals of those who are not
mentally ill, but also there is the recognition that they are inherently vulnerable. But
in addition, there is the assumption that human rights is the appropriate means by
which the care and protection of this particular group of individuals is ensured – and
further, by awarding a whole raft of rights to mentally ill persons there is the
assumption that such persons can access these rights. In other words, behind
notions of human rights, certainly in their current format, is the image of the rational,
autonomous and moral agent; the maker of claims, the claimer of rights, the
assertive, independent and goal directed moral actor.

Under the chapter headed, ‘mental health statement of rights and responsibilities’,
twelve ‘key rights’ are listed. They are worth reproducing in full here, and are as
follows:

 ‘The right to respect for individual human worth, dignity and privacy’;
 the right equal to other citizens to health care, income maintenance,
education, employment, housing, transport, legal services, equitable health
and other insurance and leisure appropriate to one’s age;
 the right to appropriate and comprehensive information, education and
training about their mental health problem or mental disorder, its treatment
and services available to meet their needs;
 the right to timely and high quality treatment;
 the right to interact with health care providers, particularly in decision making
regarding treatment, care and rehabilitation;
 the right to mechanisms of complaint and redress;
 the right to refuse treatment (unless subject to mental health legislation);
 the right to advocacy;
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 the right to access to relatives and friends;
 the right to have their cultural background and gender taken into
consideration in the provision of mental health services;
 the right to contribute and participate as far as possible in the development of
mental health policy, provision of mental health care and representation of
mental health consumer interests; and,
 the right to live, work and participate in the community to the full extent of
their capabilities without negative discrimination.’354

The above statement can be described as the basic context within which the rights of
the mentally ill are conceived, and much of the remainder of the Statement is
involved in placing these rights within a milieu that is relevant to mentally ill persons.
Thus following sections consider the rights of the mentally ill with respect to
assessment, diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation; admission to a mental health
facility or community program; standards of service delivery relevant to mental health
consumers; mental health legislation; legal matters, and three sections which focus
on the rights and responsibilities of carers and advocates, service providers and
finally the wider community in general. The approach in framing the concept of rights
in this way is clear. It recognises that there are a variety of situational locations
within which the mentally ill find themselves, and it is within the boundaries of this
contextual diversity that numerous potentials exist for undermining the moral integrity
of those who suffer from psychiatric disorders. It recognises too, that the means by
which challenges to this moral integrity are best countered is by the articulation [the
asserting, the claiming, the demanding] of human rights.
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These ‘situational locations’ are social contexts that are well known. Numerous
commentators have pointed out that Australian mental health services have
traditionally revealed a combination of, chronic under-funding; a tendency to direct
funds towards institutions when most mentally ill live in the community; the increasing
tendency to focus treatment in short stay units as in specialised wards in general
hospitals, thus discriminating against people with chronic mental health problems; the
location of most services in urban areas with the result that rural and, in particular,
outback areas receive little or no support; numerous pockets of severely
disadvantaged groups within the population of mentally ill persons (Aborigines, nonEnglish speaking Australians, the aged, migrants and refugees, children and
adolescents, forensic patients and prisoners) and finally an ongoing shortage of
research funds despite the prevalence of mental illness within Australian society.355

In addition to these most obvious of contexts, the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission Report of 1993 raised a variety of further areas where
mental health issues were prominent (with regard to their impact on the mentally ill),
yet under-recognised (with regard to structural responsiveness). Identified were the
relationship between public and private mental health services; the place of boarding
houses and other forms of accommodation where many mentally ill people reside;
the problem of the homeless mentally ill; the care requirements of those with dual
diagnosis (mental illness associated with HIV/AIDS, substance abuse, head injury,
intellectual disability and the like), and issues of education, prevention and early
intervention. Clearly the concept of human rights was being asked to bear a burden
of responsibility of vast proportions.
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Yet the Mental Health Statement of Rights and Responsibilities seeks precisely to
address each of these areas of concern. Because of the complexity of the numerous
issues confronting the reformers of a mental health system that quite clearly has
enormous structural problems, the statement of rights have more than just a flavour
of the banal about them. For example, under the heading of ‘assessment, diagnosis,
treatment and rehabilitation’ – areas that address fundamental points of contact (and
often conflict) between the mentally ill person, their families and friends and various
professionals both within institutional and community based settings – the rights
statement boldly asserts, in part, that the consumer has the right; to an integrated
system of service delivery, with treatment that reflects the highest professional
standards within a least restrictive environment free from harassment and abuse
which is sensitive to the individual’s age, gender, and cultural background. The
emphasis is on adequately resourced, multidisciplinary teams providing a high level
of care, treatment, rehabilitation, support and education appropriate to the needs of
the individual with, at all times, the recipient of care having access to mechanisms of
complaint and redress and to appeal to decisions made regarding their treatment.356

Other sections of the Statement cover a similar mix of rights which deal with the
bodily protection of mentally ill persons, the provision of effective service delivery, the
education and training of mental health and allied professionals, resource allocation,
and mechanisms of redress and compliant for the mentally ill or those advocates who
act on their behalf. For all those who are admitted to a mental health facility or a
mental health community based program, the rights based emphasis is on ‘voluntary
admission’ wherever possible. Within this context the mentally ill have a right to ‘an
explanation of their condition…to adequate discharge planning…to be informed of
their rights and reasons for admission…’, to have someone to represent their
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interests, ‘to appeal against continued detention and treatment and ‘to independent
review at regular intervals.’357

Moreover, all facilities and professionals within facilities are bound by certain
principles (moral, ethical and clinical) which again are expressed in terms of the
rights of mentally ill persons. These principles (or ‘standards’) are based upon the
recognition ‘that high standards of mental health care are essential for the treatment
and rehabilitation of people who have mental health problems or mental disorders.’
Thus the mental health ‘consumer’358 has the right to ‘services which are resourced,
organised and administered to provide care as set out in this statement’; to expect a
‘regular review of standards’ and ‘evaluation of services’; ‘to mechanisms of
complaint and redress’; ‘to be informed and consulted about proposed changes to
services and standards’; ‘to quality assurance’ evaluations; and the right ‘to expect
governments to ensure adequate levels of professionally trained and qualified staff in
mental health services.’359

promises, human rights and vulnerable persons

The promise that human rights holds is a promise not simply of moral rescue but, and
more importantly, it is a promise of moral rescue that delivers strategic results in the
form of social, political and economic returns. For those who embark on a human
rights discourse at the level of the street [‘street level philosophy’ as I have called it],
it is outcomes that are sought, with these outcomes directed toward tangible benefits
in the way that ordinary lives are led. Human rights seek to protect those who are
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vulnerable against others [institutions and individuals] that would do them harm, and
in this act of protecting, human rights seek to make lives better. This is surely to
state the obvious. As already pointed out, if people were no better off with human
rights than they were without them then there would be no point to invoking the
concept in the first place.

We appeal to human rights for a variety of reasons. We do so primarily in order to
protect vulnerable people. But we employ ‘human’ rights, rather than legal variants
of rights, because of the oughts contained within rights discourse.360 Human rights
are after all moral claims. Human rights are portrayed as those things possessed by
humans regardless of whatever else is possessed. They are seen as a moral
standard against which is measured our treatment of persons. To have human rights
is a moral demand and expectation that one will be treated in a particular manner,
that is in keeping with a standard that applies to all humans everywhere. No matter
whether we are minimalist in our view of human rights [life, liberty and property] or we
are maximalist, so that our view of human rights reflects, as some detractors might
say, little more than socio-economic ‘shopping lists’, human rights are demands that
humans be treated in certain specific ways. Failure to do so is to fail the test of moral
virtue.

We appeal to human rights also because they establish vulnerable people as our
moral equals. Although the vulnerable are disadvantaged by virtue of their
vulnerability, they remain nevertheless our equals in terms of moral worth and value.
Whilst some of us are vulnerable all the time, and many of us are vulnerable part of
the time, what we all share all the time is a moral equivalence that transcends
whatever state of vulnerability we may (temporarily) inhabit. By employing human
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rights talk we therefore seek to both minimise the disadvantage that derives from
whatever level of individual vulnerability we may experience, whilst at the same time
we seek to reaffirm our belief that all people, vulnerable or not, are to be regarded as
(on a moral level at least) fully functioning members of society. Human rights thus
assume that all persons are at least equal moral agents and one way of asserting
this is to establish rights that individuals, or those that speak for individuals, can
claim.

In this chapter I have considered two groups of people, those aged who reside in this
country’s residential aged care facilities and the mentally ill in general. In both
instances notions of human rights are often couched or framed within policy
initiatives that seek to bind both caregivers and vulnerable within an institutionalorganisational context. Within this context the idea of human rights seeks certain
protections for the vulnerable. At one level they have sought to secure specific
standards of protection for vulnerable people from those that care for them on a daily
basis. On another level they have sought to make institutions themselves responsive
to the individuals and the unique needs of those who come within their particular
borders. The question therefore remains; how effective has a rights driven approach
been at protecting the vulnerable on a day to day level of personal care, and how
effective has such an approach been in ensuring that institutions are themselves both
responsive and sensitive to the needs of the vulnerable? Of course, throughout this
thesis I have answered these questions indirectly on numerous occasions. In the
next chapter I will concentrate on responding to this question directly.
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Chapter Five:

i]

Vulnerability and the Failure of Rights

human rights and scepticism

In this chapter I will argue that as a philosophy of rescue for vulnerable people, or
indeed as a moral code by which the treatment of any person is automatically
assured or guaranteed, human rights have largely failed. It is surely the case that
even the most cursory review of events at both domestic and international level
would encourage one at least to be sceptical about the ability of human rights to
ensure the care and protection of vulnerable people. As one professional
organization recently noted, ‘the history of human rights is that of the struggle against
exploitation of one person by another.’361 And whilst there are numerous human
rights protections for ‘all members of the human family’,362 from the initial Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to the various covenants and conventions seeking to
protect specific ‘at risk’ groups – women, children, the mentally ill, refugees, migrants
and so on - the depressing reality remains that ‘…the world is inflicting injury on
millions of people as a matter of routine oppression.’363

In reflecting upon international politics in recent times we are all too familiar with ‘the
phenomenon of the “disappeared”, the torture of political prisoners, summary killings
and arbitrary arrests, the extortion of confessions by physical and mental abuse…the
detention of prisoners without trial, the economic exploitation of adults and
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children…[and the] re-emergence of genocide in situations of armed conflict.’364 With
regard to this last comment one might cite the actions of those such as Pol Pot, or
Hitler, or Stalin, or even more recent events in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda or
Chechnya. And if one approached human rights from the point of view of social,
cultural or economic goods, still there remains little hope for optimism as (again)
even the most brief investigation into the sorts of issues that impinge upon the third
world; poverty, starvation, infant mortality, the spread of AIDS, the effects of
environmental degradation, social and cultural dislocation and the like, would reveal
little security or protection from a paradigm of human rights.

Even in the industrialised west the marginalisation in social, political and economic
terms that some groups experience appear extraordinarily resistive to the supposed
benefits of human rights and their emphasis on equality of choice, opportunity and
treatment and their promise of social justice and protection from harm. Within
Australia there are numerous groups that one might look to for examples to support
this hypothesis; Aborigines, migrants, (particularly those from non-English speaking
backgrounds), refugees, the disabled, the very young, the homeless, the mentally ill,
those in aged care facilities who are frail or who suffer from the various forms of
dementia and so on. The above list is by no means exhaustive and has the flavour
of the arbitrary about it. Yet it does remind us first, that much of the business of
human rights is the protection of vulnerable peoples and second, that human rights
has too often failed those whom it is charged to care and protect. No doubt some
may argue that human rights have a variety of functions and are not simply charged
with protecting the vulnerable. That may be so, but it is hard to imagine any value
being placed upon a concept that is impotent to protect the weak and vulnerable
despite what other benefits it might have.
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In this thesis my argument is that human rights fail the vulnerable because of three
inter-related reasons; first, the concept fails to accurately portray what it means to be
a human individual – and a vulnerable human individual in particular; second, the
concept cannot describe or address the sorts of situations that vulnerable individuals
often find themselves in; and third, because of the emphasis upon rights, notions of
duty and obligation which may effectively engage us with the vulnerable, are
minimised. By extension it follows that if our current conception of human rights
cannot protect the vulnerable then we may reasonably question its usefulness for any
of us for, as I have already pointed out, we are all at various stages of our lives,
vulnerable to a greater or lesser extent. In the previous chapter I focussed on both
the mentally ill and the frail aged in nursing homes as ‘metaphors’ for the vulnerable.
In the latter part of this chapter I want to continue that discussion, but first I want to
make some introductory comments about some of the inherent tensions within the
rights paradigm that, in themselves, have tended to compromise the idea of human
rights.

ii]

problems with human rights: some opening remarks

A central problem bedevilling human rights is the tendency of one right to contradict
another. For example, privacy rights may be viewed as a challenge to freedom of the
press, cultural identity rights may undermine some notion of a global equality and
rights to freedom of speech may compromise the freedom to engage in what others
might view as restrictive religious practices. In the day to day business of social life,
human rights claims often do conflict. The right to the ownership of traditional lands
made by indigenous groups, based upon prior occupancy, spiritual connection and
cultural affiliation, may be at odds with similar claims made by European settlers,
although based upon a more recent tradition of legal ownership and economic
development. Dworkin’s notion that human rights are in some way to be regarded as
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fundamental and pre-eminent moral entitlements over and above all other claims is
naïve. Our determination of what we regard as ‘human’ rights, and the way we
resolve disputes between competing rights, that is what human rights predominate
over other human rights, is very much the stuff of politics and policy.

But rights theorists may argue that at least the articulation of such seemingly
irreconcilable positions establishes a framework for discussion wherein opposing
groups can formalise their claims and articulate their respective opinions. Yet human
rights claims may be little more than a demand that all public debate cease. Often it
appears that human rights have become increasingly politicised – used as a moral
lever to achieve political ends by powerful interest groups who see the moral
authority of rights as justifying claims that may not otherwise be regarded as socially
valid. This is what I have referred to earlier as the rights paradox, where the concept
is employed as a strategic weapon within the course of political debate to realise
ends that otherwise may not stand the scrutiny of moral assessment. Jeremy
Bentham saw within the assertion of natural rights a dubious moral authority that
came at the expense of a rational and considered reflection. ‘The language of
natural rights’ wrote Bentham, ‘require nothing but a hard front, a hard heart and an
unblushing countenance. It is from beginning to end so much flat assertion.’365 And
he went further; accept the plea of natural rights and ‘...you are an honest fellow, a
true patriot: question it or so much as ask for proof of it, you are whatever is most
odious, sinning equally against truth and against conscience.’366 Behind the
supposed moral authority of men’s ‘natural rights’ Bentham saw the shadow of the
guillotine.
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But human rights theorists may counter that, whilst there are indeed conflicting and
perhaps even irreconcilable ambitions embedded within competing rights claims,
nevertheless the articulation of such claims at least enables us to engage in moral
talk and thus construct a set of moral principles by which we can develop a prioritised
response to social, political and economic issues. This argument also has problems.
It is true that rights inevitably embrace a moral dimension and may also help us to
prioritise our values, but it is clear that we do not need rights talk to engage in moral
debate, despite a tendency to collapse all moral and ethical discussion into talk about
rights. There is more to moral discourse than human rights.

The implication is that it is frequently the case that human rights add nothing to moral
debate that could not be achieved by other means. In this respect I agree with Frey
who suggests that moral rights (of which human rights are but one variety) are either
non-existent or if they do exist are superfluous. No matter which they are Frey
suggests that, ‘I cannot see that anything is lost by giving up claims to moral rights
altogether.’367 In the following I have made some obvious changes in order to reflect
my own attitude, nevertheless it remains a fair representation of his position.

‘If such rights are superfluous, we do not require them in order to discuss our
treatment of [vulnerable people]; and if there are not any, or it cannot be
affirmed that there are, surely we would do better to concentrate directly on
our treatment of [vulnerable people] and upon the task of working out among
us both principles of rightness and justification of [the way we ultimately treat
those who are vulnerable]…’368
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Moral rights, and in particular human rights, are often either irrelevant (superfluous)
or they are may in fact be actually harmful to those who are vulnerable. With regard
to the issue of ‘superfluity’, we might refer to the example of the right to life which
surely is the most fundamental of all moral rights (on the basis that if one does not
have a right to life then no other right has any value). In the general course of a
normal human life we all agree that to take the life of another is morally wrong. But
why do we think like this? Is it the case that we do not wantonly and indiscriminately
kill others because we have a deep respect for their fundamental and inalienable
rights, or is it simply because we recognise that such acts are morally wrong? As
Gower explains

‘...the belief that killing a person is wrong in that it violates his right to life
...(is)...equivalent to the belief that killing is wrong, but we need no doctrine of
rights in order to defend that belief, therefore the right to life is a dispensable
moral notion for it does no work that cannot be done more adequately in other
ways.’369

With regard to the issue of harm, it often appears that we have become seduced by
the belief that human rights will resolve all the social and political dilemmas that we
face. A commitment to human rights has often become a panacea for all manner of
social, political and economic woes. But often by ascribing rights to vulnerable
peoples all we really do is free ourselves from the responsibility to take truly firm and
decisive action. Also, we free ourselves from the moral responsibility to account for
the actions that we take or fail to take. By ascribing to all manner of powerless and
vulnerable people a whole range of rights and freedoms (and the mentally ill and
those with dementia are a good example of this) we hope, or assume, that such

369

Barry Gower, ‘Understanding Rights: An Analysis of a Problem’, in. F. E. Dowrick [ed] Human
Rights: Problems, Perspectives and Texts, Aldershot, Teakfield, 1984, p 54.

197
groups of individuals will automatically be protected from all forms of abuse and
neglect. We are thus freed from a more serious and considered appraisal of the
impact that either the form of disability they suffer, or the consequences their social
location has for them. We are also freed from a sincere and reflective consideration
of how we, as agents, ought to engage those among us who are vulnerable within
the day to day contacts we have with such people, a point I will develop in the final
chapter. Human rights may simply encourage a degree of moral smugness and do
nothing to address the many complex factors that act upon the vulnerable.

The above comments may be challenged, in part, by the assertion that duties often
conflict with each other. Moreover, confusion and uncertainty about when and how
to act may contaminate duties and obligations. Can we, then, derive any advantage
by embracing a focus upon duties? My response is to say that a duties focus does
provide an opportunity to engage the vulnerable in a particularly powerful way, a way
that rights often overlooks because its attention is directed toward the right holder
rather than upon those who are called to discharge duties. This 'change of focus' is
crucial. Traditionally, within rights, we direct the moral spotlight to those who have
entitlements, to those who are the recipients of rights, rather than focusing this
spotlight on those who are required to act. A duties approach shifts this focus from
those who are vulnerable, who are powerless, and directs it to those who stand in
regard to them and who are called upon to discharge duties.
This change of focus, as I have called it, should not be underestimated. It represents
a cultural shift. Currently the language of health care is a rights based language.
This is not, altogether, inappropriate. But what is inappropriate is the exclusion of a
duties based dialogue that addresses directly a culture of obligation; obligation in
respect of those who are called upon to care and protect the vulnerable. The issue
might be seen as one of balance or of complementary voices. Even though a
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dialogue of rights expresses the sentiment of vulnerable well being, only when it is
complemented by a dialogue of duties, a dialogue that can be embraced by
caregivers, can the voice of the vulnerable be truly heard. I develop these ideas later
in the thesis, particularly in chapter six, where I suggest possible avenues for
engaging vulnerable people using the concept of the 'Other'. For now, I would make
two final points. First, we need to address the institutional contexts within which the
vulnerable find themselves so that institutions themselves are sensitive to the needs
of vulnerable people. An emphasis upon a culture of duties at least provides us with
a starting point to do this. Second, we must realise that such an approach will not
solve all the problems we face. Some will still assert that duties are no answer, and
other conflicts will remain, but all will no doubt agree that a crucial way to make
vulnerable lives better is to make institutions, and those actors within institutional
contexts, sensitive to the plight of vulnerable people. A focus on duties does turn the
moral spotlight onto those who have the power and opportunity to make vulnerable
lives better.

iii]

the case against human rights: the main argument

In the remainder of this chapter I want to explore two ideas. First, that the image of
man contained within the human rights paradigm powerfully overstates the degree to
which individuals are rational, autonomous and moral agents, and second, that the
concept of human rights cannot address the sorts of social situations that vulnerable
individuals often find themselves in. My intention here is not to suggest that humans
are not best described in terms of their rationality or their potential for rationality.
Indeed they are. But this rationality is not without its limitations and qualifications. In
crucial ways the image of man as a rational reflective agent is at odds with the image
of man that confronts us from within the confines of his vulnerability and this reality
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impacts upon the options and choices man has in terms of the social locations within
which he, as vulnerable person, lives out his life.

on vulnerable individuals

The first question I want to address is this: how accurate is our assumption that
individuals construct their world out of a rationally considered autonomy? Consider
the following hypothetical from Meehl.

‘Suppose that you were required to write down a procedure for selecting an
individual from the population who would be diagnosed as schizophrenic by a
psychiatric staff; you have to wager $1000 on being right; you may not include
in your selection procedure any behavioural fact, such as symptom or trait,
manifested by the individual. What would you write down? So far as I have
been able to ascertain, there is only one thing you could write down that
would give you a better than even chance of winning such a bet – namely,
“Find an individual X who has a schizophrenic identical twin”.’370

The comment by Meehl remains as pertinent today as when he first proposed it over
40 years ago. If it tells us anything it tells us that much of the sorts of behaviours that
individuals exhibit have their antecedents located within structures of genetics and
biology that are often, and to a large extent, beyond conscious control. Take for
example those collection of behaviours that are generally agreed upon to be clinical
examples of a particular nosological entity referred to as schizophrenia. It is clear
that at the heart of the schizophrenic syndrome lies an important genetic component.
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This is not to say that schizophrenia is all genetics, clearly it is not. Yet there is
overwhelming evidence to support the hypothesis that schizophrenia is an illness that
is firmly located within a genetic environment. This is clearly demonstrated by the
figure below.371
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individual

Biological proximty to schizophrenic sufferer

The information in the diagram represents ‘aggregated rates [for schizophrenia]
based on about 40 European studies conducted between 1920 and
1987…[that]…were chosen for their similarity of diagnostic criteria and ascertainment
procedures.’372 As the evidence suggests, the lifetime risk of an individual
developing schizophrenia is about 1%, with this risk increasing the closer an
individual is, in genetic terms, to one who has been diagnosed with the illness. In
general the risk to first degree relatives is about 12% whilst the risk to second degree
relatives is around 4%. What is most interesting in the above figure is the information
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provided by twin studies. Monozygotic (MZ) twins are genetically identical whereas
dizygotic (DZ) twins share on average only 50% of their genes. As Prescott and
Gottesman point out, ‘if the proportion of MZ pairs similar for a disorder
(concordance) is higher than that among DZ pairs, some degree of genetic influence
is implicated.’373 And the evidence suggests that if one MZ twin suffers from
schizophrenia then there is almost a fifty percent chance that the other twin will also
suffer from the illness. As an interesting adjunct to the above author’s report on data
concerning MZ twins reared apart with little or no postnatal contact and where one
twin has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. Only 12 such pairs of twins had, at the
time of publication, been identified in the literature, and of these pairs seven were
also affected with schizophrenia, resulting in a 58% concordance.

Whilst genetic factors are clearly crucial in the development of schizophrenia they are
not the whole picture. After all, concordance for MZ twins is only about 50%.
Factors such as birth trauma, maternal infection during gestation, social class,
stressful life events and a variety of neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
abnormalities are all implicated in the schizophrenic picture.374 Yet it is clear that
much of what constitutes the illness lies within the realm of what we might describe
as ‘biologically determined’. But schizophrenia, like all mental illnesses, is diagnosed
by behaviours. That is, one makes a judgement of schizophrenia on the basis of
identifiable and observable behaviours. These behaviours may be the self report of
sufferers who describe auditory hallucinations, delusions, ideas of reference,
paranoid thoughts, disturbance of body image and the like, or else odd, unusual or
even bizarre actions that lead one to infer that schizophrenia may be present. What
is at issue is the extent to which these behavioural displays that emerge from within
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the context of mental illness, in this case schizophrenia, can be seen as an example
of a rational, autonomous and moral agent making reflective sorts of decisions about
how to live her life. I will return to answer this question directly but for now I want to
address another aspect of this idea that people’s behaviour is often incompatible with
a ‘reflective agency’, the kind of which lies at the heart of the human rights view of
man. To do this I want to briefly address the idea of attachment and what might be
considered ‘disorders’ of attachment.

The work by Levy and Orlans provides an excellent summary of the current
understanding of the literature on attachment and I have cited them at some length
below. They describe attachment as ‘the deep and enduring connection established
between a child and caregiver in the first several years of life [that] profoundly
influences every component of the human condition – mind, body, emotions,
relationships, and values.’ They write that ‘attachment is not something that parents
do to their children; rather, it is something that children and parents create together,
in an ongoing and reciprocal relationship.’375

This idea of attachment, which is ‘rooted in millions of years of evolution’, fulfils a
number of crucial functions for children apart from the obvious one of ‘providing
safety and protection for the vulnerable young…’376 These functions include the
ability to successfully regulate later adult behaviour; the establishment of a ‘prosocial
moral framework’ that encourages and facilitates empathy, compassion, concern and
caring for others; the development of a social conscience, and as well enables the
emergence of a mature identity that manages ‘a balance between dependence and
autonomy’. To be securely attached to another individual is to encode within the

375

Terry M. Levy and Michael Orlans, Attachment, Trauma, and Healing: Understanding and Treating
Attachment Disorders in Children and Families, Washington, Child Welfare League of America,
1998, p 1.
376
ibid.

203
caregiver/child relationship a feeling of ‘…nurturance, protection, availability,
dependability, and empathic understanding, especially in times of stress or
danger.’377

But what of the consequences of ‘disrupted attachment’? Levy and Orlans write that,
‘children who begin their lives with compromised and disrupted attachment
(associated with prenatal drug and alcohol exposure, neglect of physical and
emotional needs, abuse [and] violence) are at risk for serious problems…’ such as
low self esteem, antisocial attitudes and behaviours, a lack of empathy, behavioural
and academic problems at school and poor self control. Such people are often
needy and clingy, unable to develop and maintain friendships and are incapable of
genuine trust, intimacy and friendship.378

And the intergenerational consequences are profound. The literature in this regard is
unequivocal. ‘Children lacking secure attachments with caregivers commonly grow
up to be parents who are incapable of establishing this crucial foundation with their
own children.’ Typically these parents, instead of protecting, loving and nurturing
their children, ‘abuse, neglect and abandon’ them.379 The social consequences of
disordered attachment are similarly profound and are manifested in what has come
to be known as ‘affectionless psychopathy’ or, ‘the inability to form meaningful
emotional relationships, coupled with chronic anger, poor impulse control, and a lack
of remorse’.380

377

Judith P. Salzman, Carl Salzman and Abbie N. Wolfson, ‘Relationship of Childhood Abuse and
Maternal Attachment to the Borderline Personality Disorder’, in. Mary C. Zanarini [ed] Role of Sexual
Abuse in the Etiology of Borderline Personality Disorder, Washington D.C., American Psychiatric
Press, 1997, p 73.
378
Terry M. Levy and Michael Orlans op cit, pp 1-2. [f/n 375 at p 202]
379
ibid, pp 4-5.
380
ibid, p 4.

204
Traumatic childhood experiences often set the path for later ‘dysfunctional’ adult
behaviour. Reviewing the literature on the relationship between ‘pathological
childhood experiences’ and later self destructive behaviour such as self inflicted
injury and suicide attempts, Dubo et al identify predictive indicators such as parental
neglect, parental separation, early physical trauma, and physical and sexual
abuse.381 The authors cite research by Van der Kolk et al who ‘…found that histories
of childhood trauma, particularly sexual abuse, and histories of childhood neglect
were highly significant predictors of chronic suicide attempts, cutting, and other self
injurious behaviour.’382 Other predictors for poor adult outcomes are domestic
violence and substance abuse. As Mitchell and Finkelhor point out, ‘children in
families in which domestic violence is occurring have been shown to be at risk for a
variety of adversities including behavioural, emotional and cognitive functioning,
…and long-term developmental problems…’383 This is not surprising, as parents who
are preoccupied with their own safety cannot be effective, compassionate, warm and
responsive caregivers themselves. Inevitably ‘children who have witnessed conjugal
violence exhibit elevated behaviour problems at home and in other settings…’384 In
school-age males, violent, disruptive and aggressive behaviour is typically observed,
whilst in females of a similar age, passive, clinging, withdrawn and dependent
behaviour is the norm.385

My comments on the above areas of the biological basis of schizophrenia and issues
within the attachment and parenting literature are of necessity only cursory, but I
think we can make two fairly brief statements with some degree of confidence. First,

381

Elyse D. Dubo et al, ‘Relationship Between Lifetime Self-Destructiveness and Pathological
Childhood Experiences’ in. Mary C. Zanarini [ed] op cit, 1997, p 108-110. [f/n 377 at p 203]
382
B. A. Van der Kolk, J. C. Perry and J. L. Herman, ‘Childhood Origins of Self Destructive
Behaviour’, American Journal of Psychiatry, 148:1665-1671, 1991. Cited in. ibid p. 110.
383
Mitchell and Finkelhor, ‘Risk of Crime Victimisation among Youth Exposed to Domestic
Violence’, Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 2001, 16, p 944.
384
Jaffe, Wolfe and Wilson, Children of Battered Women, London, Sage, 1990, p 41.
385
ibid.

205
I think we are entitled to say that there are a whole range of biological determinants
that underpin the sorts of behaviours that people exhibit and which set the framework
within which behavioural displays can be understood in general; and second, that the
sorts of ways people are treated in their formative years has profound implications for
the sorts of people they later become and thus for the sorts of ‘choices’ they later
make with respect to the lives that they live.

These observations are surely not unwarranted. With regard to my brief comments
on schizophrenia, it is clear that the subjective experiences that schizophrenics
encounter and which themselves are the basis on which people with schizophrenia
both interpret their world and form their (often quite irrational) responses are in no
small way genetically determined. With regard to my comments on parent-child
attachment, it seems perfectly reasonable to suggest that in general ‘pathological’
childhood experiences set the scene for later adult behaviour that may be described
in similar terms.

What does this say about the possibility that human action is both rational and
autonomous, that is, that people make informed, reasoned and reflective judgements
about the sorts of lives they want (that is choose) to live? Does the paranoid
schizophrenic entertain suspicious and hostile ideas directed at ‘others’ because she
has reached the perfectly valid and reasonable conclusion that these ‘others’ (who
can read her thoughts and are planning to do away with her) are in fact a threat to
her own personal safety and security? Or are these beliefs a part of the
symptomatology that describes the world of the schizophrenic and over which she
has little or no control?

And if, as the literature asserts, that the best predictor of a parent who abuses or
neglects his own child is a child who has suffered abuse and neglect at the hands of
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his own parent, then what does this say about the possibility that one ‘chooses’ - in
the sense of ‘rational, reflective choice’ - one’s own life? Or is it simply a coincidence
that those who ‘choose’ to neglect or reject their own children were themselves
neglected and rejected (presumably again by parents who ‘chose’ to neglect or
reject)? What I am touching on here is how we view humans with regard to their
social environment. Do humans rationally and intentionally select the lives they lead,
or do the sorts of environments from which people emerge constrain the choices that
people embrace? And if it is true that environments constrain or limit choices then
what does this say about the picture of humans as rational, reflective and
autonomous agents, who are free to choose the particular lives they lead from a
whole range of possible choices? Yet the human rights paradigm, particularly the
liberal perspective, both emerges from and supports this ‘master narrative’ which
describes humans in terms of their ability to function as rational, autonomous and
moral agents.

My intention in the above is to suggest that theories of human rights are implausible
only to the extent that they portray individuals as rational, autonomous agents without
accounting for those periods in people’s lives when they are particularly vulnerable
and thus unable to assert or engage notions of rights. My intention is thus not to
rebuke theories of human rights but it is to rebuke such theories to the extent that
they focus on individual rights without accounting for the circumstances of people
who cannot declare or claim their rights. How do the vulnerable claim their rights?
My assertion is that without a strong emphasis upon notions of duty on behalf of
caregivers then such people are effectively cast adrift. By using the term ‘caregivers’
I am meaning at least those who are charged with the care and protection of the
vulnerable, in particular - as far as the frail aged with dementia and the mentally ill
are concerned – I am referring to various health and allied health professionals as
well as owners of facilities and those in government and bureaucracy. Notions of
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human rights need to address not simply these people and their responsibilities to
the vulnerable, but also they must set out the terms and conditions, that is, the extent
of their duties and obligations. Without a strong notion of duties it is impossible to
either account for the lives of vulnerable people or to engage those lives.

There has traditionally been a current of thought within liberal democratic theory that
views the individual as a rational autonomous actor, able to stand beyond social and
political existence and judge for herself notions of right, justice and rational self
interest and act accordingly. Whilst such a view has advantages for those able to
purposefully and forcefully claim their rights, it says little for those whose judgements
may be impaired, who may be irrational, or who are not adept at making good
decisions about their lives, even if such impairment and irrationality and poor
decision making are only temporary. For a whole range of people, in particular
children, the chronically mentally ill, the intellectually disabled, and many aged and
infirm (particularly those within nursing homes), the ownership of a whole range of
rights and freedoms is largely irrelevant. For many mentally ill, for example, their life
is one of marginalisation, discrimination, disempowerment and stigmatisation.386
Mental illness may impact upon various aspects of an individual’s existence,
disrupting schooling, employment, the formation of adult relationships, family life and
an ongoing and integrated sense of self. Whilst mental illness certainly affects
different people in different ways, its influence has often dramatic consequences for
both the personality and the cognitive performance of the individual, and thus of
course for the quality of choices that such individuals invoke with respect to the lives
that they lead.
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Characteristically people with mental illness are isolated, alone, and often regarded
not simply by their families but also the wider community as social, political and
economic pariahs. This bleak picture is reinforced by Lawrence et al who observe
that ‘people with psychiatric disorders find it more difficult to obtain and keep regular
employment, have fewer friends, may be cut off from family members, and may drift
into a lower socio-economic status and lower standards of living.’387 Yet as Hohfeld
knew, one claims one’s rights. That is, one claims, or asserts, or demands them.
This is an active and not a passive exercise. Indeed it is the purposeful, assertive
and active claiming of rights that makes people powerful. But the problem is that
those who cannot engage in such activity can be effectively excluded from any
benefits that may accrue from the rights debate. In other words, the ‘master
narrative’ of the assertive, reflective rights bearing creature has little or no relevance
for those individuals who are defined in terms of their vulnerability, and particularly so
when this vulnerability is at the extreme end. In such cases the narrative itself
effectively bypasses the vulnerable in our midst.

on vulnerable locations

In the previous chapter I considered the ‘promise’ that the concept of human rights
held out for vulnerable populations. As an example of two vulnerable populations I
focussed on the aged in this country’s residential care facilities and those people who
come into contact with mental health services, that is the mentally ill. Ostensibly both
of these groups are protected by a comprehensive array of rights that acknowledge,
not only the sorts of personal impediments that such people face, but also reveal a
sensitivity to the sorts of contextual locations within which their day to day lives are
played out. With respect to these two groups of people we may therefore ask: does
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the concept of human rights provide a powerful social and political force for the
protection of such vulnerable individuals, or is this idea of human rights with its
traditional focus on individual moral entitlements largely indifferent to the fate of the
vulnerable within these particular locations? In answering this question I want to first
consider the plight of the aged within residential facilities such as nursing homes,
hostels and boarding houses and then I will focus on the position of the mentally ill.388

As Kapp points out, ‘the language of rights is the most common form of
communication in the United States today, and its invocation particularly within the
health and social service sphere is pervasive.’389 Increasingly this is becoming the
case in Australia as well. The Charter of Residents’ Rights and Responsibilities is
that document which seeks to protect the rights of those elderly in residential aged
care facilities, and although there has been an undoubted shift in the configuration of
aged care services over the period 1985-1986 to 1996-1997, nevertheless nursing
homes and hostels still play a major role in the aged care landscape. They are often
places of last resort, especially for those who are frail, have a physical or mental
impairment, have no social or family supports, or who are impoverished.390

Distinctions are often made in the literature between residential facilities that are
privately owned and run for profit, and those termed ‘not for profit’.391 With regards to
standards of care and a resulting rights based discourse these distinctions are
irrelevant. All residential care facilities, whether they operate as commercial ventures
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or as charitable concerns, exist within the same fiscally constrained environment that
is bounded by the realities of limited budgets, the expectation that operating costs will
be kept to a minimum and the requirement to deliver a standard of care that is
economically sustainable.392 What is of crucial importance with respect to residential
care facilities is the underlying cultural dynamics at work and the way these dynamics
impact upon both residents and carers, and it is to these ‘dynamics’ that I now turn.

In the previous chapter we saw that the human rights identified and protected by the
rights documents address issues such as quality of care, full information, individual
privacy, freedom of movement, control over ones personal affairs and the right to be
treated with dignity and respect. What are some of the dynamics that compromise
the enjoyment of such rights? The first concerns the reality that those who enter
residential care facilities are often unwilling and reluctant to do so. Research by
Thomas makes it clear that few Australians actually want to enter a nursing home or
hostel. In his study ‘a significant proportion of elderly residents perceived that they
had been coerced into entering a home’, with the decision often being made by
relatives, who ‘usually carry out this task with much pain and guilt and only when
care is needed desperately’, or else it is made by the doctor of the respective
individual concerned.393 Thomas cites examples of a 78 year old male who stated; ‘I
had no option, it was all my son’s doing’, and an 86 year old male who said he had
moved into the home because; the ‘doctor said I should…before I lose my marbles’,
and a 93 year old male who reported;
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‘My nephew looked for this place, I had nothing to do with it…I’m not keen on
this place…I’d rather be home with someone looking after me, but that’s
impossible I guess…I don’t know whether I’m in here for good or not.’394

As Pinkerton-James points out, ‘for many elderly people, involuntary admission to an
aged care institution can be the ultimate denial of human rights.’ It understates their
helplessness and emphasises their dependence on the decision making power of
others. But what is of equal concern is the resultant consequences of an involuntary
admission. As she makes clear ‘the level of dependency and corresponding loss of
power experienced is often without parallel.’ In the institutional setting it is often the
case that ‘lives have to be adjusted to accommodate a set of routines imposed by a
hierarchical structure in which the patient is at the bottom of the heap.’395 This
‘adjustment’ often incorporates ‘the transition from person to patient’ and the
resultant impact upon the individual’s integrity which, claims Irurita, causes ‘varying
levels of “vulnerability”…’396 But those who are ‘relocated’ to a nursing home in later
life are often already vulnerable, as this move is commonly preceded by declining
health, a loss of economic independence, a degree of cognitive impairment and
emotional trauma such as the death of a spouse.397 Further, entry to a residential
aged care facility may often come following an acute illness or a period of
hospitalisation.398 Thus whilst nursing homes often encourage a powerless
dependency this dependency may have begun prior to admission.
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The concept of ‘a set of routines’ identifies the reality that both nursing homes and
hostels are structures that run according to disciplines, such as nursing, that are
themselves overwhelmingly medically inspired and task orientated. As Hegyvary so
astutely points out, ‘…nursing, like other health professionals, defines the world,
including outcomes, through the lens of its own discipline’, and so the values and
priorities that drive the discipline (like other medical disciplines) may be directed
toward professionally derived (or institutionally derived) goals rather than any goals
patients may have chosen for themselves.399 Nursing in particular has traditionally
been orientated to hospital and institutional care400 where the emphasis has been
upon specialised functions, hierarchical authority, routine and regimentation, all of
which ‘…limit the capacity of the services to tailor assistance to individual needs’ and
in particular those needs that fall outside the scope and content of medically based
interventions.401 Whilst it is no doubt true to say that ‘the greatest protection for the
older adult resident’s rights and autonomy is the policies of the nursing home’402 still it
often seems that the task orientated regime of residential aged care institutions
function to undermine a sensitivity to individual difference. The day to day routine of
the nursing home in particular (and to a lesser extent the hostel) may consist of
waking the residents up, dressing and showering them, changing those who are
incontinent, feeding those who cannot feed themselves and giving out medication at
prescribed regular intervals during a 24 hour period. In addition to these regular daily
duties, the role of nurses and carers in general involves monitoring those who
present with behavioural problems and attending to those who are particularly frail or
399
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sick. The demands of feeding, toileting, changing and bathing often appear never
ending. This is a schedule that demands adherence to tasks and times rather than
the diversity of individual needs and differences so that individual rights, even
individual ‘human rights’, are often sacrificed for the smooth running of institutional
routines.403

Caring for the aged is physically and emotionally taxing, yet the reality is that those
who are employed in nursing homes, hostels and indeed boarding houses are mostly
without professional qualifications. Once again human rights considerations are
undermined. As Fine and Stevens state, ‘…over 57 percent of the workforce directly
responsible for caring for elderly people are untrained assistants in nursing or
personal care attendants.’404 Concerns such as these go to the heart of the provision
of a high standard of care for the elderly in residential accommodation. Staffing
levels in such institutions have been of considerable concern to professional groups.
The Australian Nursing Federation [ANF] has long been campaigning not simply for
more staff but also for what is described within that profession as an appropriate
‘skills mix’, that is, to have appropriate levels of experienced staff caring for the most
physically and mentally impaired residents. According to the ANF the aged care
industry is characterised by an exodus of registered and enrolled nurses. In a recent
survey conducted by the Victorian branch there were more than 2400 vacant shifts in
responding nursing homes.405 Partially the staffing shortage is because experienced
nurses can earn up to $130.00 a week more in the public hospital sector and partially
it is because nurses have been reduced to quasi governmental bureaucrats,406
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‘…overwhelmed with paperwork and…frequently unable to meet even the basic
needs of their residents.’407 This exodus has seen ‘reduced staffing levels and
inappropriate skill mix in many facilities, where staff who are paid less are substituted
for more costly staff.’408 Thus economic imperatives often effectively override human
rights considerations with the consequence being that standards of care suffer.

The above comments point to a general abandonment of the aged when it comes to
the provision of specialist services. Of particular interest are those aged who suffer
from mental illness. Referring to the American situation, Zarit and Knight comment
that ‘in many ways, nursing homes have become the mental hospitals of the 1990s
[but whilst] in most facilities, a majority of residents have significant psychiatric
symptoms…typically little or no treatment is provided.’409 Numerous studies have
pointed not simply to the high numbers of residents in nursing homes who suffer from
problems of mental illness such as dementia, depression, anxiety and panic
disorders, but also to the paucity of psychiatric services available for such people.410
With regard to the Australian context, Snowden notes comparable rates of mental
illness amongst nursing home residents; that is, dementia above 80% with 25% to
50% of sufferers having psychotic symptoms, depressive symptoms displayed by
30% to 50% of residents, 13% having mild anxiety symptoms and a point prevalence
of 6% to 7% for delirium.411 Snowden uses the term ‘forgotten people’ to refer to the
aged in nursing homes with mental health problems. In commenting on nursing
homes surveyed in the Sydney area he notes that only 19% received specialist
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psychiatric or psychological services for three or more hours a month and that ‘at
least 28% (of facilities) provided no ongoing education to their staff about dementia
or other psychiatric problems.’412 In commenting on Snowdon’s criticism of
residential aged care in Australia, Arie writes, with no attempt to conceal sarcasm,
that ‘…the familiar ‘inverse care law’ operates – in nursing homes the concentration
of psychiatric morbidity is highest, whilst involvement of, and access to, psychiatry is
often least’,413 and Edmond Chiu observes that Australian aged care policy
demonstrates, ‘…a continuing neglect of mental health issues of our most vulnerable
elderly citizens in residential care.’414

Another factor that functions to typically undermine the notion of human rights within
residential aged care facilities is the inappropriate mix of residents. This is a
perennial problem. The Burdekin Report, for example, noted the tendency to place
dementia sufferers in nursing homes and boarding houses and often amongst those
who do not experience the degree of cognitive and behavioural impairment that is so
characteristic of that disorder. Many dementia sufferers are ‘physically well and
inclined to wander’ and thus their intrusive behaviour can seriously compromise the
personal privacy of those not similarly afflicted. As one submission to the Burdekin
Report made clear;

‘In a nursing home situation someone with dementia can…rummage in
somebody else’s locker or dressing table. They can get into the wrong bed.
And the normal aged get very upset by this sort of behaviour…because that
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bed and that dressing table is their only private space left in that time of their
life.’415

The dual problems of staffing levels and an inappropriate mix of residents is most
marked however within privately run boarding houses and hostels. In recent years
the Victorian Community Visitors have drawn attention to these facilities and in
particular to those facilities at the lower end of the residential aged care market which
target individuals who have few personal resources, little family support, are in a
crisis situation, and who are economically poor.416 Within the Victorian health care
system these facilities ‘have become places of last resort for many of the most
disadvantaged in our community’,417 and so the diverse mix of residents has become
a feature of these facilities. Within such establishments there are ‘frail older people,
individuals with acquired brain injury, younger people with a mental illness, as well as
residents with intellectual disabilities.’ In addition there are also ‘many residents who
suffer dual or multiple disabilities and have even more complex and high level care
needs.’418 Yet despite the fact that many residents have ‘multiple and complex
disabilities’, the Report notes that ‘the vast majority of the staff who work in (these
facilities) have had little training to equip them for this task.’419

The combination of an inappropriate mix of residents with multiple problems, poor
staff-resident ratio and staff with inadequate training, seriously undermines the
quality of life of residents in these privately run boarding houses. Some examples
from the Report by the Community Visitors is instructive:
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‘Often Community Visitors are concerned to note that there is only one
member of staff on duty – someone who is doing a multitude of tasks such as
cooking, cleaning, providing personal care, answering the phone, dispensing
medications and much more.’420

‘…Community Visitors have gone to facilities and found that the one staff
member on duty cannot speak English but is in charge of a home with
predominantly English-speaking dependent residents.’421

‘Community Visitors were surprised to note on a recent morning visit to an
“up-market” facility for 30 frail aged residents that 11 staff were on duty.
These included the manager, personal care attendants, cleaners, laundry
staff, kitchen staff and office staff. The contrast with the previous
facility…was stark. In this [previous facility], home to 28 residents with
varying but quite complex needs, the proprietor was the only person on duty
and was attempting to provide personal care, clean, prepare the lunch and
much more.’422

‘Community Visitors have noted that in one facility a staff member is rostered
from 6.00 am until 10.00 pm seven days a week. In another facility, the
personal care attendant is listed on duty for seven days of the week. There
are further examples of night sleep-over staff who have been on duty since
4.30 pm the previous afternoon staying until 10.00 am the next morning to
serve the breakfast and shower the residents.’423
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What is the resultant impact on the quality of life of the residents? In particular with
regard to low fee private facilities, the Victorian Community Visitors have noted
serious concerns with cleanliness, hygiene, nutrition and the degree of social
isolation experienced by residents. Social isolation is a feature of residential care
facilities in general. It is manifested in a variety of ways. First, by the fact that many
residents are unwilling participants in residential life. Second, by being separated
from environments, family and friends that are familiar to them, residents are
effectively confined to a social space that is often alien and frightening. Third,
because of demands that residential care facilities are managed with a close eye to
the economic bottom line, there is frequently little latitude for proprietors to provide
full activity programmes run by occupational therapist or psychologists. Boredom is a
well documented feature of care facilities and particularly so with the more dependent
residents who cannot come and go as they please. Thomas reports one 83 year old
widow as saying, ‘I used to count cars passing in the street when I first came here,
then the red cars, then how many cars passing in a minute.’424

The diverse mix of residents in aged care facilities is not conducive either to social
interaction or the expression of individual preferences. At the end of their lives a
whole variety of people with different views, values, interests, backgrounds, likes and
dislikes are often thrown together into residential life. Problems emerge from the
vastly different needs (based upon disability and level of frailty) that each individual
presents with. Problems are magnified when residents, who may have lived alone all
their life or with one spouse from who they are now separated, are forced to share a
room with people they have never met and indeed, and if not for their inability to
function by themselves, would never choose to spend time with. Single rooms in
aged care facilities, particularly for the very frail and sick, are few. Rather, the
tendency is for dormitory style accommodation of two or four beds to a room. This is
424
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in line with the view that the frail aged are more easily (with respect to economic
determinants) ‘managed’ in dormitories where fewer staff are required for the task
orientated routines of daily life. And the result of residential culture for those frail
aged who rely on others for their survival is grim. As Coleman recently and pointedly
commented;

‘old ladies dread their loss of dignity as time-pressed aides, frequently male,
fail to attend promptly to their need for help with toileting. Day rooms are
crowded; the disabled unable to feed themselves, must wait until time can be
made for their feeding’.425

Little wonder that the ‘stated position’ of ACT Disability Aged Care Advocacy Service
is that ‘aged care facilities are institutions [which are] inherently abusive.’426

In the above I referred in passing to those in residential aged care facilities where the
incidence of mental illness is disturbingly high. In the following I want to focus more
directly on the experience of the mentally ill within some other institutional contexts.
These contexts are diverse and may include the acute hospital setting, community
psychiatric clinics, outpatient contacts, hostels, boarding houses as well as prisons
and other places of detention. The obvious starting point for a discussion of this sort
is the Burdekin Report which, although completed now some nine years ago,
remains the benchmark for any understanding of the way that location impacts upon
the mentally ill within Australia.427
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The Report made it clear that those who come in contact with the mental health
system are confronted, on both a structural and a personal level, by an institutional
context that is fundamentally corrosive of the ethos of care and protection. On a
structural level the Report described numerous inequities within the system; a lack of
mental health crisis teams in areas beyond metropolitan centres; a related paucity of
mental health professionals for rural and regional locations; the tendency for police to
be seconded as mental health workers particularly with respect to emergency
transportation to hospital - with the result being that mental health problems tended
to become ‘criminalized’; the inadequacy of existing community based services to
treat people with a mental illness in a least restrictive environment; and problems in
gaining access to hospital beds, for either voluntary or involuntary patients, to
forestall breakdowns, due to inflexible and rigid admission criteria.428 Thus Burdekin
concluded that,

‘people affected by mental illness are amongst the most vulnerable and
disadvantaged in our community. They suffer from widespread, systematic
discrimination and are constantly denied the rights and services to which they
are entitled’,429

and he identified a variety of particularly disadvantaged groups such as; children and
adolescents, the elderly, the homeless, women, Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islanders, people from non-English speaking backgrounds and prisoners, all who
bear the burden of already existing social disadvantage in addition to ‘seriously
inadequate specialist services.’430
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On the personal level of day to day interactions between sufferers of mental illness
and those professionals who are charged with their care and protection, the Report
noted numerous instances of neglect and downright abuse directed at the vulnerable.
This abuse and neglect was not simply confined to psychiatric hospitals but common
throughout the entire mental health system. Inpatient services were a particular
concern. With respect to this traditional way of caring for people with a mental
illness, Burdekin declared that, ‘the fact remains that the very large body of evidence
received concerning inpatient treatment was overwhelmingly negative.’431 Evidence
presented to the Inquiry described ‘harassment, intimidation and physical abuse’, as
well as evidence that the mentally ill were ‘devalued, dehumanised and their views
ignored.’ Reference was made to the ‘frequent neglect’ of ‘the physical well being of
people in psychiatric hospitals’432 and it was clear from the many submissions to the
Inquiry, from patients to carers to professionals, that a denial of respect for the worth
and dignity of the individual, surely the essential constituent elements of any human
rights ethos, was a daily occurrence. In summarising the experience of being an
inpatient within the mental health system in Australia, Burdekin noted that:

‘…the extensive evidence submitted by consumers, clinicians and carers who
have experienced inpatient hospital “treatment” clearly indicates that
insufficient planning and seriously inadequate resources have been devoted
to providing appropriate care. The loss of dignity and respect suffered by
consumers represents a clear denial of their fundamental human rights.’433

Relationships between staff and patients within psychiatric facilities present a difficult
problem for documents such as the Report. For a start the evidence presented was
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uniformly bleak. Of particular concern was a ‘considerable body of evidence’
pertaining to staff assaults on patients which, in some cases, included sexual
assaults. The Report noted that ‘many of the consumers who gave evidence of
sexual assaults in hospital emphasised that they had been unable to subsequently
pursue the matter, because staff claimed they had been deluded or fantasising due
to their mental illness.’434 And herein lies the dilemma. Mental illness, especially that
severe enough to warrant hospitalisation, is often characterised by delusional ideas
and so there may seem to be compelling reasons to dismiss the claims of those who
suffer from major mental illness, especially when there is no corroborating scientific
evidence or corroborating statements from other mental health professionals. Yet in
so doing one simply marginalizes the mentally ill even further and banishes them to
some outer world where their every experience is regarded as invalid.

But apart from assertions of serious physical and sexual assault there were more
‘routine’ concerns directed, for example, at the inappropriate use of medication. The
Report received much evidence that medication was often used as a behaviour
management technique, and as well was often administered by threat, coercion or
force.435 Burdekin noted evidence from many patients who reported forcible
injections from nursing staff:

‘Witnesses described being held in headlocks, being sat on, having both arms
and legs held down, being punched, pushed, pulled, held up against walls,
and wrestled to the floor during these instances.’436
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Whilst Burdekin noted that, in some instances, there was a need for compulsion as
regards treatment, he nevertheless pointed out that fundamental human rights issues
were raised concerning the forcible administration of medication, and suggested that
‘a culture of acceptance has developed in some hospitals and ward environments, so
that staff become insensitive to the extreme dehumanisation implicit in such
“treatment” ‘,437 and further he noted that;

‘…it is clear that one of the main problems associated with large institutions is
that they foster a custodial mentality – associated with a lack of accountability
– ultimately reflected in a lack of respect for the individuals they are supposed
to care for.’438

And within mental health institutions, as within aged care facilities, the quality of the
sorts of lives that are lived by patients (or residents) is determined in no small way by
the staff who are employed. Their power is all encompassing. As Parsons reminds
us;

‘…service users can quite typically be in situations where they are reliant on
staff for the realisation of virtually all their rights. This can give staff, and
services generally, a considerable degree of power in determining which
rights will be safeguarded and which will be forfeited.’439

The Report demonstrated the inability of ‘human rights’ to effectively challenge a
mental health system wherein the vulnerable are confronted with numerous powerful
authority figures, such as doctors, nurses, psychiatrists, psychologists and so on.
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Whilst human rights proposes the idea that all people are essentially equal
(fundamental and inalienable rights) in terms of social and political being, the
experience of the vulnerable is often quite the opposite. Particularly as patients
within the variety of locations wherein such people often find themselves, the
mentally ill are enmeshed within a political culture that is particularly hostile to the
expression of social and political equality.440 One way of thinking about political
culture is to consider the sorts of loyalties and priorities that impinge upon people. If,
for example, the psychiatric nurse is an advocate for patients’ rights, as some current
theories suggest,441 what implications does this have for other relationships when
human rights issues emerge? The nurse is also an employee of an institution, a coworker with other nurses, part of a mental health team incorporating psychiatrists,
medical doctors, social workers and psychologists. Political culture may demand the
nurse puts loyalties to the employer, co-workers, or the mental health team over a
patient’s ‘human rights’, however they may be defined. For professionals who
challenge institutional political culture the results can be costly. As Baldwin and
Barker wryly comment, ‘most services do not appear to have reached the state of
evolution whereby in-house critics, or other dissident voices, are rewarded for their
contribution to the promotion of good practice.’442

But apart from such instrumental problems, advocacy has philosophical problems as
well. At the heart of the human rights ‘narrative’ is the commitment to the idea that
rational, autonomous individuals define and articulate their own particular conception
440
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of the good. When ‘the good’ is articulated on one’s behalf, at best it dilutes the
moral force that accompanies human rights and at worst it denies authenticity by
giving voice not to the voiceless but to interlocutors who ‘claim’ to speak for the
voiceless. Harding puts advocacy into perspective when she writes that,

‘we have heard entirely too much from men about women and gender, from
whites about Blacks and race, from heterosexuals about lesbians, gays, and
sexual preference, and from economically powerful people abut workers and
why the poor are poor. Claiming to adopt the critical persona of the Other in
the name of her emancipation is unlikely to earn the applause of the Other.’443

Of course for the mentally ill themselves there are costs associated with the assertion
of rights. The unhappy reality for many mentally ill is chronicity or at least episodic
admissions to hospital. The Burdekin Report noted the reluctance of consumers to
identify themselves in case they had to return to the same hospital and thus possibly
confront staff about whom they may have made complaints. In other words ‘they
feared repercussions, should they be admitted, for having spoken out about nurses
or doctors.’444 Thus evidence was given to the Inquiry by residents from a group
home in Victoria who described staff as ‘at times cruel and sadistic’ with documented
corroboration not only of violence from staff but also accompanying threats that if
there were complaints then ‘they [the patients] would receive similar treatment.’445
As imbalances of power and the sorts of relationships such imbalances engender
undermine complaints by mental health consumers, (or even ensure that such
complaints are not made in the first place), so similar obstacles can confront
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professionals at institutional or departmental level. In 1995 the Reconvened Inquiry
into the Human Rights of People with Mental Illness (Victoria) was released.446 As its
title suggested, this report looked at developments in Victoria since the original
national inquiry into the human rights of mentally ill people was conducted. This
report documented numerous instances of intimidation and retribution by the
Department of Health and Community Services towards a whole range of individuals
and organizations within the mental health area in Victoria. This intimidation was
directed towards psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, public servants and members of
mental health advocacy groups, indeed any organization or individual who spoke out
against what they saw as shortcomings within State government management of
mental health, either in terms of policy or practice.

Intimidation and retribution allegedly took the form of the removal of senior mental
health nurses from departmental committees, forcing critics into retirement or
redundancy, the removal of people with mental health experience from positions of
responsibility within the Department and replacing them with generalist managers,
and the disciplining of health workers at Department level.447 As far as advocacy and
non-government groups were concerned, such intimidation and retribution focussed
on funding cuts, thus severely limiting such group’s ability to function. The issues
that were often the source of this conflict were those that are seen by the supporters
of ‘human rights for the mentally ill’ as going to the heart of issues relating to care
and protection. These involved the reduction of services for the mentally ill and
reduced funding to mental health programs. The resultant impact for mental health
care can be found within areas such as staffing levels on wards with acutely
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disturbed patients, bed availability for those mentally ill in crisis situations and quality
of service delivery.448

In more recent times it has become clear that context remains a powerful challenge
to human rights claims. In mid 2001 the St Vincent de Paul Society released its long
awaited assessment on mental health and social justice in Australia.449 Within this
report the issues confronting the mentally ill bore a striking resemblance to those that
confronted Burdekin in the early and mid 1990s; large numbers of mentally ill
accommodated within hostels and refuges; overly strict admission criteria preventing
the mentally ill from gaining access to inpatient care – thus forcing already
overburdened and under resourced sufferers and families to cope unsupported; a
lack of follow up and counselling for patients discharged from hospital; scarce and
difficult to access respite care and supported accommodation particularly for patients
with complex problems, and community based resources that remain under funded
and fragmented – and this whilst, as the St. Vincent de Paul document noted, there
has been a 60% decline in psychiatric beds available in New South Wales over the
past ten years.450 As Burdekin had previously observed, the process of
deinstitutionalisation sanctioned by the Richmond Report was never accompanied by
government commitment, in terms of either financial or human resources, for
community based options.451 The underlying message here is that human rights
have found it impossible to overcome the political and economic hurdles that stand in
their way.
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In terms of context I want to make one final brief comment and this has to do with the
numbers of mentally ill in the Australian prison system, which can in fact be
considered the third major institutional repository of mentally ill persons in this
country.452 The mentally ill have generally fared poorly when they have come into
contact with either law enforcement agencies or the criminal justice system in
general. For example, more than a third of those shot by police in Australia during
the years 1990-1997 were identified as being either depressed or as having had
some form of psychiatric illness.453 The prison system itself is characterised both by
a preponderance of mentally ill and intellectually disabled people, and a noticeable
lack of specialist services to attend to the needs of these people. According to New
South Wales figures, 13% of inmates have an intellectual disability, 21% have
attempted suicide and 40% meet the diagnosis of Personality Disorder. With respect
just to the female population 23% are on psychiatric medication and 73% were
previously admitted to psychiatric or mental health units.454 A 1997 report into inmate
health in the NSW prison population revealed that 50% of women and 33% of men
had received some form of assessment or treatment by a psychiatrist or psychologist
at some time in their life, and of these some 36% of women and 34% of men had
previously been admitted to a psychiatric unit or hospital.455 And in evidence given to
the NSW Legislative Council Interim Report on the Prison Population, Associate
Professor Susan Hayes reported an increase in the prevalence of adult prisoners
with an intellectual disability, from 12.5 per cent in 1988, to 17.5 percent in 1998 and
19.3 per cent in 1999.456
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The above evidence tends to support the belief that ‘…our prisons [are] becoming the
new psychiatric institutions of NSW’, particularly with the increasing tendency to
imprison people for offences related to mental illness, homelessness and poverty.457
Mullen concurs with this view. In noting ‘…an increasing willingness to imprison the
mentally ill’, he comments that, ‘arguably the mentally disordered are being
preferentially selected into the new prison populations.’458 Why this is so is
unclear,459 but what is clear is that once in prison there are precious few specialist
resources to care for, protect or treat this particularly vulnerable group. For example
in NSW with a prison population of 7697 there are 90 specialist forensic prison
hospital unit beds. In the Northern Territory, Queensland, Western Australia and
South Australia there are none and in Victoria, with the third highest prison
population of 2858, there are only 15 acute beds and 30 longer term beds.460 Green
notes both the paucity and fragmentation of services available for inmates with an
intellectual disability, in addition of course to the ‘threatened and actual physical and
sexual violence…’ within the ‘…hostile prison environment…’, where the rights of the
intellectually disabled are often disregarded and in some cases actually violated.461
And as a general comment Ogloff writes that;

‘Despite the prevalence of mentally ill people in the criminal justice system
and the difficulties that surround them, few services exist to help identify and
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treat those offenders who suffer from a mental illness. Fewer resources exist
still to help ensure that when released the mentally ill offenders will receive
the services they require in the community to help them become re-integrated
and to reduce the likelihood that they will return to gaol.’462

v]

the case against human rights: some concluding remarks

In the preceding two chapters I have discussed first, what promise human rights hold
for vulnerable people, that is the aged with dementia and the mentally ill, and second,
how this promise has been enacted. It is clear that in those social contexts wherein
vulnerable people live out their lives, the residential aged care facility and the variety
of locations where we typically find the mentally ill (hostels, nursing homes,
psychiatric hospitals, prisons), a variety of factors conspire to undermine the integrity
of the individual and render the notion of individual rights as largely irrelevant. I am
here focussing on institutional contexts. How do we make institutions sensitive to the
rights individuals have so as to enable vulnerable lives to flourish? My assertion is
that we need to focus upon the duties and obligations that caregivers within such
structures have in order to engage notions of rights and make them relevant. In
Australia, and particularly with the aged and the mentally ill, we have paid little
attention to such an approach.

Henry Shue deals directly with the issue of making rights relevant.463 Shue maintains
that, in general, the dichotomy between negative rights (rights to be left alone) and
positive rights (rights to be provided with goods and services), is misleading. The
position Shue is arguing against is that which sees negative rights (often referred to
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as security rights) as somehow more valid and more basic than positive rights (often
referred to as subsistence rights). Positive rights, so it is claimed, are rights that
require people, mostly states, to act in certain ways to provide goods and services,
such as schools, food, shelter, health care, clean water, pollution free air and so on,
whereas negative rights only require individuals and states to for bear – to ensure the
safety and security of citizens and then to stand aside and let people live their lives
as they see fit. The former require intervention in the life of the individual and state
regulation of social and economic life, whilst the latter maximise individual freedom
and reduces the intrusive and coercive power of the state.

Shue argues, convincingly, that the dichotomy is false. Rights cannot be easily
divided into positive and negative. Even negative rights (to safety and security)
involve taking what he calls ‘a wide range of positive action’ such as ‘police forces,
criminal courts, penitentiaries, schools for training police, lawyers, and guards, and
taxes to support an enormous system for the prevention, detection, and punishment
of violations of personal security.’464 All rights are in fact a combination of positive
and negative interactions and thus all rights involve individuals in a mix of acting and
refraining from acting. In this way we may say that for any right at all to be enjoyed
there must be an inexorable mix of rights and duties. Thus Schue suggests that for
the enjoyment of a right, whether positive or negative, whether rights to security or
rights to subsistence, whether rights to for bear or rights to be provided with any
variety of goods and services, there are three essential types of duties which can be
seen as correlative. These are duties to avoid depriving (a person of their security or
their means of subsistence); duties to protect people from being deprived (of their
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security or their only available means of subsistence); and duties to aid those so
deprived (of either their security or their subsistence).465

The above duties of course apply to different people in different ways depending
upon the context within which those threatened with deprivation and those charged
with protection exist. But it is only when the rights/duties dichotomy is in fact seen
not to be dichotomous are we beginning to appreciate the complexity of interactions
and engagements that sustain rights. There is clearly an interdependence here with
rights depending upon duties and duties depending upon rights in a subtle way that
makes dichotomous interpretations implausible. There is an interdependence of
benefits and responsibilities so that, as Schue points out, ‘no one is assured of living
permanently on one side of the rights/duties coin.’466

Shue’s argument clearly has important implications for the way institutional contexts
are arranged so as to maximise human rights protections for individuals. The way to
protect human rights is to ensure that institutional arrangements are sensitive to
rights/duties interrelationships. Pogge is in agreement with this but I think Pogge
introduces a dimension that personalises notions of rights and duties in a way that
Shue and Rawls do not. As Pogge points out, it is the government that is most
usually regarded as the primary guardian of human rights. A country’s constitution,
the structure of its courts, its legal and political system, the attitudes of politicians,
bureaucrats and policemen, all these are crucial in shaping, sustaining and protecting
human rights. It is within constitutions and laws that rights are articulated and it is the
attitude of social and legal institutions that are crucial in determining whether or not
there is official respect or official disrespect toward rights. That is, is the government
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a sincere or a cynical actor with regard to rights? Does it offend rights or does it
tolerate an offence of rights by various groups or individuals?467

But there is another point by Pogge that I am most interested in. Whilst he
acknowledges the role of government and institutions in the securing of rights, he
says that ‘…it makes more sense to think more broadly here [for] what is needed to
make the object of a right truly secure is a vigilant citizenry that is deeply committed
to this right and disposed to work for its political realisation.’468 And in expanding on
this he writes:

‘More reliable than a commitment by the government, which may undergo a
radical change in personnel from one day to the next, is a commitment by the
citizenry. This latter commitment tends to foster the former – especially in
democratic societies which tend to produce the strongest incentives for
government officials to be responsive to the people.’

This is the part of Pogge’s work that engages and speaks to individual people in a
context that is personal and private. Human rights, he asserts, entail moral duties,
but the duties are complex and entail obligations to act that are diverse and wide
ranging. But it is also individual. Thus ‘the human right not to be subjected to cruel
or degrading treatment gives me a duty to help ensure that those living in my society
need not endure such treatment.’469 And he adds that the ‘responsibility for a
person’s human rights falls on all…who participate with this person in the same
social system. It is their responsibility, collectively, to structure the system so that all

467

Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Cambridge, UK., Polity, 2002. In particular see
chapter two ‘How should human rights be conceived?’
468
ibid, p 62.
469
ibid, p 66.

234
its participants have secure access to the objects of their human rights.’470 In other
words I have an obligation to act to ensure that social systems themselves respect
the rights of individuals and I must not sustain systems that are coercive of
individual’s rights. The call is thus for an emphasis upon duties and obligations in a
very personal sense of individual engagement.

My comments above with respect to Schue and Pogge are brief but I acknowledge
them in order to introduce my final chapter. It is their emphasis upon rights being
sustained by duties and obligations, rather than rights and duties being opposite
(distinct and separate) sides of the same coin, that I wish to reflect on. I agree that
duties sustain rights. I agree that rights are made whole by a focus upon duties. I
agree that institutions can be made ‘human’ by ensuring that they acknowledge and
respect the rights that individuals have. In the Australian context, with respect to the
aged and the mentally ill, rights have been made vague and clumsy, and duties
optional. In the final chapter I want to reflect on what we might call a philosophy of
duties. What sources and inspirations might we adopt in order to bring duties to life
and make rights meaningful and relevant in our day to day lives? In this sense I wish
to draw on some culturally relevant images that might inspire and support a
commitment to duties. In the final chapter I want to consider virtue theory, Christian
theology and what I call ‘the narrative of everyday lives’.
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Chapter Six: On Rights, Duties and Responses to the Vulnerable

i]

on rights, duties and relationships

I want to begin by making a general observation about the relationship between
rights and duties. In his book Natural Law and Natural Rights,471 John Finnis poses
the question, are duties ‘prior’ to rights? His answer, like so many who in similar vein
address this relationship, is to reflect upon the development of the idea of human
rights from historical perspective.472 Finnis considers the history of the word ‘right’
and its various meanings and how those meanings have, within different historical
periods, been part of a cultural and linguistic metamorphosis that has led to our
present understanding of the term. In particular he notes the transition from the
notion of right (jus), referent to what ‘is just in a given situation’, to the notion of a
right as a power ‘which a person has’,473 thus establishing the individual as the
subject (rather than the object) of social and political life. Haakonssen suggests
[convincingly I think] that the idea of rights as we now know them, that is rights as in
‘human rights’, has become gradually disentangled from allied concepts of duty and
obligation so that they now tend to stand isolated and remote, sui generis - beyond
the framework of rights - duties - obligations they were originally embedded within.
This is not to say that in our modern understanding of the relationships between
people, duties or obligations no longer have meaning, rather it is to acknowledge that
we live in a culture wherein the focus is almost exclusively on rights and where
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‘…duties tend to exist either as the pale correlates of rights or as the fiercely
contested dictates of an oppressive state or overbearing moralists.’474

Despite the writings of a number of modern philosophers which have cast doubts on
the muscular pre-eminence of individual rights,475 there remains, in an intuitive sense
at least, good reason for subscribing to a view of the primacy of rights. After all we
speak of ‘fundamental and inalienable rights’ possessed by all humans everywhere
regardless of race, religion, gender and social and political affiliation. We do not refer
to ‘fundamental and inalienable duties’ that people owe to others, rather, we tend to
infer that such duties exist only because certain rights exist. On this reckoning at
least it would seem obvious that rights are ontologically or epistemologically
dominant and duties in some way merely derivative. Yet there is a sense in which
duties may be reasonably regarded as ‘prior’ to or ‘antecedent’ to rights, and that is in
the logic of their implementation. In other words in what we might refer to as the
‘instrumental’ sense we can certainly make a case for duties being regarded as prior
to notions of rights and I want to explore this idea in the following.

the narrative of rights, duties and everyday lives

Within discourse on human rights there is an inevitable point of focus centred on the
relationship between the individual and the state. Paradoxically, state structures and
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institutions are often seen on the one hand as being a potential threat to such rights,
whilst on the other they are viewed as the only forces powerful enough to effectively
guarantee them.476 The human rights debate seems thus co-opted from the ordinary
lives of ordinary people, and we are introduced to the meta-narrative of an
increasingly global political discourse with its emphasis upon national, trans-national
and supra-national actors who play out a dialogue that seems (in fact is) powerfully
removed from the everyday discourse of everyday lives. Such a perspective has a
validity, yet it obscures the degree to which human rights are part of a much more
focussed, localised and personalised narrative. The reality of human suffering is a
lived experience at the level of everyday lives. As Poe reminds us, it is the case that
‘the true wretchedness, indeed, - the ultimate woe, - is particular , not diffuse…and
the ghastly extremes of agony are endured by man the unit, and never by man the
mass…’477 Thus I want to concentrate on a ‘micro-narrative’ wherein we engage the
other and wherein our acts and actions can have a powerful and immediate effect
upon the other. It is at this level of human interaction that the mix of rights and duties
is most clearly and consistently played out.

When I employ the term ‘everyday lives’ I am referring to the numerous face-to-face
small scale exchanges and interactions that constitute the ongoing social dialogue
that humans are engaged in within the course of the lives they share with others. We
can understand this by the use of a brief example. A nurse working on a dementia
specific ward is responsible for the care and protection of many aged and infirm
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residents who, because of the level of cognitive impairment that inevitably
accompanies dementia, is required to do for those residents many of the activities of
daily living that people without dementia do easily (and almost unthinkingly) for
themselves. Such activities of daily living include feeding, dressing, showering,
toileting and other tasks that we do without even knowing that we do them, for
example turning from side to side in the bed (‘repositioning’ in nursing parlance).

For those with dementia, repositioning has an enormous impact upon the individual’s
quality of life. Loss of motor activity, muscular wastage and urine and faecal
incontinence are obvious features of dementia, and are major threats to quality of life
in moderate to severe dementia and particularly so in ‘end-stage’ dementia. People
with end stage dementia are typically anorexic and inactive. They may lie
immobilised in the bed unless repositioned, usually hourly is required, by nursing
staff. Pressure on the bony protuberances of the body (heels, ankles, buttocks,
shoulders and hips in particular) is great and this combination of immobility, body
wastage and urinary incontinence (combined of course with an inability to ask for
help) produces what are referred to as decubitus ulcers, or more commonly, bed
sores. Skin integrity is easily destroyed in those with advancing dementia and a
constant regime of skin care, a fundamental part of the overall care of any bedridden
patient, is of particular importance for those who have end-stage dementia.

Now one might argue, and plausibly so, that a dementia patient has a right (that is a
legal, a moral – even a human right) to be treated in a particular way by the nurse on
duty that will minimise the likelihood of becoming ulcerated, and with a resultant
reduction not only in physical health but also in quality of life. As a nurse caring for
such patients I pass by the bed of a helpless individual with end stage dementia. I
know that the individual needs to be turned. I know that they have been incontinent.
I know that unless they are repositioned in the bed the risk of suffering from bed
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sores will be increased. But I also want to go for my break. I am tired and not feeling
particularly energetic. The ward is under-staffed (as is typically the case in dementia
specific units) and I have been doing more than my fair share of work this evening.
What factors impinge upon my decision to place the interests of the bed ridden
resident ahead of my own desire for a rest? I would suggest only one factor is
instructive and that is - where does my duty lay? It is true that the bedridden
individual may be able to ‘claim’ a variety of rights from me (if only they could speak),
but in the final analysis what generates action on my behalf is my sense of duty, my
sense of what a nurse ‘ought’ to do given the situation that he is confronted with.

Such a state of affairs is not limited to nursing. It applies to the vulnerable in general,
but in the debate about rights and duties the actual contours of the landscape upon
which such scenes are played out are all too often obscured. Consider the rights of
the child. The three month old baby is protected, ostensibly, by a whole range of
rights and freedoms encapsulated within the concept of ‘children’s rights’. These
rights are incorporated within numerous documents at state, federal and even
international level. The fact that this child is a rights bearing agent and as such is
entitled to a special moral regard, a special degree of care and protection, is
emphatically stated even at the level of United Nations legislation. Yet it is clear that
unless those who care for the baby have a well established notion of their own duty,
obligation and moral responsibility, then the life of the baby is precarious indeed. No
matter what rights seek to secure this baby’s survival, the ongoing safety and
security of the infant will only be ensured to the extent that those who care and
protect have a sense of duty. Indeed no matter what rights are held by vulnerable
individuals, in general their effectiveness depends upon the sense of duty held by
others, by those who are charged with care and protection. As Pogge has observed,
human rights without the commitment of significant others who hold a strong sense of
duty are rights in name only.
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rights talk, authenticity and everyday lives

What I am suggesting here is that rights talk, that is simply rights talk without a
correlative emphasis upon duties, lacks authenticity in terms of the moral narratives
that we employ when confronted with everyday social interactions. Of course we
embrace rights talk in much that we do. We employ statements such as ‘you have
no right to….’ or, ‘I have a right to….’, referent to actions, behaviours, entitlements
and so on, yet there is a sense in which such talk has a limited authenticity as a
connection between justificatory remarks, reasons for acting and notions of virtue or
justice that we might all embrace in the course of ordinary lives.

When we act we do so in ways that do not borrow from notions of rights in anything
other than superficial (perhaps strategic) justifications. Thus if asked why I treated
another person in a particular way, I generally do not justify (or explain) my actions
by recourse to rights. I do not say, ‘I stopped to help her change the tyre on her car
because she had a moral right to expect my help’, even if I had said to her before we
set out on our respective journeys, ‘if your car gets a flat tyre I promise I will help
you.’ Such statements are of course formal reasons for enacting rights. Still, when I
see her stranded I do not say, ‘I must help you because I promised and that promise
generated a right and because you hold a right against me I am morally bound to
discharge a correlative duty’. And if I chose not to stop I would never say to myself
(or anyone else for that matter), by way of mitigation, that ‘after all considerations I
could not sustain any argument that could successfully assert that she had any valid
claim to make against me that I should stop to give her aid’. I suspect one would
never actually talk that way at all, let alone think in such terms. If I help I do so
because it is the decent way to act, it is the ‘proper’ thing to do. Even in the unlikely
event that I had never heard rights talk before I would still know that, according to a
reasonable moral sense, I ‘ought’ to stop and help, and even if I had never seen her
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before and we had no prior agreement it would still not be the morally correct thing to
do to go past and leave her stranded. And if I drive by and do not help I may, later,
after suffering a pang of conscience, rebuke myself and say ‘I ought to have helped’
and, ‘I have acted badly’. That is, I would remonstrate with myself in terms of a moral
discourse that owed little or nothing to ‘rights’ and mostly everything to how I ‘ought’
to have acted, with this ought being firmly located in a sense of duty.

The same sort of moral reasoning applies with my previous example of the nurse
who is torn between a desire for a break from his task orientated routine and the
demand to care for the incontinent dementia patient. I suspect that the nurse might
wrestle with his conscience as in, ‘ought I go for a break, or ought I care for the
patient’, but would never say to himself, ‘can this patient claim a right from me’ or, ‘do
I have a right to put my interest in a break ahead of his right to be cared for by me?’
The language is important for it betrays an underlying orientation and that orientation
speaks to a moral discourse that is minimally embedded in rights and primarily
embedded within the moral language of duty. My point is that rights talk is not (or at
least is seldom) authentic. In the most part it does not represent the way that we
carry on a moral discourse in the ongoing narrative of our day to day lives.

self regarding versus other regarding concerns

Part of the reason why rights talk lacks authenticity is that, within the discourse of
everyday lives, it is generally one-dimensional. Rights talk addresses a particular
sort of interest, an interest that is self regarding. We assert our rights, we demand
our rights, we claim our rights, for they reflect our interests, or at least our interests
as we define them. Duties, however, express what we ought to do, where this ‘ought’
is generally reflected outward and impacts upon others and their well being rather
than ours. Indeed to fulfil our duty and to benefit others may require a substantial
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cost on our behalf, a cost that might never be in harmony with any articulation based
upon statements such as ‘it is my right to…’ Duty is other regarding. This is why
notions of duty have traditionally been held in such high esteem within the caring
professions, for these professions ‘…are undeniably other-orientated in their care for
the ill, the vulnerable, and the voiceless [and they] express traditions of duties that
are embedded in particular and substantive visions of the goods intrinsic to
professional practice.’478

Human rights fail the vulnerable then, not simply because the rights paradigm poorly
represents what it means to be human and to be a vulnerable human at that, nor
because the paradigm cannot protect the vulnerable from the sorts of social contexts
in which they find themselves. In a very real sense they fail because the sort of talk
inevitably embraced by rights has to do with the making of claims, and vulnerable
people have a profoundly reduced ability to make claims and to ensure claims
develop into outcomes. Duties, on the other hand, whilst often being correlative to
rights, are nevertheless moral expectations and demands we acknowledge as
placing upon ourselves certain expectations to act, or certain constraints upon acting,
which are directed towards others.

As I suggested in the previous chapter, there is a shift in the moral focus when we
embrace duties talk. In rights talk, rights and duties tend to be correlative but our
focus remains fixed on the right holder. It is her rights, her entitlements, her
desserts, what is owed her that we are concerned with. In such situations we direct
our attention to what the holder of the right is owed and how it will benefit her, and
whilst we acknowledge those who have a duty, it seems our sights are set most
squarely upon the person who has the right. This certainly seems the case with our
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focus on the demented elderly and the chronically mentally ill. Yet as we have found
such people cannot engage their rights. They have numerous rights but still lead
desperate lives. But if we shift our focus to duties, the duties owed by caregivers and
those individuals and institutions [I am reflecting Pogge and Schue here] who have
the responsibility to care for the vulnerable, then we can ask questions such as: ‘what
are my duties’, and ‘what do I owe to those in my care’, and ‘how can I frame these
duties’, and ‘how can I discharge these duties’ and ‘how will I be held accountable for
such acts towards those who have rights?’

Of course having duties does not mean that I will discharge them. But when the
moral spotlight falls upon me and it is revealed that I have failed to do my duty then
concepts of embarrassment and shame and failure and humiliation come into play.
Professionals who care for the vulnerable have duties and the same may be said for
them. That is if they fail their very precise and well defined moral duty to the
vulnerable then they are liable to shame and moral censure. And if those duties are
not simply moral duties but are also moral and legal duties then they can be held
doubly accountable. In such circumstances the costs of failure are not so easy to
ignore. But first of course we need to establish just what those duties consist of.

The obligations and duties we owe to others forms a central theme within morality
and within systems of morality, transcending more than can be encompassed by
notions of rights alone. I think Williams is correct when he says that, ‘in the morality
system, moral obligation is expressed in one especially important kind of deliberative
conclusion – a conclusion that is directed toward what to do governed by moral
reasons and concerned with a particular situation.’479 These questions of ‘what to do’
and ‘how to act’ are central to the way ordinary people live their lives. As Williams
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points out, we are continually confronted with ‘ought’ sorts of questions – referent to
our own ways of behaviour with respect to other persons, with these ‘ought’
questions being generated inside us, sometimes (to be sure) in response to the rights
of others and sometimes simply out of consideration about how one ‘ought’ to
behave. It would be very odd if these sorts of questions only ever arose when
someone else presented us with a right that we were obligated, either legally or
morally, to respond to. It would be very odd indeed if our moral obligations or duties
only ever reflected the rights of others just as it would be very odd indeed if the sum
of ‘the rights of others’ was exactly equal to the sum of moral judgments in general.
In this way notions of duty can be seen as more encompassing. Responding to rights
often but not always. Sometimes standing alone as an invitation to engage (care and
protect) the other.

But those who assert the primacy of rights might still suggest that the reason why we
focus on any notion of care and protection toward the vulnerable is because the
vulnerable are, after all, humans in need of assistance and humans have an intrinsic
right to be regarded as morally deserving, whether or not we acknowledge this in our
use of language. This point of view does not undermine my general argument in this
thesis, that what is needed as far as human rights are concerned is a strong
commitment to a notion of duties or obligations. Human rights, I suggest, can only be
effective protectors of vulnerable people if they are matched by an equally important
and enthusiastic commitment to duties. By themselves they are, as I have outlined,
illusions – the illusion of empowerment for those who are most vulnerable. The way
to ‘operationalise’ rights is to talk about duty.

However, the ‘primacy of rights’ perspective misses the point when it asserts that the
only reason we care and protect is because the vulnerable, as humans, have a right
to be cared for and protected. There are I think many instances when we care and
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protect in the absence of any rights. If a tired and exhausted puppy collapses at my
door do I have a moral obligation to help it? I suspect that I do, at least in the short
term in order to sustain its life and prevent further suffering. Does the puppy have a
moral right to demand from me my assistance? I suspect not. Then if I help why do I
do so? Do I have a moral obligation to care and protect the environment? If I do
then unless we fall into the dubious position that the environment has a right to care
and protection, or the equally suspect position that our duty to the environment is
really because of rights held by future non-existent generations, we must
acknowledge that we often act in ways that go simply beyond the articulation of rights
as a reason for moral action.

ii]

a sense of duty and the moral engagement

O’Neill notes that in general, modern writings on ethics prioritise the recipient’s
perspective over the agent’s. The question is mostly, ‘what are we or what am I
entitled to’, rather than, ‘how should I or how should we, behave’. This position is
usually expanded to embrace what human rights there are and what in particular are
my human rights, but always the focus is ‘on recipience rather than on action, on
rights rather than on obligations’,480 on what one is entitled to rather than a focus on
how one is expected to behave according to notions of justice, or virtue or simply
‘good neighbourliness’. By describing all required actions between people in terms of
rights, one is encouraged to the view that if a person can sustain no claim of right
then another has no required duty. The problem of reducing all moral action to rights
and correlative duties is that, if there is no right that demands we must help another,
and all we have are the rights that people can claim from us, then no-one is actually
obligated to help anyone else beyond the rather narrow assertion of a right. We are
on the path of cold virtue, fulfilling our required obligations to others simply because
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they hold rights against us – but as for those who cannot either identify a right or,
indeed, [and perhaps more importantly] press their claim against us with any
convincing resolve, they are effectively abandoned to their own resources, and for
the vulnerable this may mean a very miserable life indeed.

But helping others is an important virtue and cannot be limited simply to a paradigm
of rights and duties. We do not simply help because another has a right against us.
We often help, indeed I suspect we mostly help, because we are sensitive to notions
of how we ought to behave. This is not to say that others do have a right against us,
but what inspires us to help, I suspect, is not the rights that people have, but the
duties that we may acknowledge or think it good, or appropriate or virtuous to
discharge. If this is so then we are led to a moral dialogue that is embedded within
what we might describe as ‘agent relative values’. In other words, when people
assess the moral oughts of a situation, they mostly act from principles internal to their
own conception of the good as they see it. When people think about the ways to
behave in any given situation I suspect that they think about how they ‘ought’ to
behave, with this ‘ought’ having little or no predication upon ideas of rights, except of
course to diminish someone else’s claim (as in ‘you have no right to do that’) or to
maximise their own claim (as in ‘I have a right…’) and so on. Rather, and for the
most part, thinking about moral action can be thought of as a narrative which is
expressed in terms of ‘what ought I do…’ or, ‘how should I behave…’, referent to any
particular situation that an agent finds herself in. The answers to such narratives
(and thus the ways that agents act) emerge from and reflect the sorts of values that
people have about the type of conduct that is appropriate for them to engage in.

And if the ‘what ought I do’ and ‘how should I behave’ is derived from factors other
than notions of other people’s rights, as I suggest is (mostly) the case, then what can
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we use as a basis to begin thinking about how we ought to act towards the
vulnerable in our midst? What sort of an agent and what sort of moral principles are
those that will secure the best interests of the vulnerable? If human rights (rights as
rights) have failed the vulnerable, how can we best approach issues of care and
protection? In other words, how can we engage notions of duty needed to fulfil the
promise of rights? In the following I want to consider this question. My discussion
will be of necessity tentative: I simply want to suggest certain possible directions that
those who have an interest in the care and protection of the vulnerable might take in
order to maximise their chances of success.

agent relative values

The notion of agent-relative values establishes the context within which discussions
on the relationship between the vulnerable and those charged with their care and
protection may take place. This concept of agent relative values reveals a number of
themes. First, it emphasises the reality that the vulnerable are characterised, to a
greater or lesser extent, by degrees of powerlessness and dependence; that there is
a disparity with respect to the ability to articulate interests and to achieve desired
outcomes between those who are vulnerable and those who are not, and in particular
between the vulnerable and those who stand in regard to them and have a duty or
obligation to care and protect. It is clear that the rights paradigm is of little use to
those who, by virtue of their vulnerability, (their powerlessness and dependence) are
either unable to claim their rights (by reason of their vulnerability), or are prevented
from claiming their rights by forces (circumstances or individuals) beyond their
influence and control. To codify rights for the vulnerable is simply to codify the
illusion of empowerment. The first aspect of agent-relative values, therefore, is to
recognise this disparity in power and options.
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Second, the term agent-relative values recognises that the moral focus needs to be
shifted from those who are vulnerable to those who are, in either a moral or a legal
sense, charged with their care and protection. Rather than emphasising the illusory
rights that vulnerable people may be said to possess, we are required to emphasise
duties and obligations – the duties and obligations of those charged with the care of
vulnerable persons. Whether or not these duties and obligations are the moral or
legal correlates of rights is not our concern. The focus is squarely on the ‘oughts’
attached to caregivers, whoever we take those caregivers to be.

Third, and following on from the above, the demand is to consider what sorts of
values and what sorts of sympathies and sentiments it is appropriate for agents to
have when considering the protection of vulnerable persons. Our attention is
directed toward the carer. When we are thinking of protecting the vulnerable we are
thinking of the person who protects and what sort of values, from a moral and ethical
standpoint, we expect them to embrace. In this way we might be seen to be
responding to the question once put by Socrates of, ‘what sort of a person ought one
be?’ Agent relative values focuses on the agent who does the caring and so, as with
virtue theory in general, its advantage is that it ‘…gives primacy to character in the
sense that it holds that reference to character is essential in a correct account of right
and wrong action.’481 Our focus is on the character of the one who stands in regard
to the vulnerable and has a duty or obligation to care and protect, and so we may
focus on the those character traits amongst carers that we find typically admirable482
and also typically effective in caring for vulnerable people.
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One way of beginning this discussion might be to pose the question of why we might
care for others in the first place? It would seem that the obvious and immediate
answer to this question is that in some fundamental way it is human to do so. This
suggests that caring is antecedent to thinking about caring. Evans suggests that a
moral sense or foundation is crucial or fundamental to certain occupations (doctor,
nurse, pharmacist and so on).

‘If I am to be a good doctor or nurse I must not merely be a loyal employee
and a careful and technically skilled practitioner (for) there is something in the
very nature of the work I am to do and the subsequent relationship with those
whom are the subject matter of my work which has a moral dimension…’483

He writes that, ‘to ignore this dimension…will render one morally culpable and a
positive danger,’ yet I think he overstates the relationship between occupying a
particular role and the degree to which a special moral consideration is to attach to
that role. That is I do not think there is any good reason for thinking that moral
considerations are more important for doctors or nurses than they are for say,
lawyers, truck drivers, financial advisors or travelling salesmen. I suspect that
doctors and nurses have a different sort of moral concern, or perhaps we could say
that the moral concern they do have is expressed in a different way, but to say the
moral imperative is more prominent or important with respect to medical people is to
miss the point. And the point is that to be human is to occupy a moral space. As
David Hume makes clear, the moral and ethical concern that we feel as humans is
located within what we might now days call an instinctual drive. It is embedded
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within ‘…some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the
whole species.’484

Why is there this concern about men’s character, about the moral and ethical
foundations upon which men build their lives? Why do we need to know that men do
care about each other – that at the basis of human action there is a sympathy or
sentiment of caring that takes into account (or displays to some degree at least) a
sensitivity to the way other people are? Part of the reason is because we realise that
if no such urge or instinct was present then human life would be very uncertain and
doubtful. The reason that nature has made moral and ethical concerns such an
integral part of being human is that without it human social life would be non existent.
And whilst we may find ample justification from within the writings of those such as
Kant, Bentham or Rawls of why we ought to help or care for others,485 such argument
itself often seems to be based upon an already pre-existing moral sentiment that
says, ontologically, that even the simplest interactions would become impossible
without such moral sentiment.

In saying this I am agreeing with Noddings who maintains that the fundamental
nature of caring is emotional. Ethical caring, the way in which we confront the other
morally, arises from what she calls ‘natural caring’, an affection or sensitivity that
emerges ‘out of love or natural inclination.’ The act of caring and a concern for
caring is an ideal that begins with human emotion rather than human intellect. We
care because as humans it seems natural to care and be cared for. And what of
those who do not care, who seem in some way to be beyond the ability to care for, or
consider, others on this level of emotional sensitivity? What of those whose
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behaviour reveals ‘…a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights
of others…’; who display ‘…deceit and manipulation … a repetitive and persistent
pattern of behaviour … [characterised by] aggression…destruction of property,
deceitfulness or theft, or serious violation of rules…’ with an accompanying
indifference to the consequences such actions have for their fellows?”486

The description above conforms in part to the ‘diagnostic features’ of someone who
is described, in terms of psychiatric pathology, as suffering from antisocial personality
disorder. Whilst we may recognise such an individual within the confines of
psychiatric nomenclature as occupying a clinical identity, to be confronted with such
a person is to confronted with a real threat to one’s survival. Writes Noddings;

‘one either feels a sort of pain in response to the pain of others, or one does
not feel it. If he does feel it he does not need to be told that causing pain is
wrong…[but] for one who feels nothing…we must prescribe re-education or
exile.’487

Thus there is a degree to which one either cares about others or does not care. In
this way ‘an ethic of caring locates morality primarily in the pre-act consciousness of
the one-caring.’488 And it is upon this ‘pre-act consciousness’, this fundamental
sentiment of caring and regard for others, this basic attentiveness to the ‘oughts’ that
both sustain and scrutinise one’s acts and actions, that we characteristically graft
rationally based principles and judgements of ethics. As Mill said ‘it really is of
importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do
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it.’489 And it is within ‘the manner of men’ that we look for those values and
sentiments that will support and sustain the vulnerable. It is upon certain agent
relative values that we graft principles of action that guide our engagement with those
amongst us who are vulnerable. Our approach to the vulnerable is not a triumph of
sentiment over rationality. What guides our approach to caring for and protecting the
vulnerable is the recognition of ‘sentiment’ or some ‘internal sense or feeling’ as an
appropriate starting point for teasing out the sorts of responses and the sort of values
that we might encourage agents to embrace.

the role of the vulnerable in Christian philosophy

In thinking about our relationship to the vulnerable and particularly with respect to
how we ought to engage them in matters of care and protection, we may begin by
invoking the image of the stranger and the role the stranger plays within Christian
philosophy The basis for this ‘engagement’ has been succinctly described by
Traherne: ‘charity to our neighbour is love expressed towards God in the best of His
creatures.’ Traherne implores us to love our neighbour because our neighbour is, as
are we, made in the image of God, thus we are to consider our neighbour as if he
were ‘the sole individual friend of God…’. In general our neighbours are to be
regarded ‘as high and sacred persons …[as] ambassadors representing His person,
in whom He is injured or obliged.’ This is, writes Traherne, our ‘glorious duty’.490.
Thus our obligations to our neighbours are based upon wider obligations that we hold
to the Divine, and based also upon the fact that we are each one of us His creatures.
The rationale for reflecting upon a Christian account of our relationships to the
vulnerable stems not simply from the importance Christianity philosophy (as opposed
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to religion or dogma)491 plays within the Western intellectual tradition, but also in its
direct focus on relationships between people. The Christian tradition is firmly centred
in a world where relationships between people are paramount and reflective of a
narrative embedded within everyday lives. Often these relationships are part of a
wider aspect – between the individual and God for example – but there is an attitude
of Christian virtue that directs itself to real lives in a real world, rather than
disembodied lives abstracted (as it were) from their social reality. The approach that
Christian philosophy adopts toward the way we ought to regard the vulnerable in our
midst is based not in notions of the rights that people hold, but in the duties and
obligations that we owe to each other – in fact by which we are bound to the other.
These duties or obligations are themselves derivative of wider duties and obligations
that we owe the Divine. Crucial to the Christian approach is the idea that we are all
neighbours, that human life is expressed in its connections and commitments
[interdependence rather than independence] between peoples of seemingly
disparate and diverse backgrounds, and that divisions which portray people as
strangers or aliens or as ‘others’ are illusory and artificial.

The Biblical texts make much of the idea of all persons having equal moral value and
thus as deserving of equal moral treatment – an idea much later developed by
human rights theorists. ‘When an alien lives with you in your land, do not mistreat
him. The alien living with you must be treated as one of your native-born.’[Lev.
19:33]492 And the Bible reminds the Hebrew people that they were once aliens and
outcasts and as God treated them with compassion and ensured their care and
protection so they must act in like fashion. ‘Love him [the alien] as yourself for you
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were aliens in Egypt. I am the Lord your God.’[Lev. 19:34] And again: ‘Do not
oppress an alien; you yourselves know how it feels to be aliens, because you were
aliens in Egypt.’[Ex. 23:9] This moral equality of Jew and alien is established by
God’s concern for both. ‘The Lord watches over the alien and sustains the fatherless
and the widow,’[Ps. 146:9] and so the alien may be the poor or the oppressed or the
vulnerable in their many presentations, nevertheless the entreaty is the same. One
owes a compassion, a degree of care and protection in a positive sense of taking
responsibility for others less able to care for themselves: ‘Do not go over your
vineyard a second time, or pick up the grapes that have fallen. Leave them for the
poor and the alien. I am the Lord your God.’[Lev. 19:9] And this concern represents
not just a moral equality but, and from that, a civil equality. ‘You are to have the
same law for the alien and the native born: Laws apply to all equally.’[Lev. 24:22]

Throughout the texts the same theme is emphasised. The old divisions that saw
people separated into groups or tribes that were distant and distinct are artificial.
Within God’s kingdom such divisions have been broken down. As Paul made clear
to the Galatians, Christ died for all and so the barriers between people have been
obliterated: ‘there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you
are all one in Christ Jesus.’[Gal.3:28] And to treat the vulnerable with care and
protection is to treat Jesus in the same way. To reject the vulnerable, to ignore them
or pass them by is to do the same to Jesus. To deny the vulnerable is to deny
oneself. This is powerfully put in the parable of the sheep and goats where the
entreaty is our responsibility to care for the vulnerable in our midst, and in so doing it
is to discharge our moral responsibility to the Divine. Only those who act with
compassion toward the vulnerable will attain eternal life.

‘For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you
gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in, I needed
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clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in
prison and you came to visit me.’[Matt. 25:35-36]

As Jesus makes clear, ‘I tell you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least of
these brothers of mine, you did for me.’ [Matt. 25:40] In this portrait of the overriding
obligation and moral responsibility to those in need, as Tubbs suggests, the stranger
or the vulnerable may be regarded as the Son of Man himself.493

The most powerful image of Christian responsibility to the vulnerable in our midst is
undoubtedly the parable of the Good Samaritan. When Jesus is confronted by one
who asks him how to ensure eternal life, Jesus responds by posing the question,
‘what is written in the law?’ The answer is given: ‘Love the Lord your God with all
your heart…and, Love your neighbour as yourself.’ The response is undoubtedly in
harmony with teachings but nevertheless another question is put to Jesus. ‘And who
is my neighbour?’[Luke.10:25-29] The response to this is the story of the man who,
whilst travelling from Jerusalem to Jericho, was set upon by robbers and left for
dead. Ignored by priest and Levite, help came in the form of a Samaritan who not
only cared for the man but also took him to an inn and paid for his lodgings until he
was fully recovered.[Luke. 10:30-37]

The background to appreciating the moral impact to this story is the social, political,
religious and ethnic distance that traditionally existed between Jew and Samaritan,
with the former regarding the latter as being polluted or ‘unclean’. There is surely no
greater distance between peoples than the distance that is built upon some notion of
cultural pollution. The alien in this case is more than just a stranger in a strange
land, he is a vile thing, an outcast, one to be hated, shunned and rejected. Yet even
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here, indeed especially here, Jesus demands that we call such people our brothers
and love them as we love ourselves and as we love God. 494 The connection we
have to each other is a powerful reinforcement of the connection we have to God. It
is a connection based upon Divine love: ‘This is the message you heard from the
beginning; We should love one another’ [1 John 3:11]. But above all it is a
connection that is engaged by action. As John says ‘…let us not love with words or
tongue but with actions and in truth.’[1 John 3:18] Thus not only are the distinctions
between ourselves and these others, whether Samaritan, or alien or vulnerable,
broken down, so that we are to regard them with the same moral courtesy that we
justly demand for ourselves, but also this is a programme that calls upon the agent to
reflect upon her actions. In this way the Christian approach is based not upon any
notion of prior rights and derivative duties, but on an essential sense of moral
equivalence with this equivalence being based upon a recognition of the proximate
engagement between persons of equal moral worth. This is a program of action,
action based upon reflection, to be sure, but in the final analysis it is action that
counts.

The Biblical story of the Good Samaritan suggests, that moral responsibility always
presupposes some kind of social proximity. ’To be a neighbour one has to become
involved, one has to become ‘actively and voluntarily familiar’ with the alien, with the
vulnerable, with the ‘other’. The source behind this involvement may be Divine
command, but this Divine command may itself reflect the wisdom that, (as with
Nodings’ comments previously), ‘…we want to be recognised and valued as persons,
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as social beings, as members of humanity in general.’495 Thus the reason we care
for the vulnerable is not sustained by nor justified by their ‘rights’, human or
otherwise, but on a shared and common humanity expressed either as the will of the
Divine, or the shared emotional connection ‘an affection or sensitivity’ (natural caring)
inspired by the nature of what it means to be human.

This idea of the stranger, or alien, or other calls us to acknowledge the French
Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Writing in Totality and Infinity Levinas
observes Western philosophy’s preoccupation with Being and asks us to think
beyond the narrow confines of a world defined by Being and Other. The Other, for
Levinas, is that which is not us. It is transcendent, external and infinite. The voice of
the Other is not our voice and cannot be reduced to what we assume or know or
think. Levinas writes of ‘the strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my
thoughts and my possession….’496 Levinas critics Western philosophy as tending to
describe ethics as a set of propositions where Being and Other are reduced to Same,
but in his work the Other is given an existence, a reality and a voice. It is in our
encounter with the Other and our recognition of the Other as valid beyond ourselves,
that genuine freedom, grounded in responsibility and obligation, is obtained.497

Reflecting Levinas, Lyotard addresses this idea of a voice and the humanising aspect
of interlocution. The example is concrete but the implications are profound. He
observes that the oppressed do not have a voice and in being denied a voice they
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are denied dialogue, and denied dialogue they are denied experience and ultimately
existence. Writing on the Nazi death camps he says:

‘They were not spoken to, they were treated. They were not enemies. The
SS or Kapos who called them dogs, pigs, or vermin did not treat them as
animals but as refuse. It is the destiny of refuse to be incinerated. The ordeal
of being forgotten is unforgettable. It reveals a truth about our relationships to
language that is stifled and repressed by the serene belief in dialogue.
Abjection is not merely when we are missing from speech, but when we lack
language to excess….Excluded from the speech community, the camp
victims were rejected into the poverty, the misery of this secret.’498

The Other, the alien, the stranger represents an invitation and an opportunity to
dialogue. It is to tell their story. But if they have no voice they have effectively no
story. The implication for our approach to the vulnerable is clear. Whether as
parents of young children, or as nurses or doctors, or social workers or psychiatrists,
or bureaucrats or politicians, or indeed as anyone who cares for the vulnerable, we
are called upon to respond in a manner that recognises a common moral
equivalence yet a different moral existence. We are charged with treating the
vulnerable in a manner that we too would want to be treated if we too were
vulnerable. What duties we have to the vulnerable are reflective not of their rights
but of the necessities of our own moral engagement. And this is based upon their
existence and their life story.
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Aristotle, the agent and virtue theory

As with Christian theology, Aristotle’s virtue theory emphasises the nature or
character of the agent as one who acts and acts for reasons that are morally valid. I
am here not providing a detailed defence of virtue theory. In discussing Aristotle I
simply want to reflect on those aspects of the theory that may provide a basis for
justifying our care and protection of the vulnerable, beyond any attachment to the
flawed notion of the rights the vulnerable may (or may not) be said to possess. Of
course Christians also act for reasons that are morally valid, even if the determination
of moral validity appears to lay in adherence to a set of prescriptions that lie outside
the agent. That is, the agent acts morally to the extent that she adheres to Divine
command, or to be more precise, her interpretation of Divine command (which may
or may not be the same thing). Within virtue ethics the agent acts morally when she
acts in a way that is consistent with what it means to be virtuous.

To be virtuous is assumed by Aristotle to be so within the confines of the social
world. Like Christian philosophy, and unlike the contract theorists – particularly
Rawls - Aristotle’s virtue ethics is grounded in the reality of the social engagement.
Like Christianity this is the micro-narrative of everyday lives. The emphasis in virtue
ethics is on ‘…the cultivation of those virtues which presupposes that I am closely
interacting with, and dependent upon, my fellow men…’ In other words ‘man…is
defined as a social being, and most of the fulfilment of which he is capable requires
the cultivation of harmonious patterns of thought and feeling which enable him to
enter into rewarding civic and personal relationships.’499 And so the virtues assumes
those character traits that enables one to engage others on a level that facilitates the
development of humanly flourishing lives, whether this is the life of the individual or
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the lives of others.500 In both virtue theory and the Christian texts, primacy is given
not so much to actions or outcomes (although both are important), but to the
character of the person who is acting, and this applies no matter what particular
conception of virtue theory one might embrace.501

We ought not make too much of the dichotomy between actor and actions. Virtue
ethics focuses upon ‘agents’ rather than ‘actions’, but one cannot easily separate the
two. Agents produce actions and agents are assessed on the basis of the actions
they engage in. Virtue ethics does not consider character in isolation from its
manifestations. The emphasis is upon a virtuous character so that virtuous acts may
flow. ‘In the end, a comprehensive account of the good life must consider both
character and personal achievement, our selves and our creations.’502 But what
constitutes the virtues? Aristotle describes a virtue as ‘…a deliberative and
permanent disposition, based on a standard applied to ourselves and defined by the
reason displayed by a man of good sense.’503 The emphasis is upon one who, with
rational reflection, adopts a particular behavioural repertoire designed to maximise
the good. This repertoire consists of certain qualities which are in and of themselves
conducive to the good, with this ‘good’ being explained in terms of human flourishing.
The emphasis upon rational reflection is important for virtue is arrived at only by
education and training. This is the contemplative life: ‘perfect happiness is a
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contemplative activity’ Aristotle wrote.504 That is, ‘none of the moral virtues arises in
us by nature…rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made
perfect by habit.’ 505 The virtuous person is one who acts rationally and reflectively
and who perfects and internalises the sorts of actions which have as their aim human
excellence and flourishing – his own and those of his fellows.

But what does the behavioural repertoire of the virtuous person consist of? What
virtues are embraced by the virtuous person? Virtue theory, in opposition to relativist
theory in general, holds that some ways of living are (always and everywhere)
preferable to some other ways: that courage is preferred to cowardice, sensitivity to
brutality, compassion to indifference, tolerance to bigotry, kindness to viciousness,
knowledge and wisdom to ignorance, and a sense of trust to enmity. Virtue reminds
us that reaching out one’s hand to the vulnerable is preferable to stepping over them
and continuing on in casual disregard. We embrace these virtues because reason
dictates that we do so. They facilitate the Aristotelian notion of arête or excellence,
which enables us to develop our inborn capacities and achieve a life of eudaimonia
or happiness.

On the face of it this position is certainly in harmony with the sorts of moral and
ethical values we try to bring about in our children, and in harmony too with the sorts
of people we hope our children will become. In their formative years we teach the
young how to behave in general terms; we teach them what constitutes being ‘a good
girl’ and ‘a good boy’, where ethically appropriate action is most often couched in
terms of ‘oughts’. We teach them notions of goodness (Aristotelian virtue or
Christian charity), the inculcation of certain habits, sensitivities, perspectives and
moral orientations which are themselves often framed in notions of duties. My duty
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to my siblings, to my parents, my family, my school and my society – not rights, for
rights will (and must) come later. We acknowledge rights as secondary and
doubtless would recoil in horror at a child well versed in his rights but without any
moral sensitivity grounded in the oughts of his duties. And why this emphasis on
duties and a secondary (derivative) focus on rights? The answer, as both Christ and
Aristotle knew well, is that before we can assert ourselves we must engage the other.
Before being independent (or rather interdependent – for independence is surely a
myth) we are dependent.

It may be then that this emphasis on duties and obligations is conducive to species
survival, after all if a parent felt no moral obligation to care the child would surely die.
Further, human social life itself may demand a certain suppression of one’s own
interests [self interest being the business of rights] in order to engage the other on a
level that facilitates the continuance of community. Such engagement recognises
first; that a society built solely on rights runs the risk of descending into the
Hobbesian state of nature where ‘to have all, and to do all is lawfull for all’, with life as
a result being ‘…nasty, brutish and short’; and second, that whilst rights are a key
element of liberal democracy, nevertheless for those who cannot articulate, or
demand, or claim their rights, life can often be very bleak indeed – especially with no
counterbalancing strong commitment to duties.

But also within Aristotle’s notion of virtue we recognise that there are some values
that appear to lie at the heart of what it means to be human. This does not mean that
there is only one way to live a human life. Virtue theory is not incompatible with
pluralism. In any given historical epoch there are many ways to express one’s
humanity. Indeed, what Aristotle is maintaining is that there is ‘…a single objective
account of the human good, or human flourishing…’ that transcends cultural or
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traditional location.506 This raises obvious points of debate.507 Still, I agree with
Sher, that within the normal course of a human life, with all its variations and
possibilities, with all its twists and turns and choices and paths eventually chosen,
there are some beliefs and values (virtues) that sustain and encourage flourishing.
As he points out, ‘…justice, courage, and honesty are crucial to our ability to
participate in practices as diverse as painting, football, and the study of physics…’ for
they link into personal qualities and attributes that facilitate human knowledge and
development on a variety of diverse levels. And we may reasonably assert that
whilst there are certain biological urges that transcend history and culture may there
not be values as well? Are there really any societies that value dishonesty, hatred,
murder, incest, a lack of respect or compassion for others; that value cowardice,
enmity and distrust and promise breaking? Of course this is straying from my brief,
for my concern is only how we engage the vulnerable and seek their protection and
this inherently implies that we will be naturally predisposed in any case toward values
that we might identify as virtues.

We might also add, of course, that there is a degree to which notions of rights
themselves appear suspiciously close to pre-existing notions of virtue. That is, rights
to justice, fair treatment, equality, respect and dignity and the like, are surely a
reflection that to act justly, fairly and to treat others as moral and political equals are
sentiments (virtues?) that one ought reasonably embrace. And so it is within the
context of the numerous face-to-face interactions that humans are engaged in within
the course of the lives they share with others that it is possible for the virtues to be
both revealed and perfected:
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‘for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are
produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the
rest; men will be good and bad builders as a result of building well or
badly…This then is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we
do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust.’508

The virtuous person, in either the Christian or the Aristotelian sense, is revealed in
the course of the acts she engages in, within the course of the everyday life she
lives.

It is true that virtue theory has been the subject of much criticism, not the least being
that it is charged with being too vague to be able to instruct us as to how we ought to
act in any particular given situation.509 We may all agree that we ought to act
‘virtuously’, but precisely what does this mean with respect to the variety of often
confusing and contradictory situations that agents regularly find themselves in? Like
virtue theory Christian theology is open to the same charge. Moral action may be
obedience to Divine Command but how do we know precisely what Divine Command
entails? These are relevant criticisms, still similar problems envelop rights-based
theories. We may all agree that we ought to respect another’s ‘human rights’, but
when there are conflicts between rights whose rights ‘trump’, and what about the
endless debates about what social and political goods are rights, and what of
situations where rights abound but injustice endures – I am thinking here of the rights
of the child, of refugees, of the mentally ill, of the disabled, of the frail aged in nursing
homes? All these groups have rights, both generic and specific, yet injustice
prevails.
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The question thus emerges. How can we ensure that duties can effectively engage
rights and thus ensure the care and protection of vulnerable people? How do we get
relevant agents both to recognise and to assume their caring obligations as the
reciprocal of the rights of the vulnerable? The difficulty is, how do we induce those
who care for the vulnerable, as citizens of a secular democracy, to accept either
virtue ethics or a Christian understanding of the calling to care for the vulnerable? It
is this I want to address in the final part of this chapter.

iii]

duty, vulnerable people and the practical response

The difficulties of engaging duties are that to try and describe a world where our
approach to the vulnerable is based upon an ethos of duty, rather than an ethos of
rights, is to endeavour to describe a world that does not exist, or exists only in an
embryonic state. Yet we are called upon to at least challenge the prevailing rights
based paradigm, for as is clear, and for reasons I have outlined in the preceding
pages, this rights based paradigm, as it currently stands, has all too often failed the
vulnerable and in particular it has failed those whose vulnerability is extreme.

A narrative of duties and obligations presents a different aspect from one based upon
rights. The term ‘narrative’ refers to the meanings and explanations we give to the
ways we act, the sustaining assumptions which provide the foundation upon which
we base our lives with respect to our personal decision making and with respect also
to the way we structure our institutions. From this comes an understanding of the
choices we embrace, the sorts of people we are, and the many and varied situations
we find ourselves in, in both a personal and a wider social context. Some cultural
narratives we take for granted and are so ingrained within our psyche that we regard
them as axiomatically valid. For example narratives such as ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’,
‘liberty’ or ‘tolerance’ (however defined), provide the unquestioned norms which
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direct the ongoing ‘conversation’ of our cultural life.510 The narrative of individual
rights, and in particular individual human rights, is another that we regard as
axiomatically valid. We tend not to question the prevailing emphasis. We tend to
assume that it is inherently valid, and the assumptions about people that it
incorporates into its world view we again tend to regard as an accurate reflection of
both the world in which we live and the relationships between the various actors in
that world. Yet as I have argued in this thesis many of these assumptions are quite
wrong.

Yet changing narratives is a challenging task. Pogge for example argues that the
task is to humanise institutions to make them sensitive to the needs and interests of
ordinary people. He identifies a need for a vigilant citizenry that is deeply committed
to the idea of rights and is thus disposed to work for their political realisation. The
same criticism could be directed at Pogge. But how does this come about? I think
Pogge’s solution reflects part of the answer. It is based upon the recognition that
narratives do not arise beyond any human input, involvement or influence. We are
not passive bystanders in the emergence of the narrative. And whilst it is clear that
narratives are often particularly resistant to change,511 it is also clear that they can
and do change and they can change quite rapidly and dramatically.512 Previous
moral narratives, as Finnis and Haakonssen have pointed out, presented notions of
rights and duties as inexorably linked to wider notions of virtue, justice and man’s
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‘place’ in the social network. Earlier narratives made no mention of rights yet
emphasised duties and obligations as foundations for a moral order.513 The point
surely is not simply that narratives can and do change, but also that we can change
them – or at the very least we can influence them.

Thus a narrative of duties and obligations begins with a reflective examination of the
sorts of reasons and values that agents have for acting. Ethical conduct is after all
based upon ethical standards. But the reasons and values that support our actions
are themselves based upon a recognition that central to our professional life, that is
our life as doctors, psychiatrists, nurses, administrators and bureaucrats, is our
concern for the other, the vulnerable, and the particular obligations we owe the other.
The other is both a moral being who is in need of care and protection, and is one
whom we have promised to care for and protect by virtue of the fact of the special
relationship we have to them. There is also the acknowledgement of certain
personal attributes that we must embrace in order to maximise the best interests of
the other, but crucially there is the realisation that the other is not distinct or separate
from us, rather that we all are in some ways different aspects of the other. The
linkages here to virtue ethics and Christian charity are clear. Narrative change thus
begins with a change of culture and that change begins at the level of personal
involvement.

Such a narrative is given voice and authenticity by the expression of both law and
social policy which inevitably helps to reinforce and sustain certain reasons and
beliefs. Practice must inevitably follow theory, but practice also guides theory. That
is, not simply does a narrative begin with the personal commitment of individuals, but
it is reinforced and sustained by the attitude of professional groups and bodies and
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also at the level of public policy. Pogge and indeed Schue are correct to see
narratives as guided by a democratic citizenry committed to change but the
relationship between democratic citizenry and democratic institutions is an
interdependent one. Governments guide social policy as well as being sensitive to
changes and shifts in the values and ideals of a concerned public. Professional
bodies influence public policy. And it would be wrong to assume that all professional
bodies are uniformly cynical in their aims and ambitions. It is natural that
professional bodies seek their advancement but ‘the caring professions’, as they are
so called, are ultimately populated by people who choose to care as a career choice.
Their ability and potential for social change is great. I suspect that what has been
missing is a cultural anchorage. We have tended to be suspicious of deeply held
beliefs as a form of cultural relativism has pervaded our civic life. Yet the caring
profession, certainly of medicine and nursing, are steeped in values that propose self
denial and community service. Perhaps these values need to be re-examined in the
life of these relevant professions.

From the perspective of social policy we can be precise about the duties that we see
as engaging the rights that the vulnerable have. For example, and with respect to
the mentally ill, we may establish rigid guidelines for spending on mental heath
research; in identifying a level per capita spending in mental health care that matches
other developed countries; outline the number of acute and non-acute beds required
per 100,000 of the general population; establish quantitatively identifiable standards
for clinical care within individual mental health establishments (such as staffing
levels, the number of psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses on duty) and indeed
through the whole range of mental health areas, for the aged, adolescents,
Aborigines, migrants and so on.
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With respect to the frail aged and those generally within residential aged care
facilities, we can make similar rigid guidelines the legal and moral norms for
government, the owners of facilities and those workers (clinical specialists, allied
health workers and general carers) who are employed to care and protect. Again
such guidelines would address staffing levels, the numbers of residents per room,
levels of clinical medical care and psychological supports, cultural (religious and
ethnic) sensitivities, access to the expertise of social workers, dieticians,
occupational therapists and so on. The way to change a cultural narrative may begin
with legal requirements that people discharge their duties in certain ways.

The intention in my comments above is to give structure to the underlying ethical
stance. Virtue theory and Christian charity give a focus on the values of the agent as
well as placing the other at the centre of the agent’s concerns. They provide a moral
spotlight which asks agents to account for their actions. The practical aspect of this
position is to incorporate within the work that we do as health care professionals a
moral and legal imperative that sees us structure our professional lives according to
the welfare of the vulnerable. But such a position is not without apparent problems.
A criticism of this approach would almost certainly be that it is economically
unsustainable. This may be the rationale that government has for its reluctance to
enforce codes of conduct and practice within the aged care industry. In particular the
Australian federal government has tended to distance itself from proactive
involvement to secure the well being of the aged, content to leave this well being as
an outcome of negotiation between owners and proprietors on the one hand and
residents on the other.514 Yet as I have made clear within this thesis, residents in
aged care facilities (and their families) are amongst the most vulnerable (powerless)
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in our community. The idea that they can sit at the table with the owners and
proprietors of facilities and resolve differences is absurd.515

But can economic imperatives intrude into the relationship we have with the
vulnerable? On the surface this does appear plausible. But if human rights are
‘trumps’ then they cannot be trumped by economics, and if they are trumped by
economic issues they are not ‘trumps’ in the first place. Whilst the government has
made much of the linking of reforms in both aged care and psychiatry to human
rights principles, it is already clear that the federal government has a rather
unconventional view of what exactly constitutes human rights. Waldron has pointed
out that the economic argument is one that governments often employ simply to
justify inaction, considering it either impolitic to raise taxes to pay for genuine reforms
or, and perhaps more importantly, to direct funds away from powerful interest groups
who may have the ability to generate electoral damage.516 This reinforces previous
comments about rights and rationality. That is, the human rights paradigm tends to
benefit those groups and individuals who are described in terms of a rational,
assertive capacity, who are able to identify their interests and powerfully assert them
and who are able to deliver costs to those who ignore their responsibilities. But for
those groups and individuals who are not so described; who are not organised, who
are powerless, who do not have access to political lobbyists or access to a
sympathetic media and who cannot deliver electoral damage if their interests are not
satisfied – that is, in particular, those who are profoundly vulnerable – the concept of
‘human rights’ is often of little use.517 At the very least this tells us that as far as the
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most vulnerable amongst us, it is time to change the narrative. And the changing of
the narrative, that is, the realisation that only by embracing duties and obligations,
can human rights fulfil their true potential, begins with personal change at the level of
individual action – whether the individual is citizen, health care professional,
administrator or bureaucrat. To ignore this reality is to condemn the most vulnerable
among us to remain abandoned, excluded and voiceless.
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Conclusion:

In this thesis I have argued that the way to engage the human rights that all
individuals have is by a commitment, on behalf of caregivers, to duties and
obligations. My special interest in this work has been our relationship to vulnerable
people. As metaphors for the vulnerable I have focussed on the aged with dementia
and the chronically mentally ill. In recent years in Australia we have increasingly
viewed these individuals through the prism of the rights yet, as I have shown in the
preceding pages, we have repeatedly failed to ensure the well being of such people.
That is, although such groups and individuals have been awarded the protection of a
whole variety of rights, their lives often appear to remain uniformly bleak and to fall
short of standards of well-being that we might regard as acceptable in a developed
and affluent liberal democracy. The reason this state of affairs exists is, as I have
suggested, because within the rights debate we have failed to provide an adequate
focus upon notions of duty and obligation that we, as caregivers, are required to
embrace in order to ensure that rights are realised. To emphasise rights and ignore
duties is to render rights meaningless. The way to engage rights for the vulnerable is
to focus upon our duties. We have neglected duties. Often we have made them
optional. In this way we have failed the vulnerable.

It may be argued that the approach I propose (engaging rights by emphasising
duties) still does not solve the problem of how you are actually instrumental in getting
people to act in this way, that is, to act out of a consideration of their duties.
However this ‘yes….but’ objection is unfair. It can apply to any writer and any
position. We may all agree that Schue and Pogge and Levinas or even Nussbaum
and Sen offer powerful arguments for treating people fairly and with a dignity, respect
and justice that protects them and ensures their well being, but we still have the
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‘yes….but’ issue. How do you actually ensure that in the everyday engagements of
everyday people, the actions acted and the behaviours embraced realise the care
and protection of the weak and the vulnerable? Rawls of course escapes such a
dilemma. In his approach to human rights, he proposes a ‘politically neutral’518 view
of the individual and individual action that does not depend ‘on any particular
comprehensive moral doctrine or philosophical conception of human nature…’.519
Rawls, instead, asserts a theory that might be regarded as a rational and logical
means for establishing a just and fair society. It is a template for the establishing of
such a society. This is both Rawls’ power and at the same time his failure. As
Levinas might say, in order to address the issue of the vulnerable we must first hear
their voice. In Rawls the voice of no-one is heard.

So if the above is fair comment then why is my approach any different? The answer,
as I have outlined in the preceding pages, has to do with the shift in focus. By
emphasising duties we focus not on the right holder, but on the bearer of duties. In
this way it seems that the rights debate often misses its mark, and not simply
because human rights are mostly negotiated social and political outcomes between
actors at (in particular) the level of international politics. Importantly, human rights
addresses the voiceless, the powerless and the vulnerable and ignores the major
players – the ones whose acts and actions impact upon the vulnerable. Rights talk
addresses the mentally ill and not the psychiatrist. It addresses the child and not the
parent. It addresses the frail aged in nursing homes and not the owner of the facility,
or the nurse, or the general practitioner, or the aged care bureaucrat, or the politician.
We need to shift our focus: our moral focus, our political focus and our legal focus to
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hold those who have duties to account both for what they do and for what they fail to
do.

It is true that we can legislate to guarantee certain benefits for the mentally ill and the
aged. We can ensure that respective wards are adequately staffed, that dementia
specific units are staffed by specialists in the area of dementia care, that the mentally
ill in prisons have access to adequate standards of psychiatric help, that all mentally
ill in crisis have access to 24 hour crisis intervention, that those with challenging
behaviours secondary to dementia are not placed in the same facilities (and often the
same rooms) as those who are simply frail and aged. The list is seemingly endless.
We can also legislate for tolerance, humanity, acceptance and compassion but
something more is required to enable us to effectively care for and protect the
vulnerable. That ‘something more’, I have suggested, is a commitment to duty and
obligation grounded in, for example, virtue ethics and Christian theology – and that
cannot be legislated for. It must be freely acknowledged and embraced by each
concerned agent.

But why virtue ethics and Christian theology? The answer is that particularly in these
approaches the locus of concern is with the agent who acts. As Kapp has pointed
out, within the health and social service sphere, those areas where we typically
encounter the vulnerable, it is a rights culture that is particularly pervasive. But this
rights culture, whilst implying correlative duties, still largely ignores the terms and
conditions of these duties. We need an approaches that speaks directly to those
who act. My argument is that to ensure this rights culture delivers the benefits it
promises, we need to balance it with a duties culture. Certainly duties form an
essential part of Christian philosophy. They are also implied within Aristotle’s virtue
ethics and I assert that these two approaches to ethical life are closely connected
with the morality we embrace within everyday lives. Within everyday lives we make
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moral judgements about how people act, not so much about what others are entitled
to expect. On what can we base a culture of duties? As Pogge has made clear, the
way to enshrine and protect rights within our society and its institutions is by ordinary
people embracing a commitment to duties and thus, and by extension, influencing
government. Pogge’s argument is powerful and engaging. In the final chapter of this
thesis I have tried to develop this aspect of Pogge’s thought and anchor it to a reality
that ordinary people might connect with and employ on a personal level.

How can we ensure the success of our project? The answer is that we cannot. But
then no approach can. However by focusing our attentions on the duties that those
individuals who engage the vulnerable have, and by calling agents into account for
their actions, then at least we can encourage an awareness of what we do and why
we do it. Both virtue ethics and Christian charity have the agent who acts as the
centre of their world. At the heart of these two views of moral action is the
engagement of other people and the sorts of personal values that one might embrace
in order to fulfil that engagement. At the heart of these philosophies is the keenly
heard voice of the other. There is a liberating capacity within their approach. To
engage the other is in some way to fulfil the promise of a more developed notion of
what it means to be an moral agent oneself.

This thesis then has sought to critically inquire into human right discourse. The
ultimate aim has been to infuse such discourse with a strong concept of duty and
particularly so in reference to those who are especially vulnerable. These
individuals, like all humans in general, do of course possess fundamental and
inalienable rights, human rights if you will, but the paradox is that without a strong
concept of duty to operationalise them, such human rights are largely irrelevant. The
paradox of rights, either legal or moral or, as one form of moral rights – human rights
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- is that such rights can only be made relevant by a focus on duty. It is to this end
that this thesis has been directed.
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